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Abstract
The increased reliance on networked technologies has led to a digital transformation
of general- and special-purpose networks that further interlace technologies and
heterogeneous systems. The ever-evolving technological landscape of interconnected
devices constantly expands the network attack surface, which has contributed to the
number and complexity of cyber attacks in recent years. The analysis of network traffic
through Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) has become an essential element of the
networking security toolset. To cope with the increased rate and complexity of cyber
attacks, researchers have utilised Machine Learning (ML) and Deep Learning (DL)
techniques to develop IDS to cope with new and zero-day attacks. However, the lack
of large, realistic, and up-to-date datasets hinders the IDS development process.
This thesis proposes an empirical investigation of ML and DL algorithms to detect
known and unknown attacks in general- and special-purpose networks. The thesis
further investigates how ML and DL algorithms can learn from a limited amount of
data while retaining high accuracy. To this effect, a special-purpose IoT dataset is
generated and evaluated against six ML techniques. The challenges and limitations
of identifying anomalies in special-purpose networks are identified and discussed.
In an attempt to reduce the need for large training datasets, this thesis investigates
the utilisation of Few-Shot learning paradigm to train IDS using a limited amount of
data. For this purpose, Siamese networks are used and evaluated in three scenarios.
This thesis further investigates the use of autoencoders to detect zero-day attacks.
The zero-day attack detection experiments highlight the problem of discriminating
benign-mimicking attacks. To overcome this challenge, an additional layer of feature
abstraction is proposed; to improve accuracy through the cumulative aggregation of
network traffic.
The results of this research demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed
approaches for IDS development. Siamese networks demonstrate their ability to
learn from limited data. The proposed autoencoder models exhibit their potential
to detect zero-day attacks. Finally, the significance of flow aggregation features in
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Cybersecurity is defined as the field concerned with “the protection of networks, data,
and systems in the cyberspace” [1]. It is the virtual space “resulting from the interaction
of people, software and services on the Internet by means of technology devices and
networks connected to it” [2]. An essential component of system and network security
is achieved by Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). IDS monitor networks or systems
for malicious activity or violations, and trigger alerts when a suspicious activity
is detected [3]. IDS development progressed through different stages. These stages
developed side by side with the increasing dependence on devices and automation,
and the significant development of Machine Learning (ML) and Deep Learning (DL)
techniques [4]. DL is defined as a class of neural networks that uses multiple layers
to extract higher-level features allowing the modelling of complex problems [5].
Aldweesh et al. in their research highlight the need for “developing advanced Intrusion
Detection Systems” to cope with the evolution of networks [6].
Based on Cisco’s Annual Internet Report (2018-2023) [7], it is expected that an
individual will have 3.6 networked devices on average in 2023 compared to 2.4 in
1
2018. This will result in a total of 29.3 billion networked devices. The report further
discusses that attacks have grown by 776% between 100 Gbps and 400 Gbps from
2018 to 2019 and will continue to grow over the next years. With this growth of attack
surface and the complexity of new attacks, current IDS however fall short of detecting
new and unknown attacks.
Following the exponential rise in the number of cyber attacks and their increased
complexity [8], different ML techniques were introduced to perform cyber attacks
detection and classification tasks. While detection is concerned with identifying the
occurrence of an attack, once detected, classification attempts to assign a label to
it based on known attack classes (i.e., categorisation) [9]. Furthermore, researchers
benefited from the ML advancement to develop IDS. ML techniques prove their
appropriateness to build IDS, however, most of these techniques require large
datasets for training and fail to flag cyber attacks that mimic benign traffic in an
attempt to bypass detection mechanisms. Moreover, succeeding to the evolution of
special-purpose networks, general-purpose IDS were rendered inadequate to provide
detection for these networks.
Current IDS research suffers from, but not limited to, the following:
• General-purpose network IDS do not provide the security needs for
special-purpose networks due to their different requirements and setup [10].
• IDS models training is timely and requires large up-to-date datasets which are
difficult to obtain [11].
• Cyber attacks emerge at an exponential rate [8], therefore, by the time IDS are
retrained to include new cyber attacks, more attacks may have been introduced.
Based on the limitations of current IDS research, the development of the next
generation IDS is necessary, which can provide better detection capabilities. To this
end, the work presented in this thesis aims to explore the utilisation of ML and DL
techniques to develop the next generation IDS.
2
1.2 Research Objectives
IDS development evolved from signature-base to using ML techniques as cyber
attacks became more complex [12]. Furthermore, the significant advancement of ML
techniques benefits all research domains, which includes cybersecurity [4].
This thesis explores the suitability of using non-conventional ML and DL
techniques to build the next generation of IDS. It is important to mention that, based on
the literature review and the analysis of the past decade IDS [4, 13], non-conventional
techniques are ones that have not been previously used for IDS development. The goal
is to build models that can train using limited size data and are capable of detecting
zero-day cyber attacks which are attacks that have not been previously detected or
documented. Zero-Day attacks differ from unknown attacks, the latter are ones that
occurred but there are not enough samples to classify them. However, zero-day attacks
are ones with no previous occurrence. Zero-Day attacks can be detected by using
anomaly detection (i.e., any instance that differs from normal traffic behaviour), or
instances that differs from both normal traffic and known attack classes. The thesis also
discusses the different challenges that accompany the processes of building IDS for
special-purpose networks (e.g. Internet of Things (IoT) networks). The main objectives
of this thesis can be summarised in the following research questions:
• RQ1: How can Machine Learning be utilised to detect anomalies and attacks in
special-purpose networks (i.e., IoT and Critical Infrastructure (CI))?
• RQ2: In an attempt to reduce the burden of needing to generate/collect large
volumes of data, can IDS models train using limited-sized datasets?
• RQ3: In order to reduce the interim period between identifying a new cyber
attack and detecting it, is there potential to build IDS that can detect new cyber
attacks without retraining?
• RQ4: How can non-conventional DL techniques provide improved robustness
and accuracy for IDS when detecting zero-day attacks?
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1.3 Thesis Statement
Building IDS is an open research field. Researchers have utilised different ML and
DL techniques to build IDS, requiring large amounts of data and lengthy training
processes. However, the available IDS datasets are limited and do not cover up-to-date
cyber attacks. This thesis investigates the development, analysis, and evaluation of
novel techniques to build IDS models that are capable of training using limit data to
classify known and unknown (zero-day) attacks.
1.4 Thesis Contributions
The work presented in this thesis builds on the existing IDS research and leads towards
building the next-generation IDS. The main thesis contributions are:
• A comprehensive analysis of the past decade IDS related articles. The analysis
covers the most predominant IDS datasets used in the literature, the ML
algorithms used for developing IDS, and cyber attacks that are covered/detected.
The analysis pinpoints the shortcoming of current IDS and highlights the
research gaps. To further analyse the cyber attacks coverage in IDS, an
extendable cyber threat taxonomy is presented. The analysis of past decade IDS
and the network threat taxonomy have been published in [13, 14].
• A model for detecting anomalies in CI networks. Six ML techniques are used,
and their performances are evaluated. The models are evaluated using a real-life
dataset that is collected from a water system controlled by Supervisory Control
and Data Acquisition (SCADA). The experiments have been published in [15].
• The creation of an IoT IDS dataset (MQTT-IoT-IDS2020) to contribute to filling
the current gap in IoT dataset availability. The dataset comprises benign traffic
behaviour, generic cyber attacks, and Message Queuing Telemetry Transport
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(MQTT)-based attacks. Three levels of features are extracted from the raw PCAP
files; namely, packet, unidirectional flow, and bidirectional flow features. The
impact of using the different feature levels on detecting generic and MQTT-based
attacks is evaluated using six ML techniques. The MQTT-IoT-IDS2020 dataset
is publicly available at [16] and the experiments and results have been published
in [17].
• A novel utilisation of Siamese networks to build IDS. This involves the
development, analysis, and evaluation of an IDS that is capable of learning from
limited-size data to classify cyber attacks. Three usage scenarios are considered
and evaluated. The first scenario aims to classify cyber attacks using a limited
number of instances for training. The second scenario aims to classify new cyber
attacks without retraining based on a few labelled instances of the new cyber
attack, benefiting from One-Shot learning paradigm. Finally, the third scenario
leverages similarity-based learning to detect unknown zero-day attacks. The
Siamese network classification experiments have been published in [18], while
the One-Shot experiments in [19].
• A model to detect zero-day cyber attacks effectively. The model relies on
the encoding-decoding capabilities of autoencoders. The detection accuracy is
compared with the well-established novelty detector; One-Class Support Vector
Machine (SVM). These experiments have been published in [20].
• A new high level of feature abstraction, called Flow aggregation. Flow
aggregation aims to benefit from the collated statistical information of individual
flows. This additional feature level enhances the detection of benign-mimicking
attacks, which are harder to detect because they are developed in a way that
bypasses detection models. The analysis of the proposed features and their
evaluation have been published in [21].
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1.5 Thesis Organisation
This thesis consists of eight chapters and five appendices, which are organised as
follows;
Chapter 2 presents a detailed overview of IDS. The chapter defines the core concepts
that are required for the understanding of the field and this thesis. This chapter also
summarises key IDS elements and attributes in a conceptual map. The conceptual
map covers several aspects including IDS types, decision making, evaluation metrics.
Finally, a discussion of IDS benchmark datasets is presented, which spans from the
earliest KDD dataset family to the latest CICIDS dataset family.
Chapter 3 provides an analysis of recent IDS in the literature. This analysis focuses
on studying the datasets of choice and the ML techniques that researchers use to build
IDS models. Furthermore, the analysis presents the cyber attacks that are detected in
the analysed IDS. The relation between the datasets of choice and the attack coverage is
discussed. A generic cyber threat taxonomy is outlined in this Chapter. The taxonomy
highlights the limitations of publicly available datasets, hindering the advancement of
IDS.
Chapter 4 explores the different challenges that accompany the process of building
special-purpose networks IDS (RQ1). In this Chapter, six ML techniques are used to
build IDS models for special-purpose networks. To this end, this chapter covers two
case studies, SCADA and IoT networks. Firstly, a SCADA dataset is introduced, and
three experiments are evaluated. The experiments vary based on the level of anomaly
detection (i.e., binary versus multi-class detection). Secondly, a MQTT based dataset
is generated and presented. The six ML techniques are used to assess the detection of
generic cyber attacks and MQTT-based attacks using MQTT-IoT-IDS2020 dataset.
Chapter 5 proposes a novel One-Shot learning IDS model. Considering the problem
of dataset availability and the exponential pace at which cyber attacks are introduced.
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The work in this Chapter aims to leverage similarity-based learning to build IDS that
can learn from limited-size data (RQ2). Siamese networks are utilised, as one of the
well-known One-Shot learning models, to learn pair similarity. This learning paradigm
is used to not only classify cyber attacks but detect new cyber attacks using a few
labelled instances without retraining (RQ3). Finally, this novel model is used to detect
zero-day attacks.
Following on the zero-day attack detection, Chapter 6 aims to build a zero-day
detection model with high detection rate and low false positive and false negative rates
(RQ4). This Chapter proposes the utilisation of the encoding-decoding capabilities of
autoencoders to detect zero-day attacks. The proposed model performance is compared
with the well-established novelty detector model; One-Class SVM. One-Class SVM is
known to perform well as an outlier, or novelty, detector, specifically with imbalanced
dataset. Furthermore, Fernández et al. [22] demonstrate that one-class classification is
effective when the minority class lacks structure, which applies to the ever-evolving
zero-day attacks. As a result, One-Class SVM is expected to outperform other novelty
detection methods. Therefore, only this algorithm is used as a benchmark for the
algorithm developed in this chapter.
Chapter 7 addresses the problem of detecting cyber attacks that mimic benign
behaviour. Benign-imitating attacks are built in a way that bypasses detection
mechanisms. This Chapter proposes a higher level of feature abstraction that can assist
in detecting these types of attacks.
Chapter 8 concludes the thesis by referring to the research questions in relation to
all proposed models and results. Then, future work and directions are discussed.
Figure 1.1 presents the outline of the thesis chapters. It shows the dependencies and
progression from one chapter to another.
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Chapter 6: Outlier-Based Zero-Day
Attacks Detection
Chapter 1: Introduction
Chapter 2: Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)
 Chapter 4: Utilising Machine Learning
for Special-Purpose IDS
Chapter 5: IDS using Limited Data
Siamese Network IDS





Chapter 7: Classify Benign Imitating Attacks Using Flow
Aggregation
Chapter 8: Conclusion and Future Work


























The yellow rectangles represent the introduction and conclusion, the green ones introduce the
work, whereas the blue rectangles represent the work carried out within this thesis. Finally, the




This chapter provides an explanation of the different aspects of IDS. An overview
of IDS technology is presented followed by a conceptual map. The conceptual
map covers the main characteristics of IDS, requirements, types, and evaluation
metrics. Furthermore this section discuss different benchmark datasets, highlighting
the limitations of currently available IDS datasets.
2.1 IDS Overview
IDS are systems built to monitor and analyse network traffic and/or other systems.
The goal of IDS is the detection of anomalies, intrusions, or privacy violations.
Ferrag et al. [23] represent them as the second line of defence after access control,
authentication, and encryption mechanisms. IDS can either be Host Intrusion Detection
System (HIDS) or Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS). Figure 2.1 shows the
two types as they differ in their monitoring scope. NIDS monitor the communication
between different nodes in a network or sub-networks. They analyse the traffic flow
and inwards and outwards communication. A traffic flow [24] is defined by the packets
involved in the communication between two nodes in a network. A network flow
could be 2-tuple, where the source and destination Internet Protocol (IP) addresses
9




are used. When the source and destination ports are also used, a flow is considered
to be 4-tuple, then 5-tuple flows additionally include the protocol used. Traffic flows
can be unidirectional or bidirectional. Unlike NIDS, HIDS monitor node or system
internals focusing on Operating System (OS) files, log files, etc., Furthermore, they
can monitor the network communication of the node(s) they are installed on, which
allows the analysis of encrypted traffic [25]. HIDS rely on packets content, rather than
headers and/or payload information.
IDS are categorised into signature-based and anomaly-based. Signature-based IDS,
also known as “Misuse Detection” [26], rely on predefined signatures that represent
known intrusions and attacks. Therefore, signature-based IDS are capable of detecting
attacks by comparing against known signatures. However, their detection capability
is limited by the signatures available in the database used, therefore, attacks with no
signature patterns go undetected; including unknown (zero-day) attacks [27].
On the other hand, anomaly-based IDS, also known as “Behaviour-based
Detection” [28], depend on identifying patterns. This method requires training the
system prior to deploying it. Artificial Intelligence (AI) techniques, specifically ML
and DL, are well-suited for anomaly-based IDS, due to their significant training
capabilities. The advantage of anomaly-based IDS is their ability to classify both
normal and abnormal traffic, thus detecting known and unknown attacks. The
accuracy of anomaly-based IDS against unknown attacks is better when compared
10













Signature-based versus Anomaly-based IDS
to signature-based IDS. However, the False Positive Rate (FPR) is often high [28].
Specification-based IDS combine the strength of both signature and anomaly-based to
form a hybrid model, which can attempt to detect both known and unknown attacks
using different AI techniques. Figure 2.2 compares signature-based to anomaly-based
IDS. Both signature-based and anomaly-based IDS, can run on either a stateless or a
stateful basis. Stateless IDS rely on packets while stateful ones rely on network flows.
Recent IDS are stateful as they benefit from the “context” flows provide.
It is important to note that IDS are responsible for detecting intrusions, unlike
Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) that can additionally take corrective and preventive
actions [29].
In the late 80’s, researchers started using statistical techniques that rely on
predefined rates, as well as normal traffic that acts as a baseline for their detection.
Following the use of statistical techniques, knowledge-based techniques were used,
including expert systems and Finite State Machine (FSM). Finally, ML techniques
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dominated the research and development of IDS. Recent surveys emphasise the
focus on utilising ML and DL techniques to build IDS, including the work in
[23, 30, 31, 32, 33]. The following section presents an overview of the ML pipeline
prior to discussing IDS attributes and benchmark datasets.
2.2 Machine Learning Overview
ML techniques have the ability to learn patterns and behaviours and generalise
decisions using a given dataset based on learning and tuning their parameters (i.e.,
without the need to pre-define patterns and rules). To build IDS using ML, similar
to other ML applications, a multistage process is followed. This process involves
preparing the data, choosing the ML model, training, validation, and testing of the
chosen model. Figure 2.3 visualises the ML pipeline.
I. Dataset Collection: Datasets are considered the backbone of developing ML
models. Large datasets are collected or generated to be used during the training
and testing processes. A dataset contains raw data that can be in any format























system data, and operational behaviour [34] or raw network traffic [23]. The
data is structured as records (instances) and fields (features). Once a dataset is
available, its instances are preprocessed.
II. Preprocessing: Preprocessing deals with raw data and it involves various steps
to ensure that the dataset is ready for ML usage. The data can be categorised
as numerical and categorical [35]. Numerical data represents quantitative values
that can be either discrete (countable) or continuous (uncountable). Categorical
data represents names or labels (i.e., the data that is expressed using natural
language descriptions, rather than numbers). Categorical data can either be
nominal or ordinal. Ordinal data values, unlike nominal one, follow a certain
ranking or scale. These different data types impact decisions during the
preprocessing steps.
Preprocessing steps include:
• Handling missing data: Datasets usually have missing fields/features in
some instances. Instances with missing features can be dropped if they
comprise a small percentage of the dataset. If a feature is missing from
most of the instances, this feature can be dropped. Alternatively, several
techniques can be used to fill the missing features with values, including
zero or random values. In this case, random values are sampled from
the same distribution, if the feature is numerical and follows a certain
distribution, otherwise, values are randomly sampled within the range of
given values of the rest of the instances. Statistical mean or median can
be used with numerical continuous variables. The most frequent value
from other instances can be used to populate missing values when it is
contained in the majority of the instances. Handling missing data depends
on the dataset domain, purpose, and importance of different instances and
features [36, 37].
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• Encoding: Dataset containing categorical features have to be encoded to be
suitable for ML usage. The two popular encoding techniques are Ordinal
and One-Hot encoding [38]. The first is used when values have ordinal
relationship, otherwise, One-Hot encoding is used.
• Normalisation: When the distribution of a dataset feature is unknown or
does not follow a Gaussian distribution, it is better to normalise/scale the
values with a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 1. Normalisation, also
known as Min-Max scaling [39], aims to map all values to a common scale,
without distorting differences in the ranges of values. This process speeds
the overall training process [40].
• Standardisation (z-score): This step ensures that the feature values have a
mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 by computing the z-score [39].
Similar to normalisation, this step ensures that all data belong on the same
scale. However, outliers are not affected by standardisation.
• Feature Engineering: Feature Learning [41] or Feature Engineering [42]
plays a vital role in building ML model since the chosen features highly
affect the model performance. Contraction, extraction, and selection are
the three processes that can be used to obtain features.
• Labelling: When a dataset is collected or generated, domain experts label
the dataset instances. This step can be dropped when using unsupervised
learning as labels are not used for model training.
III. Model Training, Validation, and Testing: ML models can be Supervised,
Unsupervised, Semi-Supervised or Reinforcement learning. In supervised
learning, the dataset instances are labelled (i.e., a class for each instance is
known) where the model learns a function that maps input to output based
on example [31]. If the output is numerical, then it is a regression model,
otherwise, it is classification when the output is categorical. Classification can
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either be binary (two classes), multi-class, or multi-label (class1 and class2 /
class1 or class2). In unsupervised learning, data is unlabelled and the model
in this case aims to discover previously undetected pattern in the training
data [31]. In clustering techniques, for example, these discovered patterns are
used to group instances. Supervised learning techniques include SVM, k-Nearest
Neighbours (k-NN), and Decision Tree (DT), while clustering, association and
dimensionality reduction are popular techniques of unsupervised learning [43].
Semi-supervised learning falls between supervised and unsupervised learning. It
learns from a small amount of labelled data and a large amount of unlabelled
data. Finally, reinforcement learning aims to maximise the cumulative reward
while learning. This paradigm is well suited for training intelligent agents based
on their actions in a certain environment.
During the training process, an ML model aims to best optimise its parameters
to reach the maximum performance (i.e., accuracy) and the minimum loss (i.e.,
error). The dataset is split into training, validation and testing sets, as shown
in Figure 2.4. The last is used to evaluate the performance of a trained model
which gives an unbiased indication of how well the model is generalised [45],
since evaluating using the training set can be misleading. In some cases in the
literature, validation and testing sets are used interchangeably which leads to
confusion [46]. However, for Artificial Neural Network (ANN), the validation
set is a portion of data reserved from the training set that is later used in
hyper-parameter optimisation. The testing set is only used for evaluation [46].
The randomisation of splitting of a dataset into training and testing sets has its
problem as some classes and/or features can be over or underrepresented. To
overcome this problem, K-fold cross validation is used. The dataset, in this case,
Train Validation Test
Figure 2.4
Dataset Split Visualisation [44]
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is split into k subsets, k − 1 subsets are used during the training process and
one subset is used for testing. This process is repeated k times and the average
performance is calculated [47]. K-fold cross validation is also used to estimate
the average generalisation error of the model [48].
The training process continues until the model reaches the desired state. The
training stops when the validation loss reaches a minimum to avoid overfitting.
A model overfits when it does not generalise (i.e., its performance is limited to
the training instances). This can be indicated with a low training loss and a high
testing loss.
Different regularisation techniques are used to avoid overfitting and ensure that
ML models generalise [49]. The three common regularisation techniques are:
L1, L2, and Dropout. The difference between L1 and L2 regularisation lies
in the penalty that they apply to the loss function. In L2 regularisation, also
known as ridge regression, a squared magnitude penalty is applied, while in L1
regularisation, also known as lasso regression, L1 norm is applied. In the case
of ANN, the magnitude is calculated based on the weights, either absolute sum
(in case of L1) or sum of squares (in case of L2) [50]. The third regularisation
approach, which can only be applied with ANN, is adding a Dropout layer. For
a fully connected layer, all connections (weights) are trainable each iteration.
Dropout randomly chooses a portion of weights to be excluded/dropped from
training each iteration [51].
Feature Engineering
Features are the building blocks of dataset instances as they represent properties,
variables, or attributes of data. For example, features can be number of packets, flags,
duration, size, etc. Feature values construct the input to any ML or DL model. Features
are obtained using one of three processes: construction, extraction, and selection.
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While feature construction aims at creating new features by mining existing ones and
finding missing relations within features, extraction works on raw data and/or features
and applies mapping functions to extract new, representable ones. Finally, the selection
aims to select the most significant subset of features. This helps reduce the feature
space and required computational power.
Feature selection is done using one of three approaches [52], shown in Table 2.1;
filter, wrapper, and embedded. A classification of the features used in different IDS
datasets is provided in [32]. Rezaei and Liu [53] categorise features that are used for
building IDS into four main categories of networking features. These categories are
time series, header, payload, and statistical. Ghaffarian and Shahriari [42] consider
features that represent basic network information as naı̈ve while others are rich. Naı̈ve
features only consider attributes from packets, therefore, they do not provide enough
information. However, rich features represent high level information (i.e., flow-based

































































In this section, a broad conceptual map dedicated to the design of IDS is presented,
including the different elements IDS can have. The conceptual map gives a global
overview of IDS.
Figure 2.5 visualises the IDS conceptual map with each branch focusing on a
dimension. Figure 2.5 (Branch 1) includes the general attributes that characterise
IDS; such as its role in the network, the information provided by IDS, the system




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































types, infrastructure in place, and the computational location. Branch 3 is dedicated
to IDS evaluation metrics. Finally, Branch 4 provides a descriptive analysis of IDS
types including an analysis of the triggers. The different branches in Figure 2.5 are
subsequently described in Sections 2.3.1 through 2.3.3.
2.3.1 General Attributes
As previously discussed, IDS focus on detecting anomalies. With reference to
Figure 2.5 (Branch 1), when an intrusion is detected, IDS are expected to log the
information related to the intrusion (1.1.1). These logs can then be used by network
forensic investigators to further analyse the detected anomaly or enhance the learning
process of IDS themselves. IDS are expected to trigger alerts upon detecting a threat
(1.1.2). The alert should provide information on the detected threat and the affected
system. By raising an alert, authorised users can take corrective actions and mitigate
the attack.
In order to build efficient IDS, the output information provided by IDS to the
end-user is critical for analysis. The recorded information should contain intruder
identification information (1.2.1) and location (1.2.2) for each event. IP addresses
and user credentials are used to identify the intruder. The system design should
be modular to adapt to the environment. Additionally, log information can contain
metadata related to the intrusion, such as timestamp (1.2.3), intrusion layer (i.e., Open
Systems Interconnection (OSI)) (1.2.4), intrusion activity (1.2.5) whether the attack is
active or passive and finally, the type of intrusion (1.2.6) [3]. Active attacks attempt
to alter data or information in a network or system, while passive attacks monitor and
gather information.
Two key aspects for effective IDS are a high detection rate (1.3.1) and a low
false-positive rate. These can be evaluated using different metrics which are discussed
in detail in Section 2.3.3 (Branch 3). Other important IDS factors include the
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transparency (1.3.8) and safety of the overall system (1.3.2). It is crucial as an
attacker may target the IDS themselves. The overall performance of IDS is also
important, which includes memory requirements, power consumption (1.3.3), and
throughput (1.3.4). This can highly impact IDS that are used in special-purpose
networks with limited resources.
Moreover, it is crucial that IDS themselves do not introduce abnormal behaviour
(1.3.5), hence a testing procedure should be set in place before deployment. The
procedure can include fuzzing to detect anomalies and bugs in IDS. Such anomalies
could be exploited by an attacker to render IDS useless or initiate a Denial of
Service (DoS) attack [3]. Finally, Axelsson [57] adds to IDS requirements; ease of
use (1.3.6), interoperability (1.3.7), transparency (1.3.8) and collaboration (1.3.9). This
is important to ensure that IDS operate with other deployed security platforms.
2.3.2 Decision-Making
Figure 2.5 (Branch 2) covers the decision-making process of IDS. IDS can be
distributed over multiple nodes in the network. In this case, decisions can be
made collaboratively/swarm-like (2.1.1), or independently (2.1.2). In a collaborative
decision-making, multiple nodes share a single decision. This collaboration can use
statistical techniques such as voting and game theory, while in an independent mode,
all decisions are made by individual nodes on the network [3].
Furthermore, in this distributed manner, when all nodes are working with the same
capacity, it is considered a flat (2.2.1) infrastructure. Alternatively, it is a clustered
infrastructure (2.2.2), where the nodes belong to clusters with different capabilities,
each contributing to the decisions in a different manner. The computation location is
another aspect of distributed IDS. The centralised computation location (2.3.1) works
on data collected from the whole network. Unlike the centralised, the stand-alone
computation (2.3.2) works on local data, disregarding decisions from other nodes.
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A combination of both centralised and stand-alone can also be achieved through
cooperative computation, such that each node can detect an intrusion on its own
but also contributes to the overall decision [58]. Finally, IDS can also operate
in hierarchical computation (2.3.4), where a cluster sends all intrusion detection
information to the root node responsible for decision making [3].
2.3.3 Evaluation
A high detection rate is essential for IDS to be considered effective. However, the
detection rate solely does not give a complete assessment of IDS performance.
The main elements that are used when measuring IDS performance, and hence are
used to derive the different metrics, are as follows:
• True Positive (TP): Number of intrusions correctly detected
• True Negative (TN): Number of non-intrusions correctly detected
• False Positive (FP): Number of non-intrusions incorrectly detected
• False Negative (FN): Number of intrusions incorrectly detected
Hodo et al. [59], Buse et al. [26] and Aminanto et al. [41] discuss main IDS
evaluation metrics in their respective work. These include the overall accuracy,
decision rates, precision, recall, and F1-Score. IDS evaluation metrics are summarised
in Figure 2.5 (Branch 3).
Overall Accuracy: Equation 2.1 provides the overall accuracy. It returns the
probability that an item is correctly classified by IDS.
OverallAccuracy =
TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN
(2.1)
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Detection Rates: Equation 2.2 calculates the Sensitivity, Specificity, Fallout, and
Miss Rate detection rates, respectively. Sensitivity (TPR) calculates the probability of
attack/anomaly instances that are correctly identified, while fallout (FPR) calculates
the probability of incorrectly detected ones. Specificity (TPR) indicates the probability
of normal/benign instances that are correctly identified, while Miss Rate (FNR)
indicates the probability of incorrectly detected ones.
Detection Rates:
Sensitivity (aka Recall, T rue Positive Rate) =
TP
TP + FN
Specificity (aka Selectivity, T rue Negative Rate) =
TN
TN + FP
Fallout (aka False Positive Rate) =
FP
TN + FP




Stefan Axelsson [57] emphasises the fact that high FPR (false alarm) limits the
performance of IDS due to the “Base-rate fallacy problem”. This problem results in
neglecting alarms because the number of false positives surpasses the number of true
positives.
Precision: Equation 2.3 provides the probability of positively classified incidents





To visualise the performance of IDS, i.e., the trade-off between sensitivity (True
Positive Rate (TPR)) and fallout (True Negative Rate (TNR)), Area Under the Curve
(AUC) and Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC), also known as Area Under the
Receiver Operating Characteristics (AUROC) curves are used [31, 60, 61]
F1-Score: Equation 2.4 represents the harmonic mean of precision and recall.
Compared with accuracy, F1-Score does not take true negatives into account, thus it
is well suited when false positive and false negative rates are critical. In addition, it is
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well suited to represent the performance of IDS when dealing with imbalanced classes,
such as a large number of negative instances, for example.
F1 =
2TP
2TP + FP + FN
(2.4)
2.4 IDS Datasets
Researchers use benchmark datasets to evaluate IDS performance using the metrics
discussed in Section 2.3.3. In this section, prominent IDS datasets are discussed. The
datasets properties and limitations are highlighted.
Table 2.2 lists the prominent available IDS datasets and categorises them based
on the domain they belong to. Moreover, attacks found in each are presented by tick
marks. These datasets cover general-purpose IDS, Virtual Private Network (VPN), Tor
Networks, Botnet, Network Flows and IoT. Details regarding the institutes contributing
to the generation of these datasets and the attack types are summarised in Table A.1.
The ratio between general-purpose and special-purpose IDS datasets is noticed in the
table.
By observing Table 2.2, the dominance of some cyber attack classes in the datasets
is clear. This is due to both their popularity and availability of tools to simulate them,
which facilitates their inclusion in datasets. For example, DoS and Distributed Denial
of Service (DDoS) are included in most of the datasets. The features and characteristics
of these datasets are further analysed in [86]. This evaluation includes DEFCON [87],
CAIDA [88], LBNL [89], CDX [90], Kyoto [91], Twente [92], UMASS [93] and
ADFA [65]. Ring et al. [94] provide a comprehensive overview of IDS datasets,































































































2018 CICIDS2018 [62] X X X - - - X X - X X X X - X X - X -
2017 CICIDS2017 [63] X X X - - - X X X X X X X - - X - X -
2017 CIC DoS dataset [64] X X - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
2017
2013




X - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - X - -
2016 DDoSTB [68] X - X - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -




X - - X - - X - - - - - - - - - - - -
TUIDS DDoS [70] X - X - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
TUIDS
Intrusion [70]
X X - X - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
2014 Botnet dataset [71] X - - - - - - - - - - - - - - X - - -
2012 STA2018 [72] X X X - - - X X - - - - - - - - - - -
2011 CTU-13 [73] X - - - - - - - - - - - - - - X - - -
2010 ISCXIDS2012 [74] X X X - - - X X - - - - - - - - - - -
2009 Waikato [75] - - X - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
2007 CAIDA DDoS [76] - - X - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
1999 NSL-KDD [77] X X - X X X - - - - - - - - - - - - -




DARPA [79] X X - X X X - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Special-Purpose Networks
Year Dataset IoT VPN Tor SCADA
















- X - -
2015 4SICS ICS [85] - - - X
IDS datasets can either include real (i.e., recorded from a network set-up) or
synthetic (i.e., simulated or injected) traffic. Synthetic attack injection could be used to
either introduce attacks to an existing dataset or balance the attack classes represented
in a dataset.
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The three main issues with current IDS datasets are that (i) they lack real-life
characteristics of recent network traffic, which renders current IDS not applicable
for production environments [95], (ii) there is a limited number of datasets for
special-purpose networks (i.e. IoT and CI) which again limits the IDS development,
and (iii) they do not cope with constantly changing networks topology.
Viegas et al. [95] mention that for a dataset to be considered appropriate, it has to
possess various properties; instances should be labelled, the dataset should contain real
network traffic, can be reproducible, and shareable, implying that the dataset should not
contain any confidential data.
The analysis of IDS research articles in the past years is overviewed in the following
chapter. The chapter discusses the datasets of choice and the dominant techniques used
to build IDS. Furthermore, the effect of dataset choice on the advancement of IDS
research is outlined.
2.5 Summary
In this chapter, an introduction and an overview of IDS and ML concepts are provided.
IDS classification, types, and learning paradigms are highlighted. Furthermore, the
discussion is elaborated and extended using the IDS conceptual map. The conceptual
map covers various aspects of building IDS which involves IDS evaluation metrics,
used techniques, and datasets are analysed. Finally, IDS datasets are reviewed
where prominent IDS datasets are outlined. The discussion pinpoints the limitations
of existing datasets; including the lack of special-purpose ones and the dominant
representation of some cyber attacks like DoS. The effect of datasets and a thorough




In this chapter, IDS research articles are discussed and analysed with respect to the
different datasets used and the ML algorithms to train IDS. Following on from the
analysis, an overview of the cyber attacks that are detected by recent IDS is presented.
The cyber attack coverage is conducted not only with respect to the analysed articles,
but also in relation to a generic cyber threat taxonomy. The presented taxonomy
classifies cyber threats based on the OSI layers, active or passive behaviour and threat
source. In active attacks, the attacker attempts to modify the data or impact the network
or system performance, while in passive attacks, the aim is to observe and gather
information for further analysis and usage. The comprehensive taxonomy is built in
an extendable fashion and has been released publicly for future amendments. Finally,
the chapter highlights the overall trends and limitations of IDS research in recent years,
which influence the research presented in the rest of this thesis.
3.1 Analysis of Recent IDS Research
In this section, recent IDS articles are discussed, analysing both research trends and
shortcomings. This analysis highlights the main algorithms used and the datasets of
choice, which concludes the strengths and weaknesses of recent IDS. To this end,
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IEEE Xplore and Google Scholar queries were made using “Intrusion Detection
System*” OR “IDS*”, further filtering results to include articles published in the
range [2008-2020]. The filtration was made to have a wide coverage of datasets,
ML techniques, and detected attacks. A total of 90 published articles in this period
were analysed. Analysis of older IDS ML techniques and used features for the period
[2004-2007] was previously conducted by Nguyen and Armitage [31]. They discuss
the limitations of port-based and payload-based classification and the emerging use of
ML techniques to classify IP traffic.
Table 3.1 summarises the IDS research selected based on the above criteria. Each
row represents one article, highlighting the dataset(s) and algorithm(s) used within the
research, alongside the attacks that IDS are capable of detecting. The algorithm trends
are discussed later in this section alongside the attacks’ coverage in the datasets used.
It is important to note that Table 3.1 is used to provide insights regarding the analysed
IDS.
Table 3.1
Over A Decade of IDS [2008 - 2020]




Probing, DoS, R2L, U2R [96]
2008 KDD-99
- v-SVC - K-Means
- Parzen Classifier























Probing, DoS, R2L, U2R [100]
Continued . . .
28







Credit Card Fraud [101]
2009 KDD-99 Genetic-based Probing, DoS, R2L, U2R [102]





Probing, DoS, R2L, U2R [104]





- EM based Clustering





Probing, DoS, R2L, U2R [107]











DDoS (TCP, UDP flood),













- Michigan - Pittsburgh
Probing, DoS, R2L, U2R [113]
2011 KDD-99
- DT
- RBF NN - NB





Probing, DoS, R2L, U2R [115]
Continued . . .
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Year Dataset Used Algorithms Detected Attacks Ref
2011 KDD-99
- Rule-Based
- ART Network - BON
Probing, DoS, R2L, U2R [116]








Probing, DoS, R2L, U2R [119]
2012 1998 DARPA SVM Attack, Non-Attack [120]
2012 1998 DARPA
ELMs:
- Basic - Kernel-Based
Probing, DoS, R2L, U2R [121]
2012 1998 DARPA SVDD U2R [122]
2012 KDD-99 Hidden NB Probing, DoS, R2L, U2R [123]
2012 KDD-99
- DT
- SVM - SA
Probing, DoS, R2L, U2R [124]
2012 KDD-99
Ensemble DTs:
- NB Tree - RF




Probing, DoS, R2L, U2R [125]
2012 KDD-99
- K-Means
- SVM - Ant Colony
Probing, DoS, R2L, U2R [126]
2013 KDD-99
- Fuzzy C means
- Fuzzy NN /
Neurofuzzy
- RBF SVM
Probing, DoS, R2L, U2R [127]
2013 NSL-KDD Fuzzy Clustering NN Probing, DoS, R2L, U2R [128]
2013 KDD-99 - K-Means - NN MLP Probing, DoS, R2L, U2R [129]
2013 KDD-99
- FFNN - ENN
- GRNN - PNN
- RBNN
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- Bayesian Net with GR
feature selection




Probing, DoS, R2L, U2R [138]




Probing, DoS, R2L, U2R [140]










2015 KDD-99 - K-Means - k-NN Probing, DoS, R2L, U2R [144]
2015 KDD-99 Weighted ELM Probing, DoS, R2L, U2R [145]
2015 GureKddcup AIS (R-chunk) Normal, Abnormal [146]
2016 KDD-99
- k-NN
- PCA - Fuzzy PCA
Probing, DoS, R2L, U2R [147]
2016 NSL-KDD
- NB
- PCA - MLP
- SVM - C4.5
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SQL Injection, XSS [150]
2016 KDD-99 - SVM - PCA - Normal, Attack [151]
2016 NSL-KDD
- SVM - DT (J48)








Probing, DoS, R2L, U2R [153]
2017 KDD-99 - Binary PSO - k-NN Probing, DoS, R2L, U2R [154]
2017 KDD-99
- R-tree - k-NN
- K-Means - SVM







2017 NSL-KDD DL RNN Probing, DoS, R2L, U2R [157]
2017 NSL-KDD
- K-Means - NB
- Information Gain
Probing, DoS, R2L, U2R [158]






- PCA - k-NN
- Softmax Regression














2018 KDD-99 Kernel Clustering Probing, DoS, R2L, U2R [164]
Continued . . .
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- MLP - NB









- Hello Flood, Sinkhole,
Wormhole
[165]















- DL - NDAE
- Stacked NDAEs
Probing, DoS, R2L, U2R [168]
2018 KDD-99
- SMO - RF
- MFNN - NB
- KFRFS - IBK
- AdaBoost
Probing, DoS, R2L, U2R [169]









- RF - SVM
- BayesNet





Probing, DoS, R2l, U2R [172]
2019 KDD-99
- DT
- SVM (least square)
Feature Selection:
- FGLCC - CFA
Probing, DoS, R2l, U2R [173]
Continued . . .
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- DoS, DDoS, Web-based,
Brute-force, Infiltration,






- IG - PCA
- SVM - IBK
- MLP
- Normal, Attack

















- Probing, DoS, R2l, U2R







- DoS, DDoS, Web-based,
Brute-force, Infiltration,
Heartbleed, Bot and Scan
[176]
2019 NSL-KDD
- DT - k-NN
- MLP - SVM
- Kernel ELM
- Genetic Algorithms
Probing, Dos, R2L, U2R [177]























- 4 DoS attacks (Blackhole,
Grayhole, Flooding and
Scheduling)
- DoS, DDoS, Web-based,
Brute-force, Bot and Scan
[176]
2019 CICIDS2017
- SMOTE - EFS
- AdaBoost - PCA
DDoS [179]
Continued . . .
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- RF - J48
- BayesNet - SVM
- AdaBoost - MLP
- Decision Stump - NB
DDoS [180]
2020 NSL-KDD Deep NN Probing, DoS, R2l, U2R [181]
2020 KDD-99
- NB - DT
- Ontology - RF





- Local Outlier Factor






- NB - MLP
- RF - J48
- LSTM - k-NN
SSH and FTP Brute-force ,
Web Attacks (Brute-force,
XSS and SQL Injection)
[184]
Where:
- ABC: Association-Based Classification - AdaBoost : Adaptive Boosting
- AIS: Artificial Immune System - ANN: Artificial Neural Network
- APAN: Advanced Probabilistic Approach for Network-based IDS
- APD: Anomaly Pattern Detection - ART: Adaptive Resonance Theory
- BFS-CFS: Best First Search with Correlation Features Selection
- BON: Back-Propagation Network - BSPNN: Boosted Subspace Probabilistic NN
- CFA: CuttleFish Algorithm - CSA: Clonal Selection Algorithm
- CSOACN: Clustering based on Self-Organized Ant Colony Network
- CUSUM: CUmulative SUM - DL: Deep Learning
- DoS: Denial of Service - DT: Decision Tree
- EFS: Ensemble Feature Selection - ELM: Extreme Learning Machine
- ENN: Elman NN - FCM: Fuzzy C-Mean
- FFNN: Feed Forward NN
- FGLCC: Feature Grouping based on Linear Correlation Coefficient
- FLN: Fast Learning Network - GA: Genetic Algorithm
- GMDH: Group Method for Data Handling - GR: Gain Ratio
- GRNN: Generalised Regression NN
- GS-CFS: Greedy Step-wise with Correlation Features Selection
- IG: Information Gain - INA: Immune Network Algorithms
- IRL: Iterative Rule Learning - KFRFS: Kernel-based Fuzzy-Rough Feature Selection
- k-NN: k-Nearest Neighbours - MFNN: Multi-Functional Nearest-Neighbour
- MLP: Multi-Layer Perceptron - NB: Naı̈ve Bayes
- NDAE: Non-Symmetric Deep Auto-Encoder - NN: Neural Network
- NSA: Negative Selection Algorithm - OCSVM: One-Class Support Vector Machine
- PCA: Principal Component Analysis - PNN: Probabilistic NN
- PSO: Particle Swarm Optimisation - R2L: Remote to Local
- RBF: Radial Basis Function - RBNN: Radial Basis NN
- RF: Random Forest - RNN: Recurrent Neural Networks
- SA: Simulated Annealing - SOM: Self-Organising Map
- SMO: Sequential Minimal Optimisation - SMOTE: Synthetic Minority Oversampling Technique
- SVDD: Support Vector Data Description - SVM: Support Vector Machine
- U2R: User to Root - VAE: Variational Auto-Encoder
- WSARE: What’s Strange About Recent Events - XSS: Cross Site Scripting
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Figure 3.1 shows the IDS datasets distribution based on the usage in the past
decade, highlighting the percentage of each. Only 10% of the IDS use simulated and
unpublished datasets. This results in IDS that neither cover real-life situations nor suit
constantly changing networks and special-purpose networks. This signifies that the
developed IDS are not deployable, and only limited for research purposes.
The figure also highlights a noticeable preference of the KDD dataset family as
nearly 47% of the selected publications use the KDD Cup’99 dataset and 18% use the
NSL-KDD dataset. Excluding the unpublished and simulated datasets, the second most
used dataset is the DARPA. This inclination is owed to the datasets availability and
popularity. Moreover, they are the oldest benchmark datasets, hence, researchers tend
to use them for evaluation and comparisons [23]. Another reason for this inclination is
the datasets’ practicality; the KDD dataset family contains normal instances and four
attacks; namely, DoS, User to Root (U2R), Remote to Local (R2L), and probing, with
multiple categories of each attack and the features are already processed, extracted,
and presented in a ML-ready format.
Figure 3.1
Distribution of Datasets Used for IDS Evaluation from Articles Listed in Table 3.1
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Despite their popularity, researchers acknowledge these datasets’ shortcomings.
The datasets fail to accurately represent current attacks because they were generated
in the late 90s. Moreover, their use leads to an endemic situation; numerous results
reported in the literature claim detection results which are not applicable in real-world
scenarios. Al Tobi and Duncan [185] provide a comprehensive analysis of the
drawbacks of the KDD Cup’99 dataset. The shortcomings of the DARPA dataset are
analysed by Mahoney and Chan [186] and McHugh [187]. Alongside the limitations
of each dataset, they are also deprecated, hence, confirming the inability of most of the
IDS presented in Table 3.1 to cope with recent attacks and threats.
To further analyse the last decade’s research on IDS, the detection algorithms in the
selected articles are considered. Anomaly-based and specification-based IDS are based
on identifying patterns that discriminate normal from abnormal traffic and distinguish
different attack classes. These IDS can be subcategorised based on the training method
used as previously visualised in Figure 2.5. The two charts in Figure 3.2 are constructed
to investigate how well the current literature covers the range of technique categories
collated in the conceptual map in Figure 2.5.
From the centre moving outwards, Figure 3.2a shows the three main categories of
algorithms and their corresponding subcategories in line with the conceptual map. The
outer circle shows the percentage of IDS from Table 3.1 that use these algorithms.
The chart highlights the dominance of ML algorithms employed when building IDS.
As shown, both statistical and knowledge-based algorithms are less represented. This
dominance is due to (i) the sophistication of new cyber attacks which poses the need
for more complex detection techniques [12] and (ii) the significant advancement of ML
techniques in various research domains that involve cybersecurity [4].
Figure 3.2b on the other hand, plots the distribution of those algorithms that are
actually used in the literature according to Table 3.1. The plot shows the dominance
of ANN, SVM, and k-means as the most used algorithms. This is reasoned by their
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(a) Occurrence of all algorithms categories based on Figure 2.5
(b) Distribution of used algorithms discussed in Table 3.1
Figure 3.2
Distribution of Algorithms Usage in the IDS from Articles Listed in Table 3.1
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ability to discriminate between benign and attack classes given a feature set. However,
leveraging new/emerging ML techniques and adapting ones from other domains will
advance the development of the next generation IDS; in a matter of benefiting from the
advancement and knowledge of ML in these domains.
3.2 Threats Taxonomy
One of the first attacks classifications was proposed by Kendall [188]. They classified
intrusions into four categories, namely: DoS, R2L, U2R and Probing. This aligns with
the KDD dataset family and can be noticed by observing the dataset family timeline
provided by Siddique et al. [189].
Following this, multiple other classifications were suggested in the literature.
These classifications focus on specific aspects of attacks or an explicit target
domain. For example, Welch and Lathrop [190] classifies threats in wireless networks
based on attack techniques, resulting in seven different categories. These are:
Traffic Analysis, Passive Eavesdropping, Active Eavesdropping, Unauthorised Access,
Man-in-the-middle, Session Hijacking and Replay. IoT security requirements were
the motivation for the threats classification by Sachin Babar et al. [191]. These
requirements are: identification, communication, physical threat, embedded security,
and storage management.
Despite the availability of traditional threat taxonomies, the need for a recent and
extendable one arose from the prevalence of common attacks found in current IDS
datasets, as illustrated in Section 2.4. The absence of a modern cyber threat taxonomy
additionally presents a further challenge for researchers in ascertaining the threat
coverage of existing datasets. Building a generic and modular taxonomy for security
threats can assist researchers and cybersecurity practitioners build tools that are more
capable of identifying a more comprehensive subset of attacks, including known,
advanced, and new zero-day attacks.
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In this thesis, a new, extendable taxonomy is proposed to categorise network threats
based on (i) source of the threat, (ii) the affected OSI model layers, and (iii) active or
passive threat. The taxonomy is depicted in Figure 3.3, and although it places attacks
under a single target layer of the OSI model, it is important to highlight that other
layers may also be affected. The focus here is on the main target layer of attack.
An attack is interpreted to be active if it alters or changes any aspect of a network
or a system. For example, it can disturb the performance or affect information. During
passive attacks, the network resources are left intact and the attacker is concerned with
either gathering information or monitoring the network. Active threats are shown in
Figure 3.3 as rectangles while passive ones are represented by ovals. Examples of
active attacks include DoS and DDoS (Figure 3.3 - 1.1) and Impersonation (Figure 3.3
- 1.5). Examples of passive attacks comprise Scanning (Figure 3.3 - 1.6) and
probing (Figure 3.3 - 1.9). Some attacks cannot be identified as either active or passive
until their impact is known. Code injections (Figure 3.3 - 3.1), for example, are
considered passive attacks when the code is used to query data or gather information,
and active if the code changes data or alters a database schema by dropping tables or
relations.
The following subsections elaborate on the five threat sources included in the
taxonomy, and the different attacks branching under each.
3.2.1 Network Threats
Network threats are initiated based on a flow of packets sent over a network. The
most popular network threats are DoS and DDoS (Figure 3.3 - 1.1). In a DoS attack,
an attacker prevents legitimate users from accessing a certain service by flooding the
network with requests. As a result, the service/server under attack looks unresponsive.
In DoS, a single machine is used to perform the attack, however, multiple machines
are used to initiate a DDoS attack. DDoS attacks are usually confused with a common





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Threats Taxonomy (3 of 3)
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for a certain service or website occurs. This arises immediately upon the occurrence of
a significant event, such as breaking news, sales events, etc.
DoS and DDoS are divided into four categories; flood attacks (Figure 3.3 - 1.1.1),
amplification attacks (Figure 3.3 - 1.1.2), protocol exploit (Figure 3.3 - 1.1.3), and
malformed packets (Figure 3.3 - 1.1.4). These are defined respectively through attack
examples. Smurf attack (Figure 3.3 - 1.1.1.1) generates a large number of ping requests
and aims to exploit network characteristics. Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP)
Flood (Figure 3.3 - 1.1.1.2) is similar to Smurf attack since it floods the network with
ICMP echo requests (ping requests). In a similar manner, User Datagram Protocol
(UDP) flood (Figure 3.3 - 1.1.1.3), SYN flood (Figure 3.3 - 1.1.1.4) and HTTP
flood (Figure 3.3 - 1.1.1.5) initiate a DoS attack by overwhelming the network with
UDP packets targeting random ports, a huge number of TCP SYN requests and HTTP
GET and POST requests, respectively. Finally, SSL attack exhausts the network by
sending useless SSL data or abusing SSL handshake. Based on Neustar’s Security
Operations Centre report, DDoS attacks increased by 151% in the first quarter of 2020
compared with 2019 [193].
The Teardrop (Figure 3.3 - 1.1.3.1) attack takes place when an incorrect offset is set
by the attacker. The ping of Death (Figure 3.3 - 1.1.4.1) attack occurs when packets
are too large for routers and splitting is required. Buffer Overflow (Figure 3.3 - 1.1.5)
occurs when a program writes more bytes than allowed. This occurs when an attacker
sends packets larger than 65536 bytes (allowed in the IP protocol) and the stack does
not have an appropriate input sanitation in place.
Packet forging (Figure 3.3 - 1.2) is the second networking attack in the presented
taxonomy. Packet forging or injection occurs when an attacker generates packets
that mimic normal network traffic. These generated packets can be used to perform
unauthorised actions and steal sensitive data like login credentials, personal data, credit
card details, Social Security Number (SSN), etc.
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During a Man in the Middle attack (Figure 3.3 - 1.3), an attacker monitors or
intercepts the communication between two or more nodes on the network. The attack
can be passive or active when controlling the communication. On the other hand, a
Man in The Browser attack (Figure 3.3 - 1.4) intercepts the browser to alter or add
fields to a web page. The added fields intend to plunder confidential data, for example,
by asking the user to enter sensitive information.
Impersonation (Figure 3.3 - 1.5), or pretending to be another user, takes different
forms. An attacker can impersonate a user to gain higher security level and acquire
access to unauthorized data (Figure 3.3 - 1.5.1) or perform cloning (Figure 3.3 -
1.5.2). Cloning is a common attack in social networks to impersonate an individual
to leverage information. One type of impersonation in wireless networks is Rogue
access points (Figure 3.3 - 1.5.3). During an IP spoofing attack (Figure 3.3 - 1.5.4.1),
an attacker spoofs an IP address and sends packets impersonating a legitimate
host. Domain Name System (DNS) spoofing, also known as DNS cache poisoning,
(Figure 3.3 - 1.5.4.2) is another type of spoofing attack. An attacker, in this case,
attempts to redirect packets by poisoning the DNS. Finally, Address Resolution
Protocol (ARP) spoofing (Figure 3.3 - 1.5.4.3) is used to perform attacks like Man
in the Middle, in order to dissociate legitimate IP and Media Access Control (MAC)
addresses in the victims’ ARP tables.
Scanning/enumeration is an essential step for initiating different attacks. To perform
a scanning attack (Figure 3.3 - 1.6), an attacker starts to search the network for useful
information such as active nodes, running OS, software versions, etc. As defined
in [194], scanning has many forms, using different protocols such as Transmission
Control Protocol (TCP) (Figure 3.3 - 1.6.1) or UDP (Figure 3.3 - 1.6.2). Scanning and
enumeration fall under “Information Gathering”.
MAC address flooding (Figure 3.3 - 1.7), and Virtual Local Area Network (VLAN)
hopping (Figure 3.3 - 1.8) are also networking attacks. In MAC flooding (Figure 3.3
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- 1.7), the attacker targets the network switches and as a result, packets are redirected
to the wrong physical ports, while the VLAN hopping attack has two forms of either
switch spoofing (Figure 3.3 - 1.8.1) or double tagging (Figure 3.3 - 1.8.2).
The last three networking attacks, in the presented taxonomy, are
Probing (Figure 3.3 - 1.9), nonTor Traffic (Figure 3.3 - 1.10), and
Heartbleed (Figure 3.3 - 1.11). During a probing attack, an attacker is actively
footprinting a system for vulnerabilities. In Tor networks, nonTor traffic is considered
anomaly. Finally, Heartbleed is an attack based on a bug in the OpenSSL library.
3.2.2 Host Threats
Host attacks, unlike networking attacks, target a specific host or system. The attack
is conducted by running malicious software which aims to compromise or corrupt
system functionalities. Host attacks are categorised under the malware (Figure 3.3 -
2.1) category which includes Trojans (Figure 3.3 - 2.1.1), worms (Figure 3.3 - 2.1.2),
virus (Figure 3.3 - 2.1.3), adware (Figure 3.3 - 2.1.4), spyware (Figure 3.3 - 2.1.5),
ransomware (Figure 3.3 - 2.1.6) and camouflage attacks (Figure 3.3 - 2.1.7).
Trojans contribute to 51.45% of all malware [195] and they often look like
trusted applications but allow an attacker to control a device. Viruses affect programs
and files when shared with other users over the network, whilst worms are
known to self-replicate and affect multiple systems. Adware is known for showing
advertisements to users when surfing the Internet or installing software. Although
adware is less likely to run malicious code, it can compromise the performance of
a system. Spyware monitors and tracks user actions or gathers information such as
documents, user cookies, browsing history, emails, etc.
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Ransomware is a relatively new type of malware, which rose 350% in 2018 [195],
where the system is kept under the control of an attacker - or a third entity. This is
done through encrypting files until the user or the organisation pays a ransom. The
encryption key is then released and the files are recovered [196]. Finally, camouflage
malware evolved over time reaching polymorphic and metamorphic techniques in
1990 and 1998, respectively [197, 198]. For example, self-mutating malware could
use numerous techniques, such as instruction substitution or permutation, garbage
insertion, variable substitutions, and control-flow alteration [199].
3.2.3 Software Threats
Software threats are grouped in the Code injection (Figure 3.3 - 3.1) category in which
an attacker “injects” malicious code that affects the execution path of a certain program
or system. This category includes Structured Query Language (SQL) Injection, during
which an attacker attempts to inject a query to a target database. This query could
result in obtaining confidential data or deleting data by dropping columns, rows, or
tables. Cross Site Scripting (XSS), as another type of code injection attacks is used to
run malicious code in a web application to steal cookies or credentials. XSS has three
main categories. In persistent/stored XSS (Figure 3.3 - 3.1.2.1), a script is saved to a
database and is executed every time a page is loaded. In Reflected XSS (Figure 3.3
- 3.1.2.2), the script is part of an HTTP request sent to the server. Document Object
Model (DOM)-based XSS (Figure 3.3 - 3.1.2.3) is considered an advanced type of
XSS where the attacker changes values in the DOM e.g., document location, document
Uniform Resource Locator (URL), etc. DOM-based XSS is difficult to detect as the
script is never transferred to the server.
Fingerprinting (Figure 3.3 - 3.2) and misconfiguration are also forms of software
threats. Fake server certificates (Figure 3.3 - 3.4) are considered alarming and should
be considered while analysing communications as they could deceive the browser/user
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thinking that the connection is secure. This could result in phishing websites looking
legitimate. Moreover, they could be used as a seed to perform other attacks like
Man-in-the-Middle.
Finally, Drive-by or download (Figure 3.3-3.5) is another software threat that
requires no action from the user, however, the malicious code is automatically
downloaded. In 2017, it contributed to 48% of all web-based attacks [200, 201] and
is considered one of the main threats in 2019 [202].
3.2.4 Physical Threats
Physical attacks are a result of a tampering attempt on the network hardware
(edge, or other devices) or its configuration. This can include changing
configurations (Figure 3.3 - 4.2) and introducing backdoors (i.e., The Evil Maid). CI
and IoT networks are usually exposed to physical threats. It is important to note that
physical threats can also include physical damage (Figure 3.3 - 4.3).
3.2.5 Other Threats
The last category of threats contains miscellaneous threats. Most of these threats are
influenced by the attacker actions. This category includes user masquerade (Figure 3.3
- 5.1) in which the attacker uses a fake identity. Phishing is another form of attacks
that relies on social engineering. In a phishing attack, an attacker uses emails or
other electronic messaging services to obtain credentials or confidential data. Spear
phishing, unlike phishing, targets a specific user or organisation. The attacker, in this
case, pretends to own and/or know specific details and personal data.
When the attacker attempts to gain authorised access or higher privileges to the
target system, either by promoting to a root user or gaining local access, these
attacks are called U2R (Figure 3.3 - 5.3) and R2L (Figure 3.3 - 5.4), respectively.
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Additionally, a user can be denied an action such as repudiation attack (Figure 3.3 -
5.5). Human attacks can also include session hijacking (Figure 3.3 - 5.6) or sniffing.
These attacks are based on the attacker gaining access over an active session to access
cookies and tokens. Finally, brute-force attacks (Figure 3.3 - 5.8), either Secure Shell
(SSH) (Figure 3.3 - 5.8.1) or File Transfer Protocol (FTP) (Figure 3.3 - 5.8.2), are
another form of human threats. Attackers in this case attempt to authenticate by trying
various passwords or passphrases.
3.3 Attacks Coverage
Based on the taxonomy discussed in Section 3.2 and the recent IDS articles outlined in
Table 3.1, it can be observed that some attacks are in the focal point of research while
a lot are not considered by recent IDS. This is due to the underrepresentation of these
attacks in recent datasets and the difficulties associated with generating datasets.
Figure 3.4a visualises all the threats presented in the taxonomy. The percentages in
the outer circle represent attacks covered by the IDS discussed in Table 3.1. As shown,
a large number of attacks (63.6%) are uncovered (i.e., not represented in the recent
datasets, thus not detected by IDS).
Figure 3.4b visualises the attacks detected by the different IDS presented in
Table 3.1. It is shown that the four attacks available in the KDD Cup’99 dataset are
the most used by IDS research, namely; DoS/DDoS, Probing, R2L and U2R. It is also
noted that these same four attacks are the ones available in the NSL-KDD dataset and
the DARPA datasets. The popularity of the KDD dataset family and their readiness for
ML development contributes to this skewness in the attacks detected by recent IDS.
Only 12 attack categories from the presented taxonomy are listed in Figure 3.4b
which highlights potential limitations of these IDS to cope with the broad range of
attacks and zero-day attacks. To tackle the detection of zero-day attacks, there is a
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(a) Occurrence of all attacks categories based on the presented taxonomy
(b) Distribution of Attacks discussed in Table 3.1
Figure 3.4
Distribution of Covered Attacks in IDS from Articles Listed in Table 3.1
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need to build extendable datasets that could be used to train different ML models used
for detection. By employing extendable datasets and a standardised method for dataset
generation, alongside advancements in ML [203, 204], new attacks can be integrated
into anomaly-based datasets and consequently, utilised by IDS.
3.4 Summary
In this chapter, recent IDS articles are analysed and discussed. The analysis shows the
wide range of algorithms used to build IDS. Table 3.1 lists the datasets and algorithms
used by each of the articles, while Figure 3.2 plots the commonly used algorithms and
their frequency of use. The discussion highlights (i) the absence of the representation
of new attacks in IDS datasets. (ii) The lack of datasets for intrusion detection on
special-purpose networks, like IoT, limiting the availability of suitable deployable
IDS, and (iii) the dominance of ML usage to build anomaly-based IDS. Due to the
pace at which new cyber attacks are rising, new non-traditional ML techniques are
needed to build appropriate IDS that can learn from limited data and are capable of
detecting zero-day attacks. To further demonstrate the gap, a cyber threats taxonomy
is presented. The taxonomy classifies cyber threats based on the OSI layer, active or
passive behaviour and threat source. Although comprehensive, the presented taxonomy
is built in an extendable fashion and is publicly available for future amendments. The
presented taxonomy confirms the cyber attack representation gap.
Based on the analysis covered in this chapter, the next chapter addresses the
highlighted gap in special-purpose network datasets and IDS. This is done by
investigating the classification of anomalies and cyber attacks in two case studies of
special-purpose networks; SCADA and IoT using six ML techniques.
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Chapter 4
Utilising Machine Learning for
Special-Purpose IDS
4.1 Problem Statement
The lack of datasets for special-purpose networks (i.e., SCADA, Industrial Automation
and Control Systems (IACS), Distributed Control Systems (DCS), and IoT networks
was highlighted in Chapter 3. This dataset shortage directly affects the advancement
of IDS in this regard. This is due to the reliance of research on dataset availability for
analysis and training up-to-date IDS. Furthermore, with the increased dependence on
automation and advancement in deployed solutions, current CI and IoT systems are
vulnerable to faulty operations and cyber attacks [205].
Robert Mitchell and Ing-Ray Chen [206] survey recent IDS for Cyber-Physical
Systems (CPS) and CI usage. The authors classify IDS based on detection techniques
into knowledge-based and behaviour-based, and based on audit into host-based and
network-based, which aligns with the IDS classification previously discussed. The
authors analyse aerospace, automotive, medical, and SCADA IDS. Their analysis
shows that, out of the 32 IDS papers they considered, 22 (68.75%) do not release their
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dataset, 4 (12.5%) do not report the dataset used and 4 (12.5%) use public datasets.
Two of the four public datasets are KDD Cup’99 dataset, NSL-KDD dataset, which are
general-purpose IDS datasets. The other two datasets cover replay and unauthorisation
attacks.
Amin et al. [207, 208] overview the various security threats of CI networks which
include threats targeting different layers (physical, regulatory control and supervisory).
This emphasises the different elements and requirements of CI networks. Furthermore,
Cheng et al. [209] highlight the lack of available mechanisms for CI IDS and
Mathur [210] discusses the challenges facing the detection of anomalies and incidents
in CI. These challenges include failing to detect coordinated cyber attacks and high
FPR that, based on the author’s investigation, are beyond the acceptable range.
Current general-purpose IDS fall short in delivering the security needs for
special-purpose networks. This is reasoned by multiple factors that include, but
not limited to, the specific requirements and architectures of these systems, the
heterogeneity of legacy protocols, their scale, computational power, and uniqueness of
the usage scenarios [10]. Therefore, building IDS that can cope with these requirements
is a pressing need. However, the limited availability of public IoT and CI datasets often
form a barrier against this advancement.
To tackle this problem, this chapter focuses on building special-purpose IDS while
exploring the different challenges that accompany this process. Six ML algorithms
and two real-world datasets are used for evaluation. These algorithms are the most
commonly used in the literature [211]. The first dataset is generated by the French
Naval Academy that simulates a CI that controls a water SCADA system [81].
The dataset comprises real-world scenarios that cover hardware failures, sabotage,
and cyber attacks. The second dataset is generated and collected using a simulated
IoT network that is based on MQTT protocol [212]. The dataset comprises normal
operations and four cyber attack scenarios.
53
Firstly, this chapter provides an overview of the six different ML techniques that
are used to build the IDS models. Secondly, the first dataset is outlined (SCADA
dataset) where the dataset properties, scenarios description, and dataset preprocessing
are presented. Later, the SCADA IDS models are explained and the experimental
results are discussed. Thirdly, an MQTT simulated network is used to generate a novel
MQTT-IDS dataset (MQTT-IoT-IDS2020 dataset). The dataset covers benign traffic,
general brute-force cyber attacks, and MQTT-based attacks. The dataset collection and
processing are described. Three levels of feature abstraction are established; namely,
packet-based, unidirectional flow, and bidirectional flow. The generated dataset is then
used to train and evaluate ML-based IDS. Finally, the chapter is summarised to show
the IDS performance and limitations.
4.2 Background
The following subsections introduce the six ML techniques that are used in this chapter
to build IDS for CI and IoT networks. These techniques are Logistic Regression (LR),
Naı̈ve Bayes (NB), k-NN, SVM, DT, and Random Forest (RF) [213, 214]. These
are amongst the commonly used techniques in the literature for evaluating IDS as
outlined in [43, 215, 211]. Furthermore, the analysis of recent IDS articles presented in
Chapter 3 demonstrates that these six are the most used succeeding ANN with 16.4%,
as follows: SVM (13.23%), DT (11.11%), NB (10.05%), k-NN (5.82%), RF (4.76%),
and LR (3.17%). The use of different techniques allows a comparison and analysis of
their varying performance. Finally, given that special-purpose networks datasets have




LR is a well-established statistical technique for classification [216]. The model is
based on the logistic, or sigmoid function (Equation 4.1), and the training goal is to
fit the function to best split the training data. In a 2D space, the resulting curve can be





LR can be (i) binary, where the dependant variable (i.e. the output) is a class of two
possible options (e.g., benign and anomaly), (ii) multinomial, where the dependant
variable can be drawn out of many classes (e.g. benign, attack 1, and attack 2) or
(iii) ordinal, which is multinomial except that the classes have an ordinal relation (e.g.,
attack severity) [217].
The output of LR is determined based on a decision boundary and a threshold. In
the binary case, for example, if the output is ≥ 0.5, it belongs to class A, otherwise, it
belongs to class B, as shown in Equation 4.2.
Y =

A, if(f(x) ≥ 0.5)
B, otherwise
(4.2)











NB classifier relies on Bayes theory [218] which depends on the conditional
probability defined as “The likelihood of an event or outcome occurring, based on the
occurrence of a previous event or outcome” [219]. Conditional probability p(Ci|x),
where x represents the input and Ci is the ith class, determines how likely an
instance belongs to class i. Based on Bayes theory; p(Ci|x) is expanded as shown in
Equation 4.3, which resembles the prior probability (class) multiplied by the likelihood
divided by the evidence. This technique is “naı̈ve” as it assumes that all features (x 1,





Given n features that represent x, the likelihood (p(x|Ci) of each feature is calculated
based on its occurrence in the training data, and is determined by Equation 4.4.
p(x|Ci) = p(x1|Ci)× p(x2|Ci)× p(x3|Ci)× ....× p(xn|Ci) (4.4)
After training, the class label of x is determined based on the maximum probability
max(p(Ci|x)). It is important to note that p(x) is used in Bayes theory as a
normalisation term in order to calculate the probability. Without p(x), the output of
p(Ci|x) does not represent a probability, however, since the NB technique aims to
decide which class label to assign to an unknown instance, the probabilistic numeric
value is insignificant, therefore p(x) can be dropped to reduce computations and only
p(Ci)× p(x|Ci) is used.
If the features of x are continuous, it is assumed that they follow a normal
distribution (Gaussian distribution). Thus, the probabilities are calculated based on the
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k-NN is known as one of the most popular classifiers due to its effectiveness and
simplicity [220]. k-NN is based on distance measurement. Using the training instances,
a new instance is classified based on its similarity to the training instances. Specifically,
the closest k instances to the new one are the ones that determine the classifier’s
decision [214].
The distance between two instances x and y can be calculated using various
formulas. For example, Equation 4.6 is used to calculate the L2 norm (Euclidean








(|xi − yi|) (4.7)
The distances between a new instance and all instances in the training data are
calculated and sorted. The least k distances are used to decide to which label the new
instance belongs, using majority voting. It is important to mention that if k is too small
(1 for example), the model will be sensitive to noisy inputs and will not be able to
generalise [221]. Figure 4.2 show sample k-NN boundaries, where two classes are
plotted with red and blue circles, and an unknown instance is plotted in yellow. Based
on the instances in Figure 4.2, the label of the unknown instance is decided as follows;
with k = 1 and k = 2, the instance is labelled as Class B (Blue), while it is labelled as







Class A (Red), Class B (Blue), and Unknown Instance (Yellow)
4.2.4 Support Vector Machine
SVM is one of the well-established supervised ML techniques [223]. Given the
training samples, SVM training goal is to construct a hyperplane in a high-dimensional
space that best separates the given classes [224]. Formally, given two classes, the






max(0, 1− yif(xi))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Loss
f(xi) = (wTxi + b)
Where C is a regularisation parameter to represent the trade-off between ensuring
that xi is on the expected side of the plane and increasing the margin. If an SVM is
working in a two-dimensional space, then the hyperplane is visualised as a line. In a
three-dimensional space, it is a plane, and an n-dimensional plane when working in
higher dimensions.
A data point falls in one of three places in relation to the hyperplane based on
yif(xi). If yif(xi) is greater than 1, then the point is outside the margin and does not
contribute to the loss. If yif(xi) equals 1, then the point is on the margin. Finally,
if yif(xi) is less than 1, then the point contributes to the loss as it is on the wrong
side [226].
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Data Linear SVM RBF SVM Poly SVM Sigmoid SVM
Figure 4.3
SVM Samples (Linear, RBF, Polynomial (3rd degree), and Sigmoid) [227]
When the data is not linearly separable, SVM use a kernel to map the data (input
features) to a nonlinear higher dimensional space in which a hyperplane best separates
the classes. SVM kernels include linear, Radial Basis Function (RBF), polynomial, and
sigmoid [211]. SVM kernels and decision boundaries are visualised in Figure 4.3.
4.2.5 Decision Tree and Random Forest
DT are composed of a group of branches that represents feature-based tests [213, 228].
Given a decision tree root, the tree starts branching based on the feature values until
reaching a leaf where the decision is made (i.e., the class is determined), as shown in
Figure 4.4.
During the training process, the training data is recursively split until a decision tree
is built. To reduce the complexity of DT and avoid overfitting, pruning process takes
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Random Forest Sample [211]
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RF, on the other hand, are a group of DT, as shown in Figure 4.5. The output
of the DT is combined to reach a classification decision in an ensemble fashion.
Bootstrapping, also known as Bagging [228], is a statistical technique used to split
the data and features among different DT.
Table 4.1 provides a short summary of the advantages and disadvantages of each
of the ML algorithms discussed in this section. Liu and Lang [43], Xie et al. [229],
and Mishra et al. [211] survey different ML techniques, their characteristics, pros, and
cons when they are applied to IDS. The authors highlight that these techniques are the





- Simple to understand and
implement
- Fast training
- Low performance with large
feature space
- Classes separability assumption
NB
- Simple to understand
- Fast to classify
- Scalable and can learn from small
dataset
- Poor performance when training
data is not representable
- Assumes feature independence
- Hard to operate with continuous
data
k-NN
- Simple to implement
- Easy to understand
- No training required
- Flexible in terms of choosing the
function that represents distance
- Slow (curse of dimensionality)
- High time/memory complexity
- Does not perform well with
imbalanced datasets
- Sensitive to the choice of K
SVM
- Well-suited for high-dimensional
data
- Can work with non-linear features
- Can learn from small data
- Not suited when classes overlap
- Relatively slow
- Computationally intensive
- Choosing the kernel can be
challenging
DT
- Easy to explain predictions
- Features interactions are taken
into account
- Can train using continuous and
discrete features
- Sensitive to data
- Prone to overfitting
RF
- Less sensitive to data compared to
DT
- Performs well on large datasets
- Mitigates the DT overfitting
problem
- Predictions are not easy to explain
- Slow training
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Python v3.6.4 [230] and scikit-learn v0.21.3 [227] are used to implement the six
ML techniques with the parameters as follows:




∗ fit intercept (bias): True
∗ solver: lbfgs
∗ max iter: 100
– NB
∗ var smoothing: 1e-9
– k-NN
∗ n neighbors: 5
∗ weights: uniform
∗ algorithm: auto
∗ leaf size: 30
– SVM
∗ kernel: linear and rbf
∗ degree: 3
∗ gamma: scale
∗ tol (tolerance): 1e-3
∗ shrinking: True
– DT and RF
∗ criterion: entropy
∗ splitter: best
∗ max depth: none
∗ min samples split: 2
∗ min samples leaf: 1
∗ max features: Square root of number of features
– RF
∗ n estimators: 10
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4.3 SCADA Dataset
Having discussed the problem this chapter is addressing and the ML techniques used,
this section aims to overview the first dataset, which is generated from a CI water
system controlled by SCADA.
4.3.1 SCADA Dataset Architecture
The CI is composed of a 9 litre main tank and a 7 litre secondary one. Each tank
can either store or distribute liquid (water in this case). The main tank is equipped
with four sensors connected to the Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC). Figure 4.6
shows the physical architecture of the control system, while a high-level diagrammatic
representation is depicted in Figure 4.7.
The four sensors are used to measure the liquid level in the main tank. “Discrete
sensor 0” indicates a low level in the tank (1.25L). “Discrete sensor 1” indicates a
measure of less than 3.35L. “Discrete sensor 2”, indicates a level of 8L while “Discrete
Figure 4.6
SCADA System Architecture [81]
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Figure 4.7
SCADA Network High-Level Architecture [81]
sensor 3” indicates a full tank measure (9L) [81]. The sensors inputs (A, B, C, and D)
are concatenated as one register (0000ABCD) as shown in Figure 4.7.
There are two pumps, Pump1 and Pump2, that control the flow between the main
and secondary tanks. The liquid volume in the secondary tank is monitored by an
ultrasound sensor installed at the top of the tank. It measures the volume using the
distance from the liquid surface to the top of the tank. It is also used to detect the
existence of liquid in the tank. All sensors use the Modbus protocol to transfer the
collated data to the control and monitor network.
4.3.2 SCADA Operation and Dataset Scenarios
During the dataset generation, the primary tank is filled from a recovery tank
simulating a liquid source, which, in real life, can be a fuel line or a river. When
the primary tank is filled (using Pump2), the PLC activates Pump1 to transfer the
liquid from the primary tank to the secondary tank to avoid spillage. Constant liquid
consumption is simulated using the valves at the bottom of the tanks.
The full operation is monitored by the PLC using sensory data readings recorded
on interval of 0.1 seconds [81]. If the liquid volume in the primary tank goes below
1.25L, the PLC turns on Pump2 automatically to allow refilling from the recovery tank.
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Table 4.2
SCADA: PLC Registers Extracted Bits Representation
Reg. No. Bit No. Value
2
4 Discrete Sensor 3
5 Discrete Sensor 2
6 Discrete Sensor 1






4 16-bits Depth Sensor
In a similar fashion, Pump2 will be turned off when a total of 9L is reached. Pump1
is automatically activated when the ultrasound sensor detects a liquid level below 2.1L
and automatically deactivates when the liquid reaches 6.3L.
The dataset consists of Comma-Separated Values (CSV) format files that contain
the sensor readings, captured from the PLC registers (2, 3, and 4) to describe the
state of the system. Table 4.2 provides an overview of the different registers and their
corresponding usage. Register2 bits provide the binary state of each discrete sensor. To
retrieve each separate sensor value, bitwise masks and operations are used. Register3
indicates the state of the two pumps and valves showing whether each is activated or
deactivated. Register4 contains the depth sensor reading represented as a step value
from 0 to 10,000 for the ultrasound sensors (e.g., step 3,000 represents 2.1L of liquid
in the tank).
The dataset comprises 14 different scenarios besides normal behaviour. These are
listed in Table 4.3, with each scenario covering one of five operational scenarios
representing potential threats (i.e., sabotage, accident, breakdown, or cyber attack) as
well as six affected components. The affected components are system components that
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4.3.3 SCADA Dataset Preprocessing
Figure 4.8 summarises the preprocessing steps applied to the SCADA dataset. As
demonstrated, the preprocessing is composed of six stages.
1. Extracting Instances
The dataset is provided in raw CSV log files, where the raw readings are recorded
line by line. Each instance is represented in 10 rows, each row containing date,
time, register number, and register reading/value of the PLC. At this stage, each
scenario instances are extracted from the corresponding log file. An instance is
represented by the PLC recording of the register values at a specific time.
2. Calculating the rate of change of Register4
Register4 monitors the liquid level in the secondary tank and its value is crucial
for each instance. Register4 value is demonstrated as the most significant,
however, its significance does not lie in the reading value itself, but in the drift
of values over time (i.e. the change trend/rate). Figure 4.9 visualises Register4




2. Calculate rate of change











































SCADA: The trends of the Rate of Change of Register4 readings for different scenarios
For each instance, the rate of change is calculated over 10 time frames as
expressed in Equation 4.8.





Table 4.3 demonstrates the variance in the number of instances over the different
scenarios. The instances are not evenly distributed over the scenarios. Therefore,
the scenario(s) with the most instances will bias the model training, thus
affecting the classification output. A threshold is applied to take only the first
N instances of each file. N should satisfy two conditions: (i) reduce the gap
between instances count across scenarios and (ii) maintain the variation of
instances per scenario.
4. Normalisation
Normalisation is an essential step to ensure the features are in the same scale and
ready for ML usage. Min-Max normalisation is used [39].
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5. Cross-Validation
Finally, the data is split into training and testing sets. A split of 80% for training
and 20% for testing [231] is used over 5-fold cross-validation.
4.4 SCADA Experiments and Results
In this section, three different experiments are outlined and evaluated showing how
accurately anomalies are detected. The aim of the different experiments is to provide
different levels of information regarding the occurrence of an anomaly. This varies
from merely reporting the occurrence of an anomaly, to identifying the affected
component and the anomalous scenario.
4.4.1 Experiment 1: Anomaly Detection
In real situations, IDS should fire an alert when an anomaly occurs. The first
experiment evaluates the ability of the six ML algorithms discussed earlier to flag
anomalies in the SCADA dataset. The models are utilised as binary classifiers to
distinguish anomalies from benign behaviour, hence this experiment does not specify
the anomaly type or associated affected component as the case in the following ones.
Figure 4.10 shows the classification accuracies of the different ML algorithms used.
As demonstrated, the highest accuracies reached are 94.12%, 93.67%, 93.30%, and

























SCADA: Anomaly Detection Overall Accuracy (5-fold cross-validation)
The recall, precision, and F1-Score of the first experiment are detailed in Table 4.4.
The three techniques with top overall accuracies (k-NN, DT, and RF) are able to
classify both benign behaviour and anomalies efficiently. The recall of the benign
class is 74.01%, 74.01%, and 75.66% and the anomaly class is 97.15%, 96.22%,
and 96.38% when using k-NN, DT, and RF, respectively. The reason these three
algorithms outperform the rest is due to the fact that they can map complex relations
and non-linearity compared to the others that aim to fit a hyperplane or a probabilistic
relation. It is important to note that in a CI setup, normal operations and anomalies can
overlap [232], thus complicating the classes separability task.
Table 4.4





Benign 7.15% 90.34% 13.22%
Anomaly 99.89% 87.7% 93.4%
Weighted Average 87.73% 88.05% 88.05%
NB
Benign 99.95% 16.74% 28.67%
Anomaly 24.99% 99.97% 39.98%
Weighted Average 34.82% 89.06% 89.06%
k-NN
Benign 74.01% 79.7% 76.74%
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Anomaly 97.15% 96.12% 96.63%
Weighted Average 94.12% 93.97% 93.97%
SVM
Benign 7.15% 92.24% 13.23%
Anomaly 99.91% 87.7% 93.41%
Weighted Average 87.75% 88.3% 88.3%
Kernel SVM
Benign 39.53% 98.52% 56.4%
Anomaly 99.91% 91.63% 95.59%
Weighted Average 91.99% 92.54% 92.54%
DT
Benign 74.01% 74.72% 74.35%
Anomaly 96.22% 96.09% 96.15%
Weighted Average 93.3% 93.28% 93.28%
RF
Benign 75.66% 75.99% 75.78%
Anomaly 96.38% 96.33% 96.36%
Weighted Average 93.67% 93.67% 93.67%
Firing an alert when an anomaly occurs is important, however, since the alert here
is provided in a binary fashion, it is not straightforward – in this case – to identify the
problem at first sight. Therefore, taking a corrective action is delayed. To this end, a
second experiment is established with the aim of providing more information.
4.4.2 Experiment 2: Affected Component Classification
Instead of just firing an alert, the second experiment aims to report the affected
component when an anomaly occurs using multi-class classifiers. Compared to the first
experiment, this additional piece of information provides more details which assists in
taking accelerated corrective actions.
Figure 4.11 shows the classification results of the different ML algorithms.
The highest accuracies are 82.69%, 82.71%, and 81.79 using k-NN, RF and DT,




























SCADA: Affected Component Overall Classification Accuracy (5-fold cross-validation)
of the fired alert compared to the binary classification explained in Section 4.4.1. Due
to the fact that more classes are involved, the accuracy of the model accounts for a large
number of false positives. This trade-off is further noted in Table 4.5 where the recall,
precision, and F1-Score are listed for the different algorithms. LR and SVM experience
the least recall of 39.83% and 59.82%. This is due to the non-linearity of the affected
components classes. Therefore, the inability of these techniques to fit, whereas k-NN
has a recall of 79.76%, DT has a recall of 74.31%, and NB has a recall of 79.76%, for
the benign class.
Table 4.5






None 39.83% 31.38% 35.08%
Discrete Sensor 1 59.53% 37.16% 45.75%
Discrete Sensor 2 23.79% 60.17% 34.05%
Network 56.57% 53.66% 55.06%
Ultrasound Sensor 62.55% 70.09% 66.09%
Whole 69.57% 100% 81.98%
Weighted Average 52.85% 56.74% 56.74%
NB
None 79.76% 38.48% 51.9%
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Discrete Sensor 1 50.57% 35.71% 41.82%
Discrete Sensor 2 0% 0% 0%
Network 16.71% 21% 18.61%
Ultrasound Sensor 1.73% 98.89% 3.39%
Whole 100% 18.82% 31.67%
Weighted Average 28.02% 43.26% 43.26%
k-NN
None 74.46% 78.39% 76.33%
Discrete Sensor 1 76.82% 74.17% 75.43%
Discrete Sensor 2 68.47% 63.09% 65.66%
Network 84.73% 87.45% 86.05%
Ultrasound Sensor 90.55% 90.59% 90.57%
Whole 99.13% 100% 99.56%
Weighted Average 82.69% 83% 83%
SVM
None 59.82% 42.95% 50%
Discrete Sensor 1 84.69% 58.63% 69.25%
Discrete Sensor 2 23.79% 57.98% 33.69%
Network 54.27% 55.87% 55.05%
Ultrasound Sensor 66.83% 72.89% 69.72%
Whole 100% 100% 100%
Weighted Average 60.97% 62.05% 62.05%
Kernel SVM
None 62.82% 67.27% 64.96%
Discrete Sensor 1 82.24% 61.62% 70.43%
Discrete Sensor 2 61.62% 51.93% 56.36%
Network 70.54% 79.86% 74.9%
Ultrasound Sensor 77.84% 85.76% 81.59%
Whole 99.57% 100% 99.78%
Weighted Average 73.55% 75.06% 75.06%
DT
None 74.31% 75% 74.63%
Discrete Sensor 1 73.7% 74.46% 74.06%
Discrete Sensor 2 64.72% 64.11% 64.39%
Network 84.8% 85.29% 85.04%
Ultrasound Sensor 90.3% 89.4% 89.85%
Whole 99.89% 100% 99.95%
Weighted Average 81.79% 81.8% 81.8%
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RF
None 74.16% 78.24% 76.11%
Discrete Sensor 1 77.19% 73.68% 75.38%
Discrete Sensor 2 68.32% 64.32% 66.22%
Network 85.12% 86.43% 85.77%
Ultrasound Sensor 90.06% 91.18% 90.61%
Whole 99.89% 100% 99.95%
Weighted Average 82.71% 82.95% 82.95%
The results of this experiment confirm the diversity of scenarios that affect different
components, yet the overlap between classes causes some to be harder to detect than
others. For example, the detection of the “Discrete Sensor 2” class experiences a low
recall of 23.79%, 0%, 68.47%, 23.79%, 61.62%, 64.72%, and 68.32% when using LR,
NB, k-NN, SVM, Gaussian SVM, DT, and RF, respectively. On the other hand, the
recall of the “Whole” class is high. The recall, in this case, is 69.57%, 100%, 99.13%,
100%, 99.57%, 99.89%, and 99.89% using LR, NB, k-NN, SVM, Gaussian SVM, DT,
and RF, respectively.
Pointing out the affected component extends the reporting capability of the model.
It allows a better identification of the problem, thus a quicker response. However, the
optimal case would be to report the exact scenario. This will reduce the time spent
to identify the problem and speed up the mitigation process. To this end, a third
experiment is established.
4.4.3 Experiment 3: Scenarios Classification
In the third experiment, the goal is to further extend the system’s ability to flag
anomalies by identifying the specific scenarios that are considered suspicious. To
perform this experiment, three operational trials are conducted. The experiments use
multi-class classifiers and leverage their output probabilities to report the suspicious
scenario.
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4.4.3.1 One Scenario Classification
In the first trial, ML models are trained to classify different scenarios based on the
multi-class classifier highest probability. Figure 4.12 shows the results of the different
ML techniques. The highest accuracy reaches only 81.19%. For completeness and
reproducibility, the full results tables (recall, precision, and F1-Score) are reported in
Appendix C.
The results demonstrate either a high or a low recall for different classes. To analyse
this, the scenarios are reviewed and the following conclusions are drawn:
(i) The scenarios in the dataset are co-related, meaning that they can overlap. This
is a known problem in CI setup [232].
(ii) The models report multiple probable scenarios for each instance with a
maximum of 4 probable ones.
Elaborating on the second conclusion, since the ML models can output the
probability of the classification result, it is observed that each instance results in a
maximum of 4 non-zero scenario probabilities. This means that each instance can
belong to at most 4 scenarios. This is demonstrated in Table 4.6 where it lists the


























SCADA: Scenarios Overall Classification Accuracy, Single Scenario (5-fold cross-validation)
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Table 4.6




























3817 - - -
100% - - -
k-NN 3
2336 1221 260 -
61.20% 31.99% 6.81% -
RF 4
2144 1315 355 3
56.17% 34.45% 9.3% 0.08%
maximum is 4 probable scenarios, the table shows the count of instances having 1,
2, 3, or 4 probable scenarios. For example, the second row shows that 61.2% of
the instances are classified with only 1 probable class, 31.99% of the instances are
classified with 2 probable scenarios and 6.81% with 3 probable scenarios. As a result,
the following experiments leverage this to report two probable scenarios which reduces
the uncertainty of this approach.
4.4.3.2 Two Scenarios Classification
In the second trial, the model reports two scenarios when an anomaly occurs instead
of one, compared to the previous experiment. The two scenarios are the ones with
the highest probabilities provided by the different classifiers. Based on the fact that
the scenarios overlap and anomalies in CI are not mutually exclusive, an instance is
correctly classified if it belongs to one of the two reported scenarios. In this case,
multi-label classification would improve the detection accuracy. Figure 4.13 shows
that this modification increases the overall detection accuracy to 95.60% and 95.49%
when using RF and k-NN, receptively. A model with higher detection accuracy allows
for a better action according to the reported scenarios. This alleviates the attack and



























SCADA: Scenarios Overall Classification Accuracy, Two Probable Scenarios (5-fold
cross-validation)
Table 4.7 provides a demonstration of instances that are correctly classified when
one probable scenario versus two probable scenarios are reported. The provided
demonstration is calculated in regard to the k-NN classification model. In the first
row, “2 Floating Objects” scenario, 67 are misclassified as “Plastic Bag” sabotage.
However, 60 of them can be correctly reported by considering the second probable
Table 4.7
SCADA: Co-relation of scenarios that are misclassified based on one probable scenario and
correctly reported with the second probable one (Calculated based on k-NN experiment)
Instances count Scenario (Y) The count of instances classified































5 5 - - - - - - 5
Normal 113 78 - - - 1 96 - 16
Plastic
Bag
107 91 49 - 3 - 35 20 -
Sensor
Failure
242 184 - - 99 73 - 9 61
Spoofing 54 32 - - - 44 10 - -
Wrong
Con.
134 96 - 7 31 8 88 - -
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scenario. Similarly, in Table 4.7 row 4, 107 instances of the “Plastic Bag” scenario
are misclassified to be “2 Floating Objects” (49 instances), “Sensor Failure” (35),
“Spoofing” (20 instances) and “Normal” (3 instances). 91 of these instances can be
correctly reported with the consideration of the second probable scenario.
In this experiment, two probable scenarios are reported. This can be misleading
when the first scenario is sufficient. This happens when an anomaly does not match
multiple scenarios. In this case, reporting a second scenario adds unneeded complexity.
Therefore, the third trial provides a confidence measure that allows better reporting,
thus improving the situational handling response.
4.4.3.3 Scenarios Classification Using Confidence
In the third trial, a single scenario is solely reported unless its classification probability
is less than a defined threshold. This threshold serves as the model confidence interval.
Therefore, when the model classification probability falls below this threshold, two
scenarios are reported. Two threshold values are used for this experiment; 75% and
85% and the results are shown in Figure 4.14.
When a 75% confidence interval is used, a single scenario is reported as long as its
classification probability is greater than or equal to 0.75, otherwise, two scenarios are
reported. The overall detection accuracy reaches 91.57%. The overall classification
accuracy rises when using an 85% confidence interval. This is demonstrated in
Figure 4.14. The overall detection accuracy reaches a maximum of 95.49% using
k-NN.
Some conclusions can be drawn from Figure 4.13 and Figure 4.14. DT accuracy
remains the same in all experiments due to the DT output which reports a single
scenario for all the instances based on how the decision branches are formed. Table 4.6
shows that the DT model outputs a single scenario for 100% of the instances.
Therefore, it is not possible to report two probable scenarios. The accuracy reaches































































75% Confidence Interval 85% Confidence Interval
Figure 4.14
SCADA: Scenarios Overall Accuracy Classification, One or Two Scenario(s) Based on 75%
and 85% Confidence Intervals (5-fold cross-validation)
In the next section, the same ML techniques are used to evaluate and analyse the
performance of detecting anomalies in IoT networks. A novel MQTT-based dataset is
generated and used for evaluation.
4.5 MQTT IDS Dataset Generation
IoT devices have been used extensively in the past decade and is estimated to reach 25.1
billion devices in 2025 [233]. IoT networks are utilised for different purposes [149] that
include, but are not limited to, smart cities [234], farming [235], supply chain [236],
and healthcare [237]. One of the distinguishable protocols for machine-to-machine IoT
communication is MQTT [238, 212].
Harsha et al. [239] survey the protocols used in IoT networks with a focus on
MQTT protocol. The authors’ work identifies the various MQTT associated security
risks, which highlights the need for special-purpose IDS. Their work shows that there
are 53396 publicly available and accessible MQTT devices [239]. Dinculeană and
Cheng [240] further analyse the MQTT security vulnerabilities. Their work concludes
that there is a need for robust detection techniques for MQTT attacks.
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Due to the lack of datasets that comprise IoT traffic, there is a pressing need to
generate up-to-date IoT datasets for IDS usage. Based on the analysis and to the best
of the author’s knowledge, there are no available IDS datasets that contain MQTT
traffic (benign or malicious).
Furthermore, with the increased dependence on IoT and the inadequacy of
general-purpose IDS to fit IoT needs - there is a need to build IoT IDS. Nonetheless,
this requires the availability of datasets to process, train, and evaluate classification
models. In this section, a generated MQTT-based IDS dataset is presented. This is the
first dataset to simulate an MQTT-based network comprising benign and malicious
traffic (representing generic and MQTT-specific cyber attacks).
4.5.1 MQTT-IoT-IDS2020
The “MQTT-IoT-IDS2020” dataset is generated using a simulated MQTT network
architecture to reflect IoT network communication. The network comprises twelve
sensors, a broker, a simulated camera, and an attacker. Five scenarios are recorded
which cover normal operation and four attack scenarios. The attacker performs the
four attacks and each is recorded independently.
The attack scenarios aim to cover both MQTT-based attacks and generic attacks
that are known to target IoT networks. According to Dietz et al., the life cycle of an
IoT network attack is composed of 7 stages. The first stage is “Scan”, followed by
“Brute-force” [241]. Network scanning is the first tier in the five-tier IoT threat model
that is outlined by Hafeez et al. [242]. Therefore, the attack scenarios are:
• Aggressive scan (Scan A)
• UDP scan (Scan sU)
• Sparta SSH brute-force (Sparta)
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Figure 4.15
MQTT-IoT-IDS2020: Network Architecture
Figure 4.15 shows the network components. The broker is responsible for delivering
the messages as it receives them from all subscribers and routing them to their
destinations. The 12 sensors are divided into three subnetowrks to simulate three
different components. During normal operation, all 12 sensors send randomised
messages using the “Publish” MQTT command. The length of the messages varies
between sensors to simulate different usage scenarios and the content is randomly
generated. In order to simulate a camera feed, VLC media player is used to send a
continuous UDP stream to the camera feed server. The network traffic is captured using
the router’s Ethernet ports. Furthermore, the network drops packets to simulate real-life
situations. The dropping rates are 0.2%, 1%, and 0.13%, which are based on the
average acceptable loss rates [243]. The benign traffic (normal traffic) is first recorded.
Then the operation continues as background traffic during the process of recording
different attacks. As shown in Figure 4.15, the attacker IP address is “192.168.2.5”,
which is used later in labelling the dataset instances.
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Tcpdump is used to capture the network traffic. The following tools are used as
follows:
• Virtual machines are used to simulate the network devices.
• Nmap is used for the scanning attacks.
• MQTT-PWN [244] is used for the MQTT brute-force attack.
The OS specification is as follows:
• Sensors: Tiny Core Linux
• Camera and camera feed server: Ubuntu
• Hacker: Kali Linux
For each scenario, a raw PCAP file is saved. The five files, namely; normal.pcap,
sparta.pcap, scan A.pcap, mqtt bruteforce.pcap and scan sU.pcap, are processed to
extract three abstraction levels of features. The feature levels are: (i) Packet features,
(ii) Unidirectional flow features, and (iii) Bidirectional flow features [245]. Flow based
features represent the communication between two nodes in the network (for example,
the average time between packets and the number of packets in a flow). The features are
saved in CSV files that are suited for ML usage. The raw PCAP files are made available
with open-access privileges [16] for further analysis of MQTT network communication
and the associated attacks. It is important to note that the three feature abstraction levels
are used exclusively as discussed in Section 4.6.
Table 4.8 summarises the features extracted from the raw PCAP files. The fourth
column shows the packet-based features. Column five shows unidirectional flow
features, and finally, column six shows bidirectional flow features. For the bidirectional
flows, some features (pointed as *) have two values— one for the forward flow and
one for the backward flow. The two features are recorded and distinguished by a prefix













Source IP Address ip src Text X X X
Destination IP Address ip dest Text X X X
Last layer protocol protocol Text X
Time to live ttl Integer X
Packet Length ip len Integer X
Don’t fragment IP flag ip flag df Binary X
More fragments IP flag ip flag mf Binary X
Reserved IP flag ip flag rb Binary X
Source Port prt src Integer X X X
Destination Port prt dst Integer X X X
Transport Layer protocol
(TCP/UDP)
proto Integer X X
Reserved TCP flag tcp flag res Binary X
Nonce sum TCP flag tcp flag ns Binary X
Congestion Window
Reduced TCP flag
tcp flag cwr Binary X
ECN Echo TCP flag tcp flag ecn Binary X
Urgent TCP flag tcp flag urg Binary X
Acknowledgement TCP
flag
tcp flag ack Binary X
Push TCP flag tcp flag push Binary X
Reset TCP flag tcp flag reset Binary X
Synchronization TCP flag tcp flag syn Binary X
Finish TCP flag tcp flag fin Binary X
Number of Packets in the
flow
num pkts Integer X *
Average inter arrival time mean iat Decimal X *
Standard deviation of inter
arrival time
std iat Decimal X *
Minimum inter arrival time min iat Decimal X *
Maximum inter arrival time max iat Decimal X *
Number of bytes num bytes Integer X *
Number of push flag num psh flags Integer X *
Number of reset flag num rst flags Integer X *











Average packet length mean pkt len Decimal X *
Standard deviation packet
length
std pkt len Decimal X *
Minimum packet length min pkt len Decimal X *
Maximum packet length max pkt len Decimal X *




User Name MQTT Flag mqtt flag uname Binary X
Password MQTT flag mqtt flag passwd Binary X
Will retain MQTT flag mqtt flag retain Binary X
Will QoS MQTT flag mqtt flag qos Integer X
Will flag MQTT flag mqtt flag willflag Binary X
Clean MQTT flag mqtt flag clean Binary X
Reserved MQTT flag mqtt flag reserved Binary X












































































4.6 MQTT Experiments and Results
In order to assess the effectiveness of different ML techniques on the
MQTT-IoT-IDS2020 dataset, the six ML algorithms discussed earlier are utilised;
LR, Gaussian NB, k-NN, SVM, DT and RF. The following features are excluded to
ensure there is no influence of identifiable data: source and destination IP addresses,
protocol, and MQTT flags. The data is split into 80% and 20% for training and testing,
respectively, and five-fold cross-validation [231] is used to evaluate each experiment.
The overall accuracy is used for evaluation in addition to the precision, recall, and
F1-Score of each class. Finally, the weighted average (W. AVG.) of precision, recall,
and F1 score is calculated to further analyse the IDS performance.
Table 4.10 presents the overall accuracy of each of the ML techniques with each of
the feature levels; packet, unidirectional and bidirectional. By observing Table 4.10,
the overall accuracy increases when flow-based features are used for all algorithms
except NB. This rise in accuracy can be seen in Figure 4.16 and is reasoned by the fact
that flow-based features better discriminate benign and MQTT-based attacks.
Table 4.10
MQTT-IoT-IDS2020: Overall Detection Accuracy
Features
Packet Unidirectional Bidirectional
LR 78.87% 98.23% 99.44%
k-NN 69.13% 99.68% 99.9%
DT 88.55% 99.96% 99.95%
RF 65.39% 99.98% 99.97%
SVM (RBF Kernel) 77.4% 97.96% 96.61%
NB 81.15% 78% 97.55%
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Figure 4.16
MQTT-IoT-IDS2020: Overall Detection Accuracy Trend using Different ML Techniques
Furthermore, RF in Table 4.10 demonstrate the highest overall accuracy when using
flow-based features. The accuracy reached 99.96% when using unidirectional flow
features and 99.97% when using bidirectional ones. This 0.01% difference between uni
and bidirectional flow features is insignificant due to the fact that these results are the
average of 5-fold cross validation. However, the results demonstrate the effectiveness
of RF in this case, which is reasoned by the techniques ability to handle multiple
features without overfitting, and its appropriateness for multiclass problems. This is
further observed in Table 4.12 where the recall, precision, and F1-Score of all the five
classes reach over 99.9%.
Table 4.11
MQTT-IoT-IDS2020 Results: LR - k-NN - DT (5-fold cross-validation)
LR
Recall Precision F1-Score
Packet Uni Bi Packet Uni Bi Packet Uni Bi
Benign 0% 100% 99.02% 0% 93.33% 98.95% 0% 96.55% 98.99%
Scan A 86.45% 70.87% 97.25% 98.39% 98.39% 97.21% 92.03% 82.39% 97.2%
Scan sU 98.21% 98.03% 98.48% 99.34% 95.76% 100% 98.77% 96.88% 99.23%
Sparta 100% 100% 100% 98.22% 100% 100% 99.1% 100% 100%
MQTT BF 100% 99.25% 99.58% 51.75% 99.82% 99.41% 68.2% 99.53% 99.5%
W. AVG. 78.87% 98.23% 99.44% 70.4% 98.32% 99.44% 72.97% 98.14% 99.44%
k-NN
Recall Precision F1-Score
Packet Uni Bi Packet Uni Bi Packet Uni Bi
Benign 17.43% 99.69% 99.95% 17.42% 98.85% 99.59% 17.43% 99.27% 99.77%
Scan A 99.99% 99.97% 100% 99.99% 99.85% 99.9% 99.99% 99.91% 99.95%
Scan sU 99.99% 99.96% 100% 99.99% 99.96% 100% 99.99% 99.96% 100%
Sparta 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
MQTT BF 25.84% 99.3% 99.75% 25.85% 99.82% 99.97% 25.84% 99.56% 99.86%
W. AVG. 69.13% 99.68% 99.9% 69.13% 99.68% 99.9% 69.13% 99.68% 99.9%
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Table 4.12
MQTT-IoT-IDS2020 Results: DT - RF - SVM - NB (5-fold cross-validation)
DT
Recall Precision F1-Score
Packet Uni Bi Packet Uni Bi Packet Uni Bi
Benign 69.29% 99.92% 99.88% 69.39% 99.92% 99.91% 69.34% 99.92% 99.9%
Scan A 100% 100% 100% 99.98% 99.95% 99.9% 99.99% 99.97% 99.95%
Scan sU 99.98% 99.91% 100% 100% 100% 100% 99.99% 99.96% 100%
Sparta 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
MQTT BF 72.56% 99.95% 99.93% 72.47% 99.95% 99.93% 72.51% 99.95% 99.93%
W. AVG. 88.55% 99.96% 99.95% 88.55% 99.96% 99.95% 88.54% 99.96% 99.95%
RF
Recall Precision F1-Score
Packet Uni Bi Packet Uni Bi Packet Uni Bi
Benign 9.34% 99.96% 99.93% 8.99% 99.94% 99.95% 9.16% 99.95% 99.94%
Scan A 100% 100% 100% 99.98% 99.95% 99.95% 99.99% 99.97% 99.98%
Scan sU 99.98% 99.91% 99.96% 99.99% 100% 100% 99.99% 99.96% 99.98%
Sparta 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
MQTT BF 15.15% 99.96% 99.97% 15.69% 99.98% 99.96% 15.42% 99.97% 99.97%
W. AVG. 65.39% 99.98% 99.97% 65.44% 99.98% 99.97% 65.41% 99.98% 99.97%
SVM (RBF Kernel)
Recall Precision F1-Score
Packet Uni Bi Packet Uni Bi Packet Uni Bi
Benign 30.23% 100% 100% 28.13% 92.67% 87.13% 28.8% 96.19% 93.12%
Scan A 83.8% 70.16% 42.13% 99.99% 96.18% 99.88% 91.18% 81.13% 59.22%
Scan sU 92.33% 99.96% 100% 99.74% 93.01% 94.34% 95.89% 96.36% 97.09%
Sparta 100% 100% 100% 91.17% 100% 100% 95.38% 100% 100%
MQTT BF 72.42% 98.44% 98.3% 53.56% 100% 100% 59.53% 99.22% 99.14%
W. AVG. 77.4% 97.96% 96.61% 74.35% 98.05% 97.02% 74.89% 97.87% 96.15%
SVM (Linear Kernel)
Recall Precision F1-Score
Packet Uni Bi Packet Uni Bi Packet Uni Bi
Benign 57.34% 99.84% 99.26% 27.8% 58.95% 97.45% 37.38% 73.82% 98.32%
Scan A 83.28% 68.23% 84.1% 70.42% 70.35% 93.44% 69.7% 67.5% 87.01%
Scan sU 78.13% 60.31% 97.76% 75.8% 70.71% 93.77% 76.92% 61.91% 95.27%
Sparta 87.64% 60.37% 99.99% 97.62% 99.94% 100% 89.89% 74.61% 99.99%
MQTT BF 24.89% 97.79% 98.71% 43.3% 99.89% 99.55% 20.84% 98.83% 99.13%
W. AVG. 66.69% 82.6% 98.5% 65.42% 88.9% 98.66% 60.4% 82.42% 98.46%
NB
Recall Precision F1-Score
Packet Uni Bi Packet Uni Bi Packet Uni Bi
Benign 10.62% 1.13% 99.96% 9.9% 97.68% 93.56% 10.25% 2.24% 96.65%
Scan A 100% 99.25% 66.41% 99.23% 18.28% 100% 99.61% 30.88% 79.81%
Scan sU 99.52% 97.76% 100% 100% 98.79% 98.52% 99.76% 98.27% 99.25%
Sparta 99.84% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 99.92% 100% 100%
MQTT BF 90.27% 97.78% 100% 53.15% 100% 97.05% 65.84% 98.88% 98.5%
W. AVG. 81.15% 78% 97.55% 73.29% 95.43% 98.37% 75.99% 75.26% 97.77%
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The importance of flow-based features is analysed by observing the separate classes
metrics for each of the algorithms in Table 4.11 and Table 4.12 which outline the
precision, recall, and F1-Score for each of the classifiers. In agreement with Table 4.10,
the flow-based features usage improves the performance.
The two classes, for which performance significantly improves using flow-based
features, are the benign class and the MQTT-BF attack class. In IoT networks, benign
operation traffic is uncomplicated compared to general-purpose networks. This is
based on the IoT network usage and requirements. Therefore, when an attacker initiates
a general-purpose network-based attack, like scanning for example, it is distinctive.
However, the challenge lies in MQTT-based attacks as they rely on the known MQTT
communication commands (i.e., publish, subscribe, etc). Thus, packet-based features
fail to discriminate benign from MQTT BF attack across all the ML techniques used.
It is observed that the NB classifier experiences a distinguishably low performance
with the benign class recall. This is because both packet-based features and
unidirectional flow features are non-discriminative for benign traffic when using
the conditional probabilistic approach that this classifier relies on. Therefore, the
conditional probability of normal operation and MQTT BF attack, given these features
are not distinguishable. This behaviour is observed in the performance trend charts.
Figure 4.17 shows the rise in the recall and precision of benign traffic, Similarly,
Figure 4.18 plots the recall and precision of the MQTT BF attack and finally, this
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Figure 4.17
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Figure 4.18
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Figure 4.19
MQTT-IoT-IDS2020: Weighted Average Trends
4.7 Summary
This chapter addresses the lack of special-purpose IDS and proposes solutions
to some of the different challenges of building IDS for IoT and CI networks.
Using the SCADA dataset, an anomaly detection IDS is built. The dataset
covers 14 different real-world scenarios that include normal system behaviour,
hardware failure, sabotage, and cyber attacks. Six ML techniques are used for
evaluation and three experiments are conducted. The experiments vary based on
the level of information reported to the operator. The first experiment performs
a binary classification (benign/anomaly). While instances are being detected as
either anomaly or not, the type of anomaly is unknown, thus delaying any
corrective actions. The second experiment reports the affected component of the
occurring anomaly, improving the reporting capability of the model. Finally, the third
experiment, which is the most reliable, reports the scenario. This helps in taking
the required corrective actions and speed up the mitigation process. The code is
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available on GitHub at https://github.com/AbertayMachineLearningGroup/machine-
learning-SIEM-water-infrastructure.
The overall evaluation shows that k-NN, DT, and RF outperform NB, SVM, and
LR. Moreover, k-NN results demonstrated the highest accuracy amongst all algorithms
in the three experiments. The accuracy reached 94.12% for the binary classification
and 95.49% for the scenarios classification. Since the scenarios overlap (i.e., are
co-related), a confidence level is used to provide the operator with the most probable
scenario and two probable scenarios when the confidence is low.
Using MQTT as an IoT case study, an IoT network is simulated and a novel
dataset is generated. The dataset covers normal operation, general networking attacks,
and MQTT-based attacks. The dataset is initially saved as raw PCAP files, then
features are extracted. Three levels of features are used, packet, unidirectional, and
bidirectional features. Each feature level is used independently and six different
ML techniques are used for attack classification. The dataset is available at
https://ieee-dataport.org/open-access/mqtt-iot-ids2020-mqtt-internet-things-intrusion
-detection-dataset .
The experiments demonstrate that networking attacks are efficiently discriminated
from normal operation. This is because, in IoT setup, the normal operation patterns
are simple and the generic networking attacks patterns are distinctive. However,
protocol-specific attacks (MQTT-attacks) are harder and more complicated to classify
due to their overlap with normal operation.
To overcome this, flow-based features are used and the experiments show that
they are better suited to discriminate between normal and MQTT-based attacks due
to their similar characteristics. Using the MQTT-IoT-IDS2020 dataset, the weighted
average recall rose from∼75.31% for packet-based features to∼93.77% and∼98.85%
for unidirectional and bidirectional flow features, respectively. The weighted average
precision rose from ∼72.37% for packet-based features to ∼97.19% and ∼99.04%
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for unidirectional and bidirectional flow features. The experiments emphasise the
special challenges faced by IoT IDS, based on their custom communication
patterns. The challenges are demonstrated through the difficulty to differentiate




IDS using Limited-Size Data
5.1 Problem Statement
Special-purpose IDS, as well as general-purpose ones, need large datasets to train IDS
models [23]. Datasets are often depicted as the bottleneck for developing robust ML
models, including ML-based IDS, due to the following reasons [246]: (i) Gathering
large realistic datasets is a complex task that requires a lot of processing time.
(ii) Training with small datasets exposes the ML model to overfitting problems.
Acquiring large volumes of training data poses a particular problem with IDS that
defers their advancement for two main reasons. (i) The need for continuous generation
of datasets to cope with zero-day and emerging attacks. This is impractical in real-time.
and (ii) the long interim time between a new cyber attack being detected and building a
corresponding dataset that contains representative instances of this new attack. By the
time a large dataset is generated to mimic a new cyber attack and the retraining process
takes place, newer cyber attacks are detected and more data is needed as cyber attacks
emerge at an exponential rate [8].
This dataset dependency problem can be defined as resolving the directly
proportional relation between the complexity of a problem, the size of a required
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model, and the amount of data needed as shown in the following expression:
“Size(Model) ∝ Size(Data) ∝ Complexity(Problem)” [247]. This chapter focuses
on resolving this relation in regard to the size of the data, which requires a shift in the
development process of ML models.
Formally, this chapter proposes a new approach for building IDS. The approach
relies on One-Shot learning paradigm which enables training using limited size
datasets, thus, alleviating the need to gather large datasets. To this end, a Siamese
network model is proposed and trained to differentiate between classes based on pair
similarities rather than specific class features. Learning from similarities requires less
data for training and provides the ability to introduce new cyber attacks post-training
(i.e. zero-day attacks).
The proposed Siamese network is evaluated for three usage scenarios. The first
scenario evaluates the validity of similarity-based learning for IDS usage. This is
performed by assessing the classification accuracy using limited data for training.
The second usage scenario evaluates the ability of the Siamese network model as a
One-Shot learning model by introducing new attack classes that are not used during
training. Finally, the third scenario evaluates the effectiveness of similarity-based
learning to detect unknown zero-day attacks.
Four datasets are used. The first dataset is the SCADA dataset, which represents
CI setup where dataset availability is limited and hard to gather. Then, the model is
generalised for general-purpose IDS datasets. The recent CICIDS2017 dataset is used
alongside the most used datasets for IDS evaluation; KDD Cup’99, and NSL-KDD.
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5.2 Background
5.2.1 Learning from Limited-Size Datasets
Li et. al [11] discuss the large dataset requirements and the difficulty of obtaining such
datasets. Besides the size of the dataset, current ML approaches require an extensive
amount of time to train a single model. Therefore, researchers propose approaches to
handle this time and dataset size limitations.
Online learning focuses on reducing the computation time needed to train a model.
This is done by continuously updating the model weights (i.e. tuning) as data becomes
available. This learning paradigm assumes that data becomes available over time and
does not require the dataset to be fully available prior to training. [248]. However,
caution must be taken when utilising online learning because models can shift to
undesirable states over time as training continues [249]. Moreover, online learning
is not suitable to learn from small datasets, nor detect unknown attacks.
Prior research suggested “Transfer Learning” to overcome the need for large
datasets [250, 251]. The premise of transfer learning to solve a target problem T
(where data availability is limited), is to create a model M for a similar problem T ′,
where large amount of data is available. The model M is then transferred to the initial
problem T and retrained on the limited dataset. The rationale for transfer learning is
that the initial training on T ′, yields training weights that discover useful features for
the problem domain and hence suitable for problem T . Therefore, after retraining, the
model learns and generalises faster on small datasets [252]. This is a common approach
in the image processing domain where, for example, models are trained using standard
large datasets, such as, MNIST and ImageNet [253, 254, 255].
Despite the fact that transfer learning proposes a viable solution, it does not
eliminate the need for an original large dataset and raises a number of additional
challenges; (i) Finding a suitable pretrained model “What to transfer?” [250],
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(ii) Deciding the appropriate tuning of the pretrained model to fit in the new
domain “How and when to transfer?” [250] and (iii) Transfer could reduce the learning
performance of the target domain, known as “Negative Transfer” [250, 256].
To overcome the need to build new datasets for detecting unknown attacks, X. Sun et
al. [257] proposed a Bayesian probabilistic model to detect zero-day attack paths.
The authors visualised attacks in a graph-like structure and introduced a prototype to
identify them. Their results show the applicability of the proposed approach, however,
the model is limited to the duration contained in the analyses period and restricted by
the interaction with system calls.
Unlike the formerly discussed approaches and traditional ML techniques, One-Shot
learning requires one or a few samples from each class to use during training, therefore,
overcoming the need for large datasets. It also provides the ability of classifying
classes that are not included in the training process. Chopra et al. explain this by
mentioning that “traditional techniques are intrinsically limited to a small number of
categories” [258].
In this chapter, the model proposed is designed based on the One-Shot learning
paradigm using “Siamese Network”. Siamese networks are trained to learn pair
similarities rather than features to discriminate each class. Accordingly, given a small
dataset, generating pairs of similar and dissimilar samples will instantly increase the
size of the dataset, resulting in an average size dataset suitable for training. Moreover,
since the network is trained to detect similarities, adding new cyber attack classes will
be possible in real-time without the need for retraining.
5.2.2 One-Shot Learning
Fei-Fei et al. [259] were the first to introduce One-Shot learning. One-Shot learning
is inspired by human being learning and generalisation capability, and focuses on
learning new classes using only one - or a few - samples. One-Shot learning has
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been used in various domains with the most prominent one being image and video
processing [260, 261, 262]. It has also been introduced in other domains, such as,
robotics [263], language processing [264, 265] and drug discovery [266].
5.2.3 Siamese Network
Siamese networks are widely used in the literature for One-Shot learning. Siamese
networks were first introduced by Bromley et al. [267] in the 90’s and were initially
used to solve the problem of hand-written signature matching. Subsequently, Siamese
networks were adapted by other domains. Popular implementations of Siamese
networks exist for image and video processing. Koch et al. [268, 269] present one
of the principle implementations of Siamese networks which is employed by many
researchers. Other widely used implementations include: Yao et al. [270] and Varior et
al. [271].
Figure 5.1 represents the Siamese network architecture which is composed of two
identical subnetworks that share weights. The two networks are referred to as “Twin
networks” and share a common architecture, i.e., two identical networks. The weights
of the twin networks are initialised with random weights and the twin networks outputs
are passed to a similarity component, which is responsible for calculating the distance
defining “how alike” the two inputs are. The output of the latter is a comparison based
similarity value. The loss is then calculated and the weights are updated based on
gradients to minimise the loss function. Gradient descent is an optimisation algorithm
that searches for the local (or global) minimum of a function [272]. During ANN
training process, weights are updated by repeatedly taking steps in the opposite
direction of the gradient until reaching a local minimum. The steps are determined





















Formally [268, 273], given a pair of inputs (x1, x2) and twin networks (X, Y ), such
that x1 is the input of X and x2 is the input of Y , the similarity between f1(x1) and










such that f1 and f2 are the outputs of Networks X and Y respectively, and f1 ≡ f2
since X and Y are twin networks. Ultimately, the training goal is to minimise the
overall loss l as defined in Equation 5.2; for each given batch i of input pairs (x1, x2)i
and label vector yi, where yi(x1, x2)i = 1 if x1 and x2 belong to the same class and 0
otherwise. λ represents l2 regularisation parameter.
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l(x1, x2)i =
y(x1, x2)i log di + (1− y(x1, x2)i) log(1− di) + λw2
(5.2)
This loss function is sensitive to outliers (i.e., dissimilar pairs with large distances),
which disproportionately affect the gradient estimation. An alternative loss function is
the constructive loss, proposed by Chopra, Hadsell and LeCun [258]. This is shown in
Equation 5.3, where m > 0 is a margin. The constructive loss caps the contribution of
dissimilar pairs if the distance is within a specified margin m [274], hence limiting the
effect of large distances. In this work, the margin is set to m = 1 [274].
l(x1, x2)i = y(x1, x2)i × (di)2
+ (1− y(x1, x2)i)× (max(m− di, 0))2
(5.3)
Batches of similar and dissimilar pairs are used to train the network. It is essential
to note that an equal number of similar and dissimilar pairs are used in the training
batches to avoid biases. After training, given any two pairs, the network is capable of
calculating their degree of similarity, di ∈ [0, 1]; the lower the di, the closer the pair.
The choice of the twin networks architecture is domain specific and based on
the application context. ANN, Convolutional Neural Network (CNN), and Long
Short-Term Memory (LSTM) are commonly used architectures for establishing twin
networks. CNN are well-suited for image processing whilst LSTM are routinely used
with temporal data.
In this Chapter and for the purpose of the experiments, feedforward ANN are used
as the building block of the twin networks as their structure is aligned with the structure
and format of the data used in this Chapter for IDS purposes.
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Similar to a single ANN, the Siamese network twin networks are trained in a
back-propagation fashion. The twin networks are initialised with identical weights
and during training, batches of similar and dissimilar pairs are used to calculate
the loss, using the function given in Equation 5.3. The weights are then updated
based on the learning rate, gradient descent, and optimisation function as explained
in Section 5.2.4. Hyperparameter optimisation is performed to determine the model’s
set of optimal parameters. Hyperparameters were chosen based on consideration of:
(a) random search [275], (b) recommendations by Lake et al. [276], who published
their progress and findings on a 3-year project where Siamese networks were used for
one-shot learning, Pang et al. [277], who published their Siamese network model that
outperforms state-of-the-art in image processing domain, and (c) empirical analysis of
ANN architecture. The details of the optimised architecture (i.e., the number of layers,
neurons, etc.) are provided later in the Chapter.
5.2.4 Artificial Neural Networks
ANN are used as the building block of the Siamese network model in this chapter
and the classification models the following chapters. ANN are inspired by how the
biological brain works. The first ANN were proposed by McCulloch and Pitts [278] in
1943. Later in 1986, the back propagation paradigm was introduced by Rumelhart and
McClelland [279].
ANN are composed of an input layer, zero or more hidden layers, and an output
layer. Each layer is composed of one or more neurons. Each neuron has one or more
input, and its computed output is passed onto the neurons in the following layer.
Neurons in layer i are connected to the ones in layer j, j = i + 1. This connection
between neurons is called weight and is represented aswij . During the training process,
the input values are propagated forward, the error is calculated (based on the difference
of the actual output and the expected one), then the error is propagated, and the
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weights are updated accordingly. The value of a connection (i.e. weight) implies the
significance of the input.




xi.wi) + b) (5.4)
Where n represents the number of inputs to this node, xi is the ith input value, wi is the
weight value, b is a bias value. Finally, f is the activation function, which squashes the
output. This output can be the input to the next layer, or the final output of the network.
Activation functions’ main role, in the hidden layers, is to add non-linearity into the
model [280]. In the final (output) layer, an activation function can be used to squash
the output to the corresponding class labels, which is used to represent probabilities of
the classification. Activation function can be, but not limited to, Linear, Tanh, Sigmoid,
and Rectified Linear Unit (RELU) [280], shown in Figure 5.2.
The errorE is calculated at the final layer using the difference between the expected
output and the predicted output (which is, as mentioned, a result of propagating the
input signal). Finally, the weights are updated based on Equation 5.5.




Where Wt is the old weight and Wt+1 is the new weight. η is the learning rate to
control the gradient decent steps.





































The base of all optimisers is the gradient descent, as explained above. However,
gradient decent encounters the problem of making big changes and could miss the
minimum. As a result, stochastic gradient descent was introduced, where smaller
subsets (random or batches) are used to calculate the gradient and more frequent
updates are applied, then, momentum and acceleration were added [281]. One of
the widely used optimisers is Adam (adaptive moment estimation) [282], where
momentum is utilised by adding fractions of previous gradients.
The weight of a neuron is directly proportional to the significance of the node’s
input, which indicates the strength of the connection [283]. This is because the output
of any neuron is calculated by multiplying the weights by the input values [284].
5.3 Datasets
Four datasets are used for the evaluation of the Siamese network model. The datasets
cover the CI dataset introduced in Chapter 4 and three prominent general-purpose
IDS datasets. The latter covers two benchmark IDS datasets, specifically, CICIDS2017
and NSL-KDD. Moreover, KDD Cup’99 is used in comparison to the NSL-KDD to
demonstrate the effectiveness of having clean data when generating training pairs and
also, when introducing new attacks to the trained model.
The four datasets are used to mimic the situations in which limited data is provided
due to privacy and/or ethical concerns. The first dataset is discussed in detail in
Section 4.3.
5.3.1 KDD Cup’99
The KDD Cup’99 [78] is considered the oldest benchmark dataset used in evaluating
IDS. As outlined in Chapter 3, more than 60% of the research in the past years (2008
- 2020) was evaluated using this dataset. KDD Cup’99 comprises normal activity and
4 cyber attack classes.
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The KDD Cup’99 dataset is relatively large, however, the dataset provider publishes
a reduced subset of ∼10%. For the purposes of this experiment, only the smaller KDD
Cup’99 10%, which covers all classes [285] is used to ensure the applicability of the
proposed Siamese network to limited datasets. Table 5.1 shows the number of instances
per class for the KDD Cup’99 dataset.
Table 5.1
KDD Cup’99 Classes and Corresponding Number of Instances
Class # of Instances
1 Normal 97278 (19.70%)
2 DoS 391458 (79.24%)
3 Probe 4107 (0.82%)
4 U2R 1128 (0.23%)
5 R2L 52 (0.01%)
5.3.2 NSL-KDD
The NSL-KDD [77] dataset is proposed by the Canadian Institute for Cybersecurity
(CIC) to overcome the problems of the KDD Cup’99 dataset discussed by Tavallaee et
al. [286]. Similar to KDD Cup’99, NSL-KDD covers 4 cyber attack classes and normal
activity. The NSL-KDD is used for evaluation to observe the effect of enhancing and
filtering a dataset on the similarity learning and performance. Table 5.2 shows the
number of instances per class for the NSL-KDD dataset.
Table 5.2
NSL-KDD Classes and Corresponding Number of Instances
Class # of Instances
1 Normal 67343 (53.46%)
2 DoS 45927 (36.47%)
3 Probe 11656 (9.25%)
4 U2R 995 (0.78%)
5 R2L 52 (0.04%)
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5.3.3 CICIDS2017
The CICIDS2017 dataset [62] is a recent dataset generated by the CIC. The dataset
contains up-to-date real-life benign, insider and outsider attacks. Using the provided
PCAP files, the bidirectional traffic flows are generated and labelled. Table 5.3 lists
the attacks used in the experiments and the number of instances/flows for each. The
dataset contains DoS attacks using different tools to initiate the attack, for example,
HTTP Unbearable Load King (Hulk) and Slowloris [63].
Table 5.3
CICIDS Classes and Corresponding Number of Instances
Class # of Instances
1 Normal 248607 (90.50%)
2 DoS (Hulk) 14427 (5.25%)
3 DoS (Slowloris) 2840 (1.03%)
4 FTP Brute-force 5228 (1.9%)
5 SSH Brute-force 3627 (1.32%)
The NSL-KDD and KDD Cup’99 are provided in feature-like format, thus, they were
preprocessed before being published. They have 42 features that are transformed to
a total of 118 features after encoding the categorical features [287] . Finally, for the
CICIDS2017, 31 bidirectional flow features are extracted.
It is essential to note that no feature engineering or selection is performed to ensure
that the class excluded from training does not indirectly influence the feature sets in
any way.
5.4 Siamese Network Usage Scenarios Overview
This section overviews the three different usage scenarios for Siamese networks. A
conceptualisation of these scenarios is provided in Figure 5.3.
The first scenario is aimed to evaluate the suitability of similarity learning for cyber
attack classification. In this scenario, the model is trained using a limited sample of
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instances from K classes. A multi-class classification is performed, such that a new
instance P is classified as one of the K classes.
The second scenario is the one based on One-Shot learning. The IDS is trained
using instances from K classes. After training, labelled instances from a new class e
are added. During the evaluation, a new instance P is classified as one ofK+1 classes
(i.e., the K classes that are used during training and an additional class e). The model
is evaluated based on its efficiency to classify (i) a new attack class, and (ii) attack
classes that are used during training.
Finally, the similarity-based training is used to detect zero-day attacks (i.e., cyber
attacks that were never seen before by the model and no few labelled instances are
available to fit in the second usage scenario). After training, the similarity measure is
used to decide if a new instance belongs to one of the K known classes or an unknown








































Siamese Network Usage Scenarios Overview
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5.5 Scenario 1: Classification using Limited Data
In this section, the Siamese network model is utilised to classify instances from a group
of known attack classes. The network is trained using pairs that can be obtained from a
few samples of each class. This reduces the demand of collecting and annotating large
datasets, and will validate the similarity-based learning paradigm for IDS development.
5.5.1 Methodology
Figure 5.4 visualises the process of building the classification intrusion detection
model. The dataset is split into two halves, as shown in Figure 5.4-1. Collectively,
the first half is used as the training pool of instances to generate similar and dissimilar
pairs for training and validation sets (Figure 5.4-2). The second half is used as the
evaluation pool of instances used to generate the testing pairs (Figure 5.4-3).
Since the Siamese network model relies on random pair generation, pairs are
drawn out randomly from the pools of instances. The rationale for having pools of
instances and randomly drawing out pairs, is to hinder any selection bias either during
training (i.e., selecting similar and dissimilar pairs) or during evaluation of the new
class (i.e. selecting the labelled instances that best represent this class). Furthermore,
the uniqueness of the pairs - no duplicates - is ensured. It is important to note that
the construction of similar and dissimilar pairs is an open research question in the
literature [288].
For testing, each instance i is paired with one random instance from each class
which is picked from the testing pool of instances producing N pairs. After the pairs
are selected, the similarity is calculated for all pairs and the label (class) of instance i
is decided based on the pair with the highest similarity (i.e., least distance).
In order to evaluate the trade-off between the number of labelled instances needed
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4- Train Siamese Network using B
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      * M Similar Pairs 
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For each testing instance ti
3- Generate Testing Batch T with t instances for each
class
     ti contains N*j pairs (j pairs with each class)
5- Evaluation
Calculate similarity with class pairs
Voting (pair with highest similarity)
Figure 5.4
Siamese Network for Intrusion Detection (Classification)
j times for each instance i. A majority voting is used to deduce instance i label, where
the class with the highest votes is selected as instance i label (Figure 5.4-5).
Algorithm 5.1 summarises the overall process of generating pairs, training, and
testing the Siamese network model. Siamese twin networks architecture is determined
by the number of input neurons being the number of features and one neuron as the
output layer. The number of hidden layers and number of neurons in each layer is then
determined; each hidden layer has a number of neurons that is reduced by a fraction
105
Algorithm 5.1 Siamese Network: Usage Scenario 1 Train and Test Algorithm
Input: Attacks Dataset
Output: Trained Siamese Network Evaluation
Ensure: dataset = {c1, c2, . . . , cn : n ≥ 3}
1: train batch size, test batch size← 30, 000
2: n epochs← 2000
3: training = 50% ci ∀ci ∈ dataset
4: testing = dataset− training
5: batch← GETTRAININGBATCH(train batch size)
6: Build Siamese Network with Random Weights
7: for i = 0 to n iterations do
8: Update Siamese Network Weights based on batch
9: end for
10: EVALUATECLASSIFICATION(test batch size)
from the previous layer [289]. The tuning of the architecture is performed using ANN
parameter optimisation. During the training phase, both training and validation loss
curves are monitored to ensure that the network converges, while avoiding overfitting,
using Dropout layers. The parameters (the number of hidden layers, number of neurons
in each layer, η - learning rate -, number of epochs, etc) are chosen based on the optimal
state of the model.
The Siamese network regularisation can be monitored using the loss behaviour.
Regularisation is carried out on the onset of unstable behaviour during training.
Figure 5.5 shows an unstable network performance state.
Figure 5.5
Siamese Network Loss Curve (Non-converging case)
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Figure 5.6
Siamese Network Loss Curve
(Converging case) - 1
Figure 5.7
Siamese Network Loss Curve
(Converging case) - 2
As a result, the regularisation parameters of the network are reconsidered and
dropout layers and kernel regularisation are added to obviate overfitting and ensure
network convergence. This is distinctly observed in Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.7. The full
models’ architectures are listed in the evaluation section and they follow this validation
of loss curves and parameters optimisation.
The model is trained for the optimal number of iterations with the generated batch
of pairs as described in Algorithm 5.2. The number of iterations (2000, in this case)
is decided by monitoring the loss curves after performing parameter optimisation. The
batch size = 30, 000 is based on the literature recommendation for the advisable
Siamese network training batch size [277, 268]. It is important to note that the
classes are equally represented in both the training and testing batches and that pair
uniqueness is guaranteed. A “set” data structure is used so that a pair is added to the
batch of pairs unless that pair is already contained within the set, as demonstrated in
Algorithm 5.2. As outlined in the algorithm, the dataset should have at least 3 classes,
otherwise, the Siamese network model converges to a 50% similarity output and fails
to train adequately. This is because when there are only two classes, A and B for
example, the instances have a 0.5 probability of being similar [(A,A) or (B,B)] or
dissimilar [(A,B), (B,A)]. Since the dissimilar pairs resemble the same combination,
the similarity learning will converge to a 50% output (0.5 probability).
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Algorithm 5.2 Siamese Network: Generate Training Batch
Input: Dataset of N classes, Batch Size
Output: Batch of similar and dissimilar pairs
and associated labels (0: dissimilar, 1: similar)
1: function GETTRAININGBATCH(batch size)
2: num similar pairs = batch size/2
3: num dissimilar pairs = batch size/2
4: num similar pairs per class = num similar pairs/N
5: all combinations = combinations(N)
6: num dissimilar pairs per combination
= num dissimilar pairs/len(all combinations)
7: pairs set← {}
8: for c in N do
9: for i = 0 to num similar pairs per class do
10: (ins1, ins2)← 2 random instances ∈ c training
11: if (ins1, ins2) ∈ pairs set then
12: go to 10
13: end if
14: pairs[i]← {ins1, ins2}
15: pairs set.add({ins1, ins2})
16: end for
17: end for
18: for c1, c2 in all combinations do
19: for i = 0 to num dissimilar pairs per combination do
20: ins1 ← random instance ∈ c1 training
21: ins2 ← random instance ∈ c2 training
22: if (ins1, ins2) ∈ pairs set then
23: go to 20
24: end if
25: pairs[i]← {ins1, ins2}
26: pairs set.add({ins1, ins2})
27: end for
28: end for
29: targets[0..batch size/2]← 1 . Similar
30: targets[batch size/2..batch size]← 0 . Dissimilar
31: return pairs, targets
32: end function
For the evaluation (Algorithm 5.3), an equal number of instances are used from each
class. For each new instance, a pair is selected for each class using the new instance
and a random instance from that class. The similarity is calculated for each pair and the
pair with the closest similarity contributes to the classification result. This process is
performed j times and voting is used to collate the results (j ∈ 1, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30).
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Algorithm 5.3 Siamese Network: Evaluate Classification
Input: Trained Siamese Network, Batch Size
Output: Classification Accuracy
1: function EVALCLASSIFICATION(batch size)
2: n correct← 0
3: num per class← batch size/N
4: for c in N do
5: for i = 0 to num per class do
6: ins1 ← random instance ∈ c testing
7: for j = 0 to 5 do
8: pairs← (ins1, random instance x∀x ∈ N)
9: similarities← model.predict(pairs)
10: votes[argmin(similarities)]+ = 1
11: end for
12: if argmax(votes) == c then
13: n correct+ = n correct+ 1




18: accuracy = n correct ∗ 100/batch size
19: return accuracy, confusion matrix
20: end function
5.5.2 Experiments and Results
The evaluation specifies how accurately the network can classify based on learning
similarities using a few samples from each class. The optimal hyperparameters of the
twin networks; ANN architecture (number of hidden layers and neurons), learning rate,
etc. are as follows (bold: input, italic: output of Siamese network before similarity
calculation, Dr: Dropout layer):
• Twin Networks Architecture:
– SCADA: In(10) : 8
– CICIDS2017: In(31) : 25 : Dr(0.1) : 20 : Dr(0.05) : 15
– NSL-KDD - KDD Cup’99:
In(118) : 98 : Dr(0.1) : 79 : Dr(0.1) : 59 : Dr(0.1) : 39 : Dr(0.1) : 20
• Activation: Relu
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• L2 regularisation: 0.001
• Optimiser: Adam
• Number of epochs: 2000
• Loss: Constructive loss [258]
5.5.2.1 SCADA Dataset Results
The SCADA dataset classification Confusion Matrix (CM) is presented in Table 5.5.
A sample CM is presented in Table 5.4. Each row of the CM represents an actual
class and each column represents a predicted class, or vice versa. For the normal class
row, True Negative (TN) and False Positive (FP) are recorded, while for attack classes,
True Positive (TP) and False Negative (FN) are recorded. An ideal CM would have a




Correct Normal Attack1 Attack2 Attack3 Attack4
Normal TN FP1 FP2 FP3 FP4
Attack1 FN1 TP11 TP12 TP13 TP14
Attack2 FN2 TP21 TP22 TP23 TP24
Attack3 FN3 TP31 TP32 TP33 TP34
Attack4 FN4 TP41 TP42 TP43 TP44
As shown in Table 5.5, the overall accuracy is 76.06% with j = 5. However, it
is seen that the classes either have high classification accuracy (reaching 100%) or a
low accuracy (less than 50%). The model accuracy using different j pairs for voting is
outlined in Table 5.6. It is important to highlight that a ZeroR [290] (baseline majority
classifier) will result in a classification accuracy of 7.14%, by classifying all instances
as the majority class. It should be noted as well that the classes in the raw input space,

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Siamese Network: SCADA Classification Accuracy Using Different j Votes
No Votes Overall Normal
(j) Accuracy TNR FPR
1 72.23% 34.3% 65.7%
5 76.06% 48.45% 51.55%
10 77.77% 45.35% 54.65%
15 78.6% 46.65% 53.35%
20 79.18% 47.3% 52.7%
25 79.06% 46.75% 53.25%
30 79.21% 45.7% 54.3%
This overlap was evident in Section 4.4 through the variant classification accuracies,
which led to the use of classification confidence to reach a higher scenario classification
accuracy. This classes overlap is demonstrated further here by fitting a k-NN model
(with k=30, to compare with Siamese network when 30 pairs are used for majority
voting) to the data at the input space. It is noted that the k-NN model calculates the
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distance between instances in their input space, while the Siamese network similarity
calculates the distance between the outputs of the twin networks. Figure 5.8 shows for
each class c, the number of wrongly labelled classes for instances of c (for example,
instances of “S6: 2 Floating Objects” are misclassified as 7 other classes for the k-NN
and 3 for the Siamese network). From Figure 5.8 it can be observed that the Siamese
network model has learned a transformation that reduces the overlap between classes,
justifying the performance improvements for classes S5: Humidity and S8-S10: Person
Hitting.
Furthermore, it can be seen that the classes which do not overlap (for example, S2,
S3: Blocked Measures and S4: DoS), have high classification accuracy. Finally, for
classes overlapping with more than 7 other classes, the Siamese network is able to
reduce the number of misclassified classes resulting from the overlap. However, “pair










































SCADA Dataset k-NN (k=30) and Siamese Network (SN) (30 pairs): Number of Wrong
Associated Classes During Classification
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5.5.2.2 CICIDS2017 Dataset Results
The CM of the classification for the CICIDS2017 is presented in Table 5.7. As
presented, based only on pairs similarity, the overall accuracy is 83.74% with j = 5.
The different attack classes accuracies are 96.08%, 75.17%, 80.05%, and 76.55%,
respectively. Moreover, the low false negatives are presented in the first column. Also,
a small FPR for Normal (0.05%, 2.6%, 1.87%, and 4.62%) for the attack classes
respectively.
Table 5.7



































































Siamese Network: CICIDS2017 Classification Accuracy Using Different j Votes
No Votes Overall Normal
(j) Accuracy TNR FPR
1 74.55% 70.43% 29.57%
5 83.74% 90.87% 9.13%
10 84.54% 92.58% 7.42%
15 84.63% 93.07% 6.93%
20 84.69% 93.55% 6.45%
25 84.69% 93.73% 6.27%
30 84.71% 93.85% 6.15%
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Table 5.8 lists the overall accuracy, TNR, and FPR when using different j pairs
for voting. It is observed that using 5 pairs results in a distinctive rise in both the
overall accuracy (from 74.55% to 83.74%) and the TNR (from 70.43% to 90.87%)
than using 1 pair. The reason 1 pair performance is poor owes to the instance selection
randomness. The probability of selecting a representable pair increases as j increases,
therefore, increasing the likelihood of correct classification based on similarity. This
random selection process is also affected by the instances variance and outliers.
5.5.2.3 KDD Cup’99 and NSL-KDD Datasets Results
The CM of the classification for the KDD Cup’99 dataset is presented in Table 5.9.
As shown, the overall accuracy when j = 5 is 87.99% with a small portion of attack
classes misclassified as normal (0.1%, 0.97%, 0.27%, and 8% for the attack classes
respectively). Similar to the CICIDS2017 dataset, using 5 pairs results in a rise in the
accuracy and TNR as outlined in Table 5.10.
Table 5.9
Siamese Network: KDD Cup’99 Classification Confusion Matrix (j = 5)
Predicted Class


























































Siamese Network: KDD Cup’99 Classification Accuracy Using Different j Votes
No Votes Overall Normal
(j) Accuracy TNR FPR
1 82.03% 69.27% 30.73%
5 87.99% 73.72% 26.28%
10 88.26% 73.67% 26.33%
15 88.29% 73.63% 26.37%
20 88.26% 73.65% 26.35%
25 88.23% 73.6% 26.4%
30 88.24% 73.6% 26.4%
Training the Siamese network model on the NSL-KDD dataset, which is an
improved dataset based on the KDD Cup’99 (filtered where duplicates are removed),
did show a minor rise in the classification results. The CM of the NSL-KDD dataset
is presented in Table 5.11 and the different j votes performance is in Table 5.12.
The overall accuracy increased to 91.01% compared to 87.99% for the KDD Cup’99
dataset.
Table 5.11
Siamese Network: NSL-KDD Classification Confusion Matrix (j = 5)
Predicted Class


























































Siamese Network: NSL-KDD Classification Accuracy Using Different j Votes
No Votes Overall Normal
(j) Accuracy TNR FPR
1 86.61% 80.47% 19.53%
5 91.01% 86.45% 13.55%
10 91.1% 86.45% 13.55%
15 91.17% 86.4% 13.6%
20 91.24% 86.47% 13.53%
25 91.26% 86.42% 13.58%
30 91.3% 86.53% 13.47%
By comparing the KDD Cup’99 dataset results to the NSL-KDD ones, the minor
improvement can explained by the learning approach of the Siamese network. Since
the Siamese network learns from similarities, rather than specific class features, it can
overcome the balancing or duplicate issues. The randomisation of choosing the training
batch pairs and ensuring the balanced representation of class pairs resolve this as well.
To the best of the author’s knowledge, there are no manuscripts that use Siamese
networks or leverage similarity-based One-Shot learning for IDS. However, the
performance of recent articles that use the aforementioned datasets is outlined below.
Comparing the performance of the models presented here with recent IDS models is
not straightforward, yet, their performance aid in the interpretation of the different
classes performance results.
Recent IDS articles evaluation is outlined in Table 5.13. These studies focus on
multi-class attack classification and report explicit class metrics, not only the overall
accuracy. It is important to note that by observing Table 5.13, it is evident that the
overall classification accuracy is higher than each class performance. This is due to
class imbalance problem. For example in [176], the TPR for the SSH and FTP attack
classes in the CICIDS2017 dataset are 0% and 3.1%, respectively, while the overall
accuracy is 96%. Similarly, the TPR for the R2L and U2R in the KDD Cup’99 dataset
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is 24.3% and 15.5%, respectively, with an overall accuracy of 92.6%. Class imbalance
problem is a common problem with datasets and is considered relative to the degree of
imbalance, the overall dataset size, and the complexity of the data [291, 292]. Common
approaches to overcome class imbalance are upsizing, downsizing, and altering the
contribution of misclassifying under-sampled and over-sampled classes to the overall
accuracy [291, 292]. None of these methods have been used in the papers discussed
in Table 5.13, which resulted in both a gap between classes detection accuracy and
overall accuracy, and the misleading overall accuracy results. It is important to note
that the class imbalance problem did not pose a problem for the evaluation presented
in this Chapter. This is due to the fact that equal number of pairs are randomly selected
from a pool of instances, which ensures balance in training and testing.
With regards to the results presented in this section and those in Table 5.13, KDD
Cup’99 overall accuracy using the Siamese network model reaches 88% compared to
92.6% in [176] and 99.8% in [182]. However, by analysing the TPR of the different
classes, it is observed that the Siamese network experience higher TPR for the attack
classes. For example, the Siamese network model TPR of DoS, Probe, R2L and U2R
are 98.67%, 90.88%, 96.43%, and 80.23% compared to 99.9%, 98.9%, 96.9%, and
75% in [182], and 93.9%, 73.2%, 24.3% , and 15.5% in [176], respectively. Similarly,
the overall accuracy of the NSL-KDD reaches 91% for the Siamese network model
compared with 77.8% in [176] and 83.83% [293]. The TPR of DoS, Probe, R2L,
and U2R when using Siamese Network are 93.68%, 85.55%, 94.48%, and 94.87%
compared with 97.42%, 96.51%, 68.53%, and 95.14% in [177] and 86.63%, 83.73%,
35.15%, and 23.5% in [294]. Finally, the CICIDS2017 overall accuracy reaches 84%
using the Siamese network model, compared with 96% in [184]. The TPR of FTP and
SSH classes using the Siamese network model is 80.05% and 76.55% compared with
98% and 77% in [184] and 0% and 3.1% in [176].
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Table 5.13
Recent IDS Studies for Multi-Class Classification Performance












































































5.6 Scenario 2: One-Shot Detection
In this section, the Siamese network is used as a One-Shot learning architecture. The
experiment evaluates the Siamese network performance on classifying a new cyber
attack class without the need for retraining. This new class is represented with a few
labelled samples. The experiment evaluates how accurate the similarity measure is,
showing the capability of the Siamese network to find similarity between pairs of
classes that were not used during the training process.
5.6.1 Methodology
Figure 5.9 shows the process of building the intrusion detection model and then
evaluating it with an additional class that is not used during training. The process is
similar to the one presented in Figure 5.4. However, the difference between both is
that a class e is excluded from the training classes as shown in Figure 5.9-1. Class
e is used to mimic a real-life situation in which a new attack is detected and only a
few samples of it are available. In situations where a few instances are not enough
to retrain a traditional IDS, there is still need to classify this new attack until enough







For each testing instance ti
7- Evaluation
Calculate similarity with class pairs
Voting (pair with highest similarity)
Dataset
N classes
2- Split each class (except e) into
50% training
50% testing
6- Train Siamese Network using B
4- Generate Training Batch B with 
      * M Similar Pairs 
             equal number of pairs for each class  
      * M Dissimilar Pairs
             equal number of pairs for all classes combinations
5- Generate Testing Batch T with t instances for each
class
     ti contains N*j pairs (j pairs with each class)
1- Choose class e to be
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Siamese Network for Intrusion Detection (One-Shot Learning)
Moreover, Algorithm 5.4 summarises the overall process of training and testing the
Siamese network model. The difference is in the evaluation process which is outlined
in Algorithm 5.5.
The instances of class e are split such that 50% represents the labelled samples (i.e.,
mock adding them to the pool of instances for Siamese network to pair with during
testing) and the other 50% are used as new instances to evaluate the accuracy.
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Algorithm 5.4 Siamese Network: Usage Scenario 2 Train and Test Algorithm
Input: Attacks Dataset
Output: Trained Siamese Network Evaluation
Ensure: dataset = {c1, c2, . . . , cn : n ≥ 3}
1: train batch size, test batch size← 30, 000
2: n epochs← 2000
3: excluded class = random class e s.th. e ∈ dataset
4: training classes = dataset− e
5: training = 50% ci ∀ci ∈ training classes
6: testing = dataset ∩ training
7: batch← GETTRAININGBATCH(train batch size)
8: Build Siamese Network with Random Weights
9: for i = 0 to n iterations do
10: Update Siamese Network Weights based on batch
11: end for
12: EVALUATEONESHOT(test batch size)
Algorithm 5.5 Siamese Network: Evaluate One-Shot Model
Input: Trained Siamese Network, Batch Size, Excluded Class (e)
Output: Accuracy
1: function EVALUATEONESHOT(batch size)
2: n correct← 0
3: num per class← batch size/N
4: K ← N − e
5: for c in N do
6: for i = 0 to num per class do
7: if c == e then
8: ins1 ← random instance ∈ e unlabelled
9: else
10: ins1 ← random instance ∈ c testing
11: end if
12: for j = 0 to 5 do
13: pairs← (ins1, random instance x∀x ∈ K)
14: pairs.append(ins1, random instance ∈ e labelled
15: similarities← model.predict(pairs)
16: votes[argmin(similarities)]+ = 1
17: end for
18: if argmax(votes) == c then
19: n correct+ = n correct+ 1
20: end if
21: confusion matrix[c, argmax(votes)]+ = 1
22: end for
23: end for
24: accuracy = n correct ∗ 100/batch size
25: return accuracy, confusion matrix
26: end function
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5.6.2 Experiments and Results
The evaluation specifies how accurately the Siamese network can utilise similarity
learning to classify: (i) the classes that are used in training and (ii) a new class that is
not used during training using few instances.
For the One-Shot evaluation, multiple experiments, specifically N − 1 where N
is the number of classes, are conducted to evaluate the performance of the Siamese
network when using a different set of attack classes for training and evaluation. In
each experiment, a different class of the dataset is excluded, one at a time.
5.6.2.1 SCADA Dataset Results
The SCADA One-Shot experimental results follow the same behaviour as discussed
in Section 5.5.2.1 where classes overlapping with less than seven other classes have
a high classification accuracy. The classes that are not overlapping with others, (for
example, DoS and Blocked Measures) show high TPR when introduced after training
(acting as the new class). Table 5.14 and Table 5.15 list the CM and the different pairs
performance for the first Blocked Measure class, while Table 5.16 and Table 5.17 list
for the DoS attack class. The detection rate of Blocked Measure 1 when 1 pair is used
is 100%, as shown in Table 5.15. Similarly, the detection rate of DoS is 100% as shown
in Table 5.17. Both the CM of One-Shot learning when excluding different classes, and
the CM of classification, demonstrate the disparity of detection rates between classes,
showing the high rates for classes that do not overlap or overlap with less than seven
classes, and low rates otherwise.
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Table 5.14






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































Siamese Network: SCADA One-Shot Accuracy (Blocked Measure 1 excluded from Training)





(j) Accuracy TPR FNR TNR FPR
1 76.65% 100% 0% 40.65% 59.35%
5 78.86% 100% 0% 59.05% 40.95%
10 79.62% 100% 0% 63.5% 36.5%
15 80.13% 100% 0% 66.5% 33.5%
20 80.2% 100% 0% 67.85% 32.15%
25 80.21% 100% 0% 67.7% 32.3%
30 80.28% 100% 0% 69.05% 30.95%
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Table 5.16



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(j) Accuracy TPR FNR TNR FPR
1 77.58% 100% 0% 40.15% 59.85%
5 80.09% 100% 0% 64.85% 35.15%
10 81.25% 100% 0% 70.9% 29.1%
15 82.13% 100% 0% 75.9% 24.1%
20 82.34% 100% 0% 76.85% 23.15%
25 82.78% 100% 0% 80.15% 19.85%
30 82.88% 100% 0% 81.4% 18.6%
Classes where the overlapping covers less than half of the other classes (humidity
and different hitting intensities, for example) show high accuracy TPR when
introduced after training. This is shown in Table 5.18 and Table 5.19 for person hitting
with high intensity class. The detection rate rises from 55.05% when using one pair
to 71.95% when using 5 pairs and reaches its highest of 87% when using 30 pairs.
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Finally, classes with high overlap encounter low TPR, similar to their classification
accuracy whether they are introduced during training or post training. For example,
Wrong Connection is not detected when introduced after training, and all its instances
are misclassified as other anomaly scenarios. For completeness, the full CM tables are
listed in Appendix D.1.
Table 5.18






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































Siamese Network: SCADA One-Shot Accuracy (Person Hitting High Intensity excluded from





(j) Accuracy TPR FNR TNR FPR
1 63.63% 55.05% 17.65% 21.65% 78.35%
5 66.69% 71.95% 14.75% 26.95% 73.05%
10 67.85% 79.9% 7.65% 24.05% 75.95%
15 68.22% 83.45% 5.15% 22.1% 77.9%
20 68.34% 85.6% 3.2% 21.45% 78.55%
25 68.43% 86.6% 2.95% 21% 79%
30 68.47% 87% 2.8% 20.5% 79.5%
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5.6.2.2 CICIDS2017 Dataset Results
The CM of the CICIDS2017 dataset when excluding SSH class is presented in
Table 5.20 and excluding FTP in Table 5.22. The overall accuracy is 81.28% and
82.5%, respectively. The overall accuracy demonstrates that the network performance
was not disturbed by the attack class addition post training when compared to 83.74%
classification accuracy when all classes are used in training and testing (Table 5.7). It
is important to note that the new attack class performance is 73.03% and 70.03% for
SSH and FTP, respectively when using 5 pairs. Moreover, the added class demonstrates
low False Negative Rate (FNR), specifically 8.63% and 15.4% for FTP and SSH,
respectively. .
Table 5.21 and Table 5.23 present the evaluation results, showing the performance
impact the number of labelled samples (j) of the new attack class e has. This is shown
in terms of overall accuracy, new attack TPR, FNR, Normal TNR and FPR, using j
instances for majority voting, where j ∈ 1, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30.
Using five labelled instances of the new attack class results in an increase in the
overall accuracy and the TPR accompanied with a drop in the FNR. Using only 1
labelled instance demonstrates a comparably poorer performance owing to the instance
selection randomness, which could result in either a good or a bad class representative.
However, using five random labelled instances boosts performance, reinforcing the
importance of having distinctive class representatives. This is further demonstrated
in the steady rise of the TPR when more pairs are used. For example, the SSH
TPR rises as follows; 64.10%, 73.03%, 77.82%, 78.33%, 78.30%, and 78.45% for
j ∈ (1, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30), respectively. In a similar fashion, the TPR of the FTP
class rises from 56.65% when using one pair to 78.48% when using 30 pairs.
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Table 5.20










































































(j) Accuracy TPR FNR TNR FPR
1 72.72% 64.10% 16.43% 63.35% 36.65%
5 81.28% 73.03% 15.40% 78.52% 21.48%
10 82.56% 77.82% 13.40% 79.95% 20.05%
15 82.58% 78.43% 13.03% 79.92% 20.08%
20 82.49% 78.33% 13.18% 79.97% 20.03%
25 82.43% 78.30% 13.25% 79.78% 20.22%
30 82.49% 78.45% 13.13% 79.97% 20.03%
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Table 5.22










































































(j) Accuracy TPR FNR TNR FPR
1 72.91% 59.65% 8.03% 72.83% 27.17%
5 82.5% 70.03% 8.63% 87.18% 12.82%
10 84.57% 72.80% 8.32% 87.70% 12.30%
15 85.47% 76.72% 8.12% 87.40% 12.60%
20 85.78% 77.58% 8.10% 87.23% 12.77%
25 85.86% 78.27% 8.10% 86.92% 13.08%
30 85.94% 78.48% 8.00% 86.73% 13.27%
For transparency and reproducibility, the rest of the CICIDS2017 performance
evaluation tables are listed in Appendix D.2 and they follow similar performance
behaviour. DoS (Slowloris) result tables is listed in Table D.21 and Table D.22.
The TPR rises from 50.97% when using one pair to 72.82% when using 30 pairs.
DoS (Hulk) results are listed in Table D.23 and Table D.24, where the TPR rises from
91.07% when using one pair to 95.18% when using 30 pairs.
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5.6.2.3 KDD Cup’99 and NSL-KDD Datasets Results
The CM of the KDD Cup’99 and NSL-KDD datasets One-Shot when DoS class is
excluded from training are presented in Table 5.24 and Table 5.26, respectively. As
observed, the overall accuracies are 76.67% and 77.99%, respectively. It is important
to note, however, that the FNR for the new class (i.e. DoS) are 26.38% for the
KDD Cup’99 and 9.87% for the NSL-KDD and the TPR are 40.28% and 78.87%
respectively. These percentages clearly demonstrate that the NSL-KDD results are
higher because it is an enhanced version of the KDD Cup’99. Given that the new
class is not used in training, having a better representation of instances shows a better
performance (i.e., NSL-KDD outperforms KDD Cup’99).
Table 5.24
Siamese Network: KDD Cup’99 One-Shot Confusion Matrix (j = 5) (DoS excluded from
Training)
Predicted Class
































































(j) Accuracy TPR FNR TNR FPR
1 66.89% 41.67% 22.50% 66.35% 33.65%
5 76.67% 40.28% 26.38% 76.03% 23.97%
10 77.57% 40.07% 27.25% 76.10% 23.90%
15 77.67% 39.90% 27.32% 76.02% 23.98%
20 77.68% 39.93% 27.38% 76.02% 23.98%
25 77.68% 39.87% 27.40% 76.07% 23.93%
30 77.68% 39.88% 27.40% 76.03% 23.97%
Table 5.26
Siamese Network: NSL-KDD Cup’99 One-Shot Confusion Matrix (j = 5) (DoS excluded
from Training)
Predicted Class
































































(j) Accuracy TPR FNR TNR FPR
1 72.75% 67.35% 9.05% 84.87% 15.13%
5 77.99% 78.87% 9.87% 93.22% 6.78%
10 77.7% 84.62% 9.87% 93.35% 6.65%
15 79.05% 83.78% 9.87% 93.32% 6.68%
20 78.63% 85.25% 9.87% 93.37% 6.63%
25 79.49% 84.62% 9.87% 93.35% 6.65%
30 79.12% 85.37% 9.87% 93.35% 6.65%
For transparency and reproducibility, the rest of the KDD Cup’99 and NSL-KDD
dataset result tables are listed in Appendix D.3 and Appendix D.4, respectively.
5.7 Scenario 3: Zero-Day Attacks Detection
In this section, the IDS model relies on the similarity-based learning of the Siamese
network to detect zero-day attacks. The experiment evaluates how accurate the
similarity measure can detect attacks that are dissimilar to all classes involved during
the training process, i.e. zero-day attacks. Zero-Day attacks are flagged when their
similarity, with all known classes, is below a certain threshold. The threshold is decided
based on the model optimisation and training.
The distinction between One-Shot (Section 5.6) and zero-day detection presented
in this section is that, in the One-Shot scenario, newly detected attacks have a few
labelled instances that are not sufficient for retraining, while in a zero-day detection
scenario, there are no available data for the new attack. Therefore, the model is utilised
to detect instances that do not match any of the known classes. After the instances are
flagged as unknown, they can be filtered and labelled with the help of other methods
(experts for example) and then can be used for the learning of IDS.
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5.7.1 Methodology
Figure 5.10 shows the process of building the intrusion detection model and how
its similarity learning approach is applied to detect unknown attacks (i.e. zero-day
attacks). The process is similar to Figure 5.9, however, after excluding class e, it is not
assumed that any of its labelled instances are available, thus is not used in the testing
pool of instances. During the evaluation process, a similarity threshold is used. If the
Yes No
Correct Class has 
Highest Vote OR 
Class is e and 
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2- Split each class (except e) into
50% training
50% testing
5- Train Siamese Network using B
3- Generate Training Batch B with 
      * M Similar Pairs 
             equal number of pairs for each class  
      * M Dissimilar Pairs
             equal number of pairs for all classes combinations
4- Generate Testing Batch T with t instances for each
class N
     ti contains (N-1)*j pairs (j pairs with each class
except e)
1- Choose class e to be
excluded from training
Figure 5.10
Siamese Network for Intrusion Detection (Zero-Day Detection)
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similarity is larger than the threshold, then the instance is suspected to be a zero-day
attack (knowing that the similarity/distance output is in the range [0 - 1]; the closer
the value to 0, the more similar the pair is and dissimilar pairs are closer to 1). The
determined threshold is stated for each dataset accordingly in the following sections.
The overall algorithm is the same as Algorithm 5.4 except that a different evaluation
function is called. The evaluation function is described in Algorithm 5.6.
Algorithm 5.6 Siamese Network: Evaluate Zero-Day
Input: Trained Siamese Network, Batch Size, Excluded Class (e), Threshold (th)
Output: Zero-Day Detection Accuracy
1: function EVALZERODAYDETECTION(batch size)
2: n correct← 0
3: num per class← batch size/N
4: K ← N − e
5: for c in N do
6: for i = 0 to num per class do
7: ins1 ← random instance ∈ c
8: for j = 0 to 5 do
9: pairs← (ins1, random instance ∈ K)
10: similarities← model.predict(pairs)
11: if similarities[argmin(similarities)] < th then
12: votes[zero day]+ = 1
13: else
14: votes[argmin(similarities)]+ = 1
15: end if
16: end for
17: if argmax(votes) == c OR c == e AND argmax(votes) == zero day
then








5.7.2 Experiments and Results
5.7.2.1 SCADA Dataset Results
Based on the limitations regarding the SCADA dataset that was discussed in the
classification results (Section 5.5.2.1) and the One-Shot results (Section 5.6.2.1),
similarity-based zero-day detection is not anticipated to develop high detection
accuracies. However, for the completeness benefit, the SCADA results are outlined
in this section.
For instance, Table 5.28 and Table 5.29 present the results when person hitting with
high intensity and DoS classes are used to mimic zero-day attacks, respectively. Each
table lists the overall accuracy using different number of pairs for voting alongside the
percentage of attack instances flagged as unknown (i.e. zero-day correctly classified)
and as benign (i.e. zero-day attack classified as normal behaviour). Then, the tables
show the same for the benign class instances, the percentage of classification as
unknown and as benign. Finally, the percentage of known attacks (the ones used during
training) that are classified as zero-day is listed.
Table 5.28
Siamese Network: SCADA Zero-Day Accuracy (Person Hitting High Intensity excluded from












(j) Unknown Normal Normal Unknown Unknown
1 61.69% 50.8% 22.3% 23.65% 25.9% 10.59%
5 64.46% 44.1% 33.35% 33.1% 22.1% 9.25%
10 64.38% 64.5% 22.1% 20.45% 47.5% 13.48%
15 65.49% 55.65% 30.55% 26.05% 35.9% 11.05%
20 65.25% 67.45% 22.25% 19.3% 49.7% 13.11%
25 65.1% 74.05% 17.8% 13.65% 58.25% 14.57%
30 65.57% 69.85% 21.3% 17.7% 51.15% 13.1%
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Table 5.29













(j) Unknown Normal Normal Unknown Unknown
1 76.64% 100% 0% 40.15% 5.6% 4.75%
5 79.32% 100% 0% 63.3% 3.05% 4.15%
10 78.8% 100% 0% 60.65% 16% 6.55%
15 80.59% 100% 0% 71.75% 6.35% 4.8%
20 79.99% 100% 0% 70.65% 11.4% 5.91%
25 79.72% 100% 0% 69.45% 16.65% 6.77%
30 80.6% 100% 0% 75.2% 10.2% 5.63%
The overall accuracy falls in the same range as the one reported in the classification
and One-Shot sections, which reach 65.57% and 80.6%. Furthermore, it is observed
in Table 5.28 and Table 5.29 that the zero-day class detection accuracies reached
74.05% and 100% for S8 and S4, respectively. Also, the percentage of attacks detected
as benign is around 20% and 0%, respectively and the percentage of known attacks
detected as zero-day attacks reach a maximum of 14.57% and 6.77%, respective. This
is crucial as it conveys these attacks were misclassified as other attack classes which
ensures detection and the chance for taking corrective and mitigation actions. The rest
of the result tables are listed in Appendix E.1. The results show that the similarity, in
this case, does not flag zero-day attacks effectively. This is not only because of the
classes overlap problem, but also due to the scarcity of features in the SCADA dataset.
The dataset provides the sensors recordings only [81].
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5.7.2.2 CICIDS2017 Dataset Results
The CICIDS2017 dataset encounters the highest performance in terms of zero-day
detection. When excluding SSH brute-force attack class from training and using it
to mimic zero-day attacks, 84.8% of the new class instances are correctly detected
as unknown. The overall accuracy reached 82.4% as demonstrated in Table 5.30.
Moreover, 9.85% of the known attacks are detected as unknown.
Similarly, when DoS (Hulk) class is used to mimic a zero-day attack, 94.17% of
the zero-day attack is detected as unknown with an overall accuracy of 76.14%. The
performance is outlined in Table 5.31. For completeness, the CICIDS2017 result tables
when other attack classes mimic zero-day attacks are listed in Appendix E.2. FTP
class experiences a low zero-day detection accuracy and the instances are misclassified
as other attack classes, with a very low classification of [3-5]% as normal. DoS
(Slowloros) class, on the other hand, reaches a zero-day detection accuracy of 88.88%.
Table 5.30













(j) Unknown Normal Normal Unknown Unknown
1 65.98% 65.28% 18.13% 44.73% 44.83% 20.74%
5 77.74% 65.75% 21.72% 67.52% 28.17% 7.97%
10 80.35% 82.23% 11.1% 64.82% 33.67% 9.91%
15 81.48% 79.57% 13.82% 72.95% 25.6% 8.86%
20 81.87% 84.3% 9.93% 70.65% 28.37% 9.67%
25 81.92% 85.92% 8.45% 69.45% 29.67% 10.06%
30 82.44% 84.8% 9.58% 73.13% 25.98% 9.58%
136
Table 5.31
Siamese Network: CICIDS2017 Zero-Day Accuracy (DoS (Hulk) excluded from Training)












(j) Unknown Normal Normal Unknown Unknown
1 57.47% 82.28% 15.88% 38.97% 50.85% 35.14%
5 71.53% 78.83% 19.82% 61.37% 33.37% 17.8%
10 73.13% 90.43% 8.57% 57.85% 39.5% 20.66%
15 74.83% 87.42% 11.53% 67.62% 29.77% 19.3%
20 75.28% 93.07% 5.95% 64.85% 32.83% 20.26%
25 75.48% 95.4% 3.62% 63.72% 34.12% 20.73%
30 76.14% 94.17% 4.82% 68.12% 29.72% 20.27%
5.7.2.3 KDD Cup’99 and NSL-KDD Datasets Results
The zero-day attack detection results of the KDD Cup’99 and NSL-KDD datasets
when R2L is excluded from training are presented in Table 5.32 and Table 5.33,
respectively.
As shown, the overall accuracy reaches 72.98% and 71.04% using 30 pairs in
voting. More importantly, the 85.85%, and 72.83% of the R2L class (zero-day class)
are correctly flagged as unknown. Around 25-30% of the known attack instances are
classified as unknown attacks. The rest of the classes zero-day detection result tables
are presented in Appendix E.3 and Appendix E.4.
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Table 5.32













(j) Unknown Normal Normal Unknown Unknown
1 58.1% 87.98% 8.6% 44.4% 46.9% 42.36%
5 71.65% 86.03% 10.1% 62.27% 27.83% 25.67%
10 72.39% 86.27% 9.9% 63.7% 26.5% 25.38%
15 73% 85.92% 10.22% 64.93% 25.02% 24.52%
20 72.97% 85.88% 10.25% 65.07% 24.98% 24.62%
25 72.97% 85.88% 10.25% 65.13% 24.9% 24.64%
30 72.98% 85.85% 10.28% 65.15% 24.87% 24.62%
Table 5.33













(j) Unknown Normal Normal Unknown Unknown
1 56.7% 78.73% 14.42% 62.37% 36.1% 51.33%
5 69.44% 72.87% 18.03% 79.18% 20.38% 33.69%
10 69.62% 73.1% 18.12% 79.72% 20% 33.65%
15 70.87% 72.72% 18.15% 79.82% 19.88% 31.46%
20 70.82% 72.85% 18.13% 79.77% 19.95% 31.58%
25 70.81% 72.85% 18.12% 79.75% 19.97% 31.58%
30 71.04% 72.83% 18.13% 79.77% 19.93% 31.19%
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5.8 Summary
In this chapter, a novel IDS implementation that leverages One-Shot learning was
presented. The models were built using Siamese networks. The objective is to build
models that can learn using a limited number of instances. To achieve this goal, three
usage scenarios were proposed and evaluated using four datasets. The datasets covered
CI networks and general-purpose networks as well.
In the first usage scenario, a Siamese network is trained to classify attacks
using limited instances during training. The aim is to evaluate to applicability of
similarity-based learning for cybersecurity use. ANN were used as the building
block of the Siamese twin networks and random search hyperparameter optimisation
alongside the literature hyperparameters values recommendations [277, 276] are
performed and loss curves are monitored to ensure the network convergence. The
results demonstrated that similarity-based learning using Siamese networks is indeed
applicable for cybersecurity use. However, a trade-off was encountered between the
number of overlapping classes and the effectiveness of the similarity-based learning.
This was demonstrated in the performance of the SCADA dataset, where some classes
classification accuracy reached 100%, while others were below 50%. The CICIDS2017
dataset experienced the highest classification accuracy that reached 84.771% with a
FPR of 6.15%.
In the second usage scenario, the Siamese network is trained using N − 1 classes.
After training, a class was added to the network without retraining. The new class
represents the case where a new attack is identified and a few labelled instances are
available to represent it, however, the instances are not enough to train IDS model.
In this case, the Siamese network model is evaluated on its adaptability to correctly
classify known attacks (the ones that were used during training) and a new attack.
The classification accuracy of attacks that were excluded from the training process
demonstrated the applicability of this approach. For the CICIDS2017 dataset, The
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SSH Brute-force classification, when mimicking a new attack, reached 78.45% while
the FTP Brute-force reached 78.48%. The NSL-KDD and the KDD Cup’99 datasets
results confirmed the significance of having a few, yet representable, instances to
represent the new cyber attack class. This can be observed in the DoS classification
accuracy that rose from 39.88% to 85.37% for the NSL-KDD dataset.
Finally, in the third usage scenario, the Siamese network is further utilised by
leveraging the similarity to detect zero-day attacks. In this case, the new cyber attack
is assumed to be unknown and no instances exists to represent it. The similarity-based
comparison then discriminates instances that fall out of the accepted similarity
threshold. The Siamese network was capable of discriminating 84.8% of the SSH and
94.17% of the DoS (Hulk) attacks in the CICIDS2017.
Overall, the experiments and results demonstrate the ability of the proposed
Siamese network model to classify cyber attacks based on learning from similarity.
Furthermore, the results show the ability of the model to adapt to new cyber attacks







Detecting zero-day cyber attacks is a challenging task due to their complexity and
the pace at which they evolve and emerge [295]. Current ML-based IDS achieve
high detection accuracy for known attacks, but they are less effective at detecting
unknown zero-day attacks. This is due to the limitations of the models employed
by current IDS. With the advancement of ML and DL in domains like image and
video processing, Natural Language Processing (NLP), etc., researchers started to
leverage these techniques for cybersecurity usage. Nguyen and Reddi [296] discuss the
importance and benefit ML can bring to cybersecurity by granting a “robust resistance”
against attacks.
As defined by Chapman, a zero-day attack is “a traffic pattern of interest that
in general has no matching patterns in malware or attack detection elements in the
network” [297]. Bilge and Dumitras [298] discuss the implications of zero-day attacks
in the real world focusing on their impact and prevalence. The authors highlight
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that zero-day attacks are significantly more prevalent than suspected, demonstrating
that out of the 18 attacks they analysed, 11 (61%) were previously unknown [298].
Furthermore, based on the authors’ findings, a zero-day attack can exist for a
substantial period of time, with an average of 10 months [298], before being detected,
thus compromising the target system during that period. The number of zero-day
attacks encountered in 2019 exceeds the previously reported figures of the last three
years [299]. As a result of all these discussed dimensions, there is a need for an
effective detection for zero-day attacks.
In Chapter 5, Siamese networks were utilised to detect zero-day attacks alongside
classifying known attacks. The Siamese network was used to flag instances that are
dissimilar to all known classes (benign and known attacks) as zero-day attacks.
Recent research uses outlier-based techniques to detect zero-day attacks (i.e.,
instances/occurrences that vary from benign traffic). However, the main drawback
of current outlier-based IDS research is that they have relatively low accuracy rates
as a result of both high FPR and high FNR [300]. The high FNR leaves the
system vulnerable to cyber attacks [301] and the high FPR needlessly consumes the
time of cybersecurity operation centres, leading to “alert fatigue” or “cybersecurity
fatigue” [302]. This is evidenced in a study by Cisco that shows that only 28% of
the investigated intrusions are real [301]. Therefore, this limits the performance and
practicality of deploying the models in real-life.
This chapter focuses on building a model that is capable of detecting zero-day
attacks efficiently. The aim is to build models with high detection rates while
keeping the false-negatives to a minimum. The proposed methodology leverages the
encoding-decoding of autoencoders, which benefits from their training technique that
minimises the reconstruction error. By training using benign traffic only, the model can
flag unknown attacks. To further demonstrate the efficiency of the autoencoder model,
besides comparing the results with recent research, the results are compared against
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a One-Class SVM. One-Class SVM is considered one of the robust novelty detection
models and has proven its effectiveness and high accuracy in the literature [303].
6.2 Background
The two models that are utilised in this part of the research are explained in this
section. Autoencoder is outlined in Section 6.2.1, while Section 6.2.2 discusses the
unsupervised variant of a SVM (One-Class SVM) model. Finally, Section 6.2.3
provides an overview of recent IDS research that uses autoencoders.
6.2.1 Autoencoders
The zero-day detection model that is presented in this chapter benefits from
autoencoder characteristics and attributes, specifically the encoding-decoding
capabilities. The objective is that the autoencoder acts as an outlier-based zero-day
attack detector. In this case, the autoencoder model is used to perform binary
classification (i.e., benign and zero-day attack) and not multi-class classification.
Rumelhart et al. [304] are the first to introduce autoencoders. Their aim is to
overcome the back propagation in an unsupervised context by using the input as the
target. Autoencoders are categorised as self-supervised learners since the input and
output are the same, and the model performs representation learning [305]. As defined
by Goodfellow et al. [5], an autoencoder is “a neural network that is trained to attempt
to copy its input to its output” [5].
The basic architecture of an autoencoder is represented in Figure 6.1. The
architecture of an autoencoder and the number of hidden layers differ based on the
domain and the usage scenario [306]. Formally, given an input vector X , where X
represents the feature vector and its size is determined based on the number of features





represented in Equation 6.1 [305], such that φ and ψ are the encoding and decoding
functions, respectively.
φ : X → F
ψ : F → X ′
φ,ψ = argmin
φ,ψ
||X − (φ ◦ψ)X||2
(6.1)
Commonly, the reconstruction error of an input X is represented as the difference
between X and X ′. X ′ = g(f(X )), where f(x) is the encoding function φ,
which constructs the encoded vector of X . g(x) is the decoding function ψ, which
reconstructs/restores the encoded vector of X . Mean square error (L2 norm) and
mean absolute error (L1 norm) are common functions that are used to calculate the
reconstruction error as shown in Equation 6.2 and Equation 6.3, respectively, where n








(|xi − x′i|) (6.3)
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Autoencoders are popular for dimensionality reduction and feature learning [307,
308]. An autoencoder can be seen similar to Principal Component Analysis (PCA)
when its encoding function f(x) is a single-layer network with a linear function [309].
In this case the autoencoder adds neither non-linearity to the output nor depth (one
layer), which is what PCA does by learning linear transformation of features to another
space. This results in a similar output feature space [310]. However, various other
applications have been recently proposed for autoencoders in the literature including:
word semantics [311], image compression [312], image anomaly detection [313], and
denoising [314].
6.2.2 One-Class SVM
SVM is one of the well-established supervised ML techniques. Unlike supervised
SVM, One-Class SVM is an unsupervised variant. It is defined as a model capable of
detecting “Novelty” [315], first proposed by Schölkopf et al. [316]. The training goal of
One-Class SVM is to fit a hyperplane that acts as a boundary which best comprises all
the training data and excludes any other data points. The result of training a One-Class
SVM can be visualised as a spherically shaped boundary [317]. Since One-Class SVM
is considered one of the most established outlier-based ML techniques, it provides an
ideal comparison for assessing the performance of the proposed autoencoder.
Formally, given a class of instances {x1, ...., xN}, and a mapping function ϕ() that
maps the features to a space H , the goal of One-Class SVM is to “fit a hyperplane Π
in H that has the largest distance to the origin, and all ϕ(xi) lie at the opposite side
of hyperplane to the origin” [318]. Figure 6.2a and Figure 6.2b show examples of the
One-Class SVM boundary when using linear and RBF kernels, respectively.
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(b) RBF Kernel [319]
Figure 6.2
One-Class SVM Boundaries Example
6.2.3 Related Work
Autoencoders have been proposed for cybersecurity usage for feature engineering
and learning. For example, in the work by Kunang et al. [320], autoencoders are
used for feature extraction, then the features are used in a multi-class SVM classifier.
The authors use KDD Cup’99 and NSL-KDD datasets for evaluation. The evaluation
results of the model are an overall accuracy of 86.96% and a precision of 88.65%.
The different classes accuracies show a highly varying performance as follows;
97.91%, 88.07%, 12.78%, 8.12%, and 97.47% for DoS, probe, R2L, U2R and normal,
respectively, a precision of 99.45%, 78.12%, 97.57%, 50% and 81.59% for DoS, probe,
R2L, U2R and normal, respectively.
Kherlenchimeg and Nakaya [321] use a sparse autoencoder to extract features.
The bottleneck layer of the autoencoder (latent representation) is used as an input
to a Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) classifier. NSL-KDD dataset is used for
evaluation to reach an 80% accuracy. In a similar fashion, Shaikh and Shashikala [322]
use a stacked autoencoder with an LSTM classifier to detect DoS attacks. Using
the NSL-KDD dataset, the overall detection accuracy is 94.3% and a FNR of
5.7%. Abolhasanzadeh [323] uses autoencoders for dimensionality reduction and the
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extraction of bottleneck features. The experiments are evaluated using the NSL-KDD
dataset. In addition, AL-Hawawreh et al. [167] train deep autoencoders on benign
traffic to deduce the most important feature representation to be used in their deep
feed-forward ANN. Shone et al. [168] use a stacked Non-Symmetric Deep autoencoder
to refine and learn the complex relationships between features. The authors use RF
for classification and evaluate their model using both KDD Cup’99 and NSL-KDD
datasets. Farahnakian and Heikkonen [324] use a deep autoencoder where it is fed into
a single supervised layer for classification. The KDD Cup’99 dataset is used and the
highest accuracies are 96.53% and 94.71% for binary and multi-class classification,
respectively. In all these experiments, autoencoders are used alongside other models
that perform the classification task.
6.3 Datasets
Three mainstream IDS datasets are chosen to evaluate the models proposed in
this chapter. CICIDS2017, NSL-KDD, and KDD Cup’99 are the datasets used for
evaluation.
The CICIDS2017 dataset [63] covers a wide range of recent insider and outsider
attacks in a 5-day recording. It contains a diverse coverage of protocols and attack
variations and it is provided in a raw format which allows the flexibility of processing
the dataset. Table 6.1 summarises the traffic scenarios recorded per day. The raw files
of the CICIDS2017 dataset are preprocessed as discussed below. The full CICIDS2017
description is available in [325].
The second and third datasets are the NSL-KDD [77] and the KDD Cup’99 [78].
Both datasets cover normal traffic and 4 cyber attack classes, namely, DoS, Probing,
R2L, and U2R, and are provided in CSV feature files. Each instance is represented
with its feature values alongside the class label. The feature files are prepared for ML






Tuesday SSH and FTP Brute-force
Wednesday DoS/DDoS and Heartbleed
Thursday
Web Attack (Brute-force, XSS, Sql Injection) and
Infiltration
Friday Botnet, Portscan and DDoS
Benign traffic instances are solely used to train the models. The benign instances are
split into training and validation [326] using sklearn “train test split” function [326].
Each of the attack classes is then used to mimic a zero-day attack, thus assessing
the ability of the model to detect it. Since the NSL-KDD dataset is provided in
two files;“KDDTrain+.csv” and “KDDTest+.csv”, attacks in both files are used for
evaluation.
6.3.1 CICIDS2017 Dataset Preprocessing
To prepare the CICIDS2017 dataset, the process is outlined as follows. Firstly, the
PCAP files of the CICIDS2017 dataset are split based on the attack type and the
timestamps provided by the dataset owner. As a result, a PCAP file for each attack class
is created. Secondly, bidirectional flows features are extracted. It is important to note
that flow-based features are better suited for modern IDS development [53]. This is
due to the advancement and complexity of networks and the dependence on encrypted
traffic. Flow-based features are applicable for both encrypted and unencrypted traffic
analysis [53], because their extraction relies on the communication between two nodes,
rather than specific packet data. Thirdly, features with high correlation are dropped to
minimise model instability [327].
The process of dropping highly correlated features is described in Algorithm 6.1. A
threshold of 0.9 is used [328]. Features with correlation less than the threshold are used
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for training. This is because features with high correlation have similar impact on the
output (i.e., the dependent variable) [328]. Therefore, one of them is dropped. Finally,
the features are scaled using a Standard Scaler. This is done to normalise the features
to a mean µ of 0 and standard deviation σ of 1, which accelerates the overall training
process [40]. It is important to note that only benign instances are used in selecting the
features and scaling to ensure zero influence of the cyber attack instances.
Algorithm 6.1 Drop Correlated Features
Input: Benign Data 2D Array, N, Correlation Threshold
Output: Benign Data 2D Array, Dropped Columns
1: correlation matrix← data.corr().abs()
2: upper matrix← correlation matrix[i, j] {i, j ∈ N : i <= j}
3: dropped← i{i ∈ N : correlation matrix[i,∗ ] > threshold}
4: data← data.drop columns(dropped)
5: return data, dropped
6.4 Methodology
6.4.1 Autoencoder-based model
An ANN is used as the building block for the proposed autoencoder. Random
search [275] is used for the ANN hyperparameter optimisation. The ANN architecture,
number of epochs, and learning rate are decided based on the output of random search.
Random search is known to converge faster than grid search to a semi-optimal set
of parameters. It has also been proven to be better than grid search when a small
number of parameters are needed [329]. Finally, it limits the possibility of overfitted
parameters.
Once the hyperparameters are decided, the model training takes place.
Algorithm 6.2 outlines the overall training process. First, benign instances are split
into 75%:25% for training and validation [231], respectively. The model is initialised
using the optimal ANN architecture (number of layers and number of hidden neurons
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per layer). Finally, the model is trained for n number of epochs. The loss and accuracy
curves are analysed to confirm that the autoencoder converges.
Once the model converges, as shown in Figure 6.3, the model is evaluated using
Algorithm 6.3. An attack instance is flagged as a zero-day attack if the Mean Squared
Error (MSE) (reconstruction error) of the decoded (X ′) and the original instance
(X ) is larger than a given threshold. The threshold is chosen at first based on the
value returned by the random search hyperparameter optimisation. For the purpose of
evaluation, multiple thresholds are assessed; 0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2. The threshold plays
an important role in deciding the value at which an instance is considered a zero-day
attack, i.e., which MSE between X ′ and X is within the acceptable range.
Algorithm 6.2 Autoencoder: Training
Input: benign data, ANN architecture, regularisation value, num epochs
Output: Trained Autoencoder
1: training = 75% of benign data
2: testing = benign data− training
3: autoencoder ← build autoencoder(ANN Architecture, regularisation value)
4: batch size← 1024
5: autoencoder.train(batch size, num epochs, training, testing)
6: return autoencoder
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Algorithm 6.3 Autoencoder: Evaluation
Input: Trained Autoencoder, attack, thresholds
Output: Detection accuracies
1: detection accuracies← {}
2: predictions← model.predict(attack)
3: for th ∈ thresholds do
4: accuracy ← (mse(predictions, attack) > th)/len(attack)
5: detection accuracies.add(threshold, accuracy)
6: end for
7: return detection accuracies
6.4.2 One-Class SVM based Model
Similar to the autoencoder-based model, One-Class SVM model is trained using the
benign instances only. A “ν” value is specified for training the One-Class SVM.
Chen et al. describe the ν value as “ν ∈ [0, 1] which is the lower and upper bound
on the number of examples that are support vectors and that lie on the wrong side
of the hyperplane, respectively” [330]. The ν default value in scikit-learn library is
0.5 [227]. This means that the goal is to produce in a hyperplane that includes 50% of
the training samples. However, for the purpose of this experiment, multiple ν values
are chosen (0.2, 0.15, 0.1, 0.05). These ν values were used to evaluate and compare the
autoencoder performance.
Algorithm 6.4 shows the process of training the One-Class SVM model. Similar to
the autoencoder model in Section 6.2.1, 75% of the benign samples are used in the
training process. Unlike the autoencoder model where evaluation relies on a threshold,
a trained One-Class SVM model outputs a binary value {0,1}. The output represents
whether an instance belongs to the class to which the One-Class SVM is fit. Hence,
each attack is evaluated based on how many instances are predicted with a “0” output
of the One-Class SVM.
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Algorithm 6.4 One-Class SVM Model
Input: benign data, nu value
Output: Trained SVM
1: training = 75% i ∈ benign data
2: testing = benign data ∩ training
3: oneclasssvm← OneClassSVM( nu value, ‘rbf ′)
4: oneclasssvm.fit(training)
5: return oneclasssvm
6.5 Experiments and Results
6.5.1 CICIDS2017 Dataset
Autoencoder Results
The optimised architecture for the CICIDS2017 dataset autoencoder model is as
follows:
• ANN Architecture: In(18):Hidden(15):Hidden(9):Hidden(15):Out(18)
• Batch size: 1024
• L2 regularisation: 0.0001
• Number of epochs: 50
• Loss: L2 norm (Mean Square Error)
Table 6.2 lists the autoencoder model accuracy of all CICIDS2017 classes. It is
important to note that the accuracy is defined differently for benign and attack classes.
The model’s accuracy reflects the detection of attacks. This relies on the reconstruction
error being larger than the given threshold. Unlike attacks, for the benign class the
accuracy represents the rate of instances not classified as zero-day attacks (i.e., the
reconstruction error smaller than the given threshold).
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Table 6.2
Zero-Day Detection: CICIDS2017 Autoencoder Results
Class Detection Accuracy
Threshold 0.2 0.15 0.1 0.05
Benign (Validation) 96.56% 95.19% 90.47% 81.13%
FTP Brute-force 5.18% 5.34% 6.73% 82.82%
SSH Brute-force 7.2% 8.38% 78.05% 80.51%
DoS (Slowloris) 65.63% 71.73% 78.13% 80.85%
DoS (GoldenEye) 66.98% 85.55% 87.71% 90.01%
DoS (Hulk) 98.23% 98.23% 98.34% 98.43%
DoS (SlowHTTPTest) 22.42% 24.03% 28.09% 39.02%
DDoS 83.47% 92.23% 97.88% 99.67%
Heartbleed 28.61% 28.9% 39.6% 43.64%
Web BF 9.7% 9.95% 82.04% 85.41%
Web XSS 11.14% 11.28% 96.38% 99.46%
Web SQL 16.67% 16.67% 22.22% 27.78%
Infiltration - Dropbox 1 47.06% 52.94% 94.12% 94.12%
Infiltration - Dropbox 2 85.71% 85.71% 100% 100%
Infiltration - Dropbox 3 16.3% 23.8% 89.5% 98.04%
Infiltration - Cooldisk 48.08% 51.92% 86.54% 92.31%
Botnet 17.46% 17.77% 37.15% 66.88%
PortScan 16.15% 28.37% 75.21% 98.47%
From Table 6.2, it is noted that the benign class accuracy with a threshold of
0.2, 0.15, 0.1, and 0.05 is 96.56%, 95.19%, 90.47%, and 81.13%, respectively.
Furthermore, three categories of attack detection accuracy are observed. Firstly, cyber
attack classes that are distinctive from benign which are easily detected. For example,
DoS (Hulk) and DDoS where the detection accuracy is high regardless of the threshold
[83% - 99%]. Secondly, cyber attack classes that are slightly different from benign (for
example, SSH Brute-force, and PortScan). It is observed that the detection accuracy,
in this case, depends on the threshold value and an accuracy rise is observed for lower
thresholds. This emphasises the influence threshold value choice has on the detection
accuracy. Thirdly, cyber attack classes that are not distinguishable from benign traffic,
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which are detected but with a lower accuracy (for example, Botnet, SQL Injection and
DoS-SlowHTTPTest). These cyber attacks behaviour are similar to the benign traffic
behaviour.
Figure 6.4 provides a visualisation of the different CICIDS2017 classes and their
corresponding detection accuracies with different threshold values. By observing
Figure 6.4, the three discussed categories can be seen, (i) classes with a high stable
detection accuracy, (ii) classes with a prompt rise in detection accuracy in the
right-most slice (0.05 threshold) and (iii) classes that are not distinguishable from
benign traffic. Finally, the benign accuracy (top left) falls within an acceptable range
with different thresholds, with 18.87% FPR at most. These can be observed further by
plotting the ROC curves for each of the attack classes, as shown in Appendix F.
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Figure 6.4
CICIDS2017 Autoencoder Detection Results Summary Per Class
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One-Class SVM Results
One-Class SVM model results are listed in Table 6.3. By analysing the One-Class
SVM results, three observations are identified; (i) The benign detection accuracy
decreases when the ν increases. The detection accuracy is 94.84% when ν = 0.05
and 79.71% when ν = 0.2. This is because One-Class SVM model includes more
instances within the decision boundary with lower ν. (ii) The classes with high
detection accuracy in the autoencoder results (Table 6.2) are detected effectively by the
One-Class SVM; however, the One-Class SVM fails to detect the two other categories.
This is due to the limitations of the One-Class SVM algorithm, which attempts to fit
a hyperplane to separate benign class from other classes. Classes that fall into this
hyperplane will always be classified as benign/normal. Finally, (iii) Detection rate of
the correctly identified attack classes varies within [0 - 5]% range. For example, DoS
(SlowHTTPTest) detection accuracy is 98.11% when ν = 0.05 and 98.71% when
ν = 0.2. Similarly, SSH detection accuracy is 78.96% when ν = 0.05 and 80.95%
when ν = 0.2.
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Table 6.3
Zero-Day Detection: CICIDS2017 One-Class SVM Results
Class Detection Accuracy
ν 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
Benign (Validation) 94.84% 89.81% 84.84% 79.71%
FTP Brute-force 5.16% 10.19% 15.16% 20.29%
SSH Brute-force 78.96% 79.51% 80.26% 80.95%
DoS (Slowloris) 6.75% 7.66% 8.38% 10.37%
DoS (GoldenEye) 67.32% 71.87% 72.39% 72.85%
DoS (Hulk) 85.73% 90.69% 91.35% 91.55%
DoS (SlowHTTPTest) 98.11% 98.59% 98.66% 98.71%
DDoS 29.89% 39.35% 39.94% 40.96%
Heartbleed 99.09% 99.49% 99.54% 99.58%
Web BF 17.05% 21.1% 23.41% 35.84%
Web XSS 8.38% 9.58% 9.76% 10.13%
Web SQL 5.37% 5.77% 6.31% 6.85%
Infiltration - Dropbox 1 11.11% 38.89% 38.89% 38.89%
Infiltration - Dropbox 2 29.41% 29.41% 35.29% 35.29%
Infiltration - Dropbox 3 57.14% 57.14% 57.14% 57.14%
Infiltration - Cooldisk 90.96% 92.15% 93.8% 94.91%
Botnet 36.54% 44.23% 46.15% 50%
Portscan 57.61% 59.27% 60.04% 63.43%
The comparison of the autoencoder model with the One-Class SVM one is further
visualised in Figure 6.5. The two classes that One-Class SVM performs better with
than the autoencoder model are DoS (SlowHTTPTest) and Heartbleed. For these two
classes the autoencoder reconstruction error was below the zero-day threshold value,
however, they were placed on the opposite side of the One-Class SVM hyperplane,
which explains their detection accuracy. Therefore, One-Class SVM is well suited for
flagging recognisable zero-day attacks. However, autoencoders are better suited for
complex zero-day attacks as the performance ranking is significantly higher. Figure 6.5
shows a class-by–by-class comparison of the performance of autoencoder versus
One-Class SVM. Figure 6.5 (a) plots the results using One-Class SVM ν = 0.2 and
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autoencoder threshold of 0.05, while Figure 6.5 (b) plots the results using One-Class
















































(b) SVM (ν = 0.1), AE (Threshold = 0.1)
Figure 6.5
CICIDS2017 Autoencoder and One-Class SVM Comparison
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6.5.2 KDD Cup’99 and NSL-KDD Dataset
Autoencoder Results
The autoencoder optimised architecture for the KDD Cup’99 and NSL-KDD datasets
is:
• KDD Cup’99 ANN Architecture:
In(118):Hidden(100):Dr(0.2):Hidden(60):Dr(0.2):Hidden(100):Out(118)
• NSL-KDD ANN Architecture:
In(118):Hidden(122):Dr(0.2):Hidden(60):Dr(0.2):Hidden(100):Out(122)
• Batch size: 1024
• L2 regularisation: 0.001
• Number of epochs: 50
• Loss: L1 norm (Mean Absolute Error)
It is noted that L1 (Mean Absolute Error) is chosen over L2 for KDD dataset family
because it demonstrates better performance. Furthermore, due to the pre-engineered
features of these two datasets and their given ranges, L1 provided a better scale for the
reconstruction error. Table 6.4 and Table 6.5 list the autoencoder results for the KDD
Cup’99 and the NSL-KDD datasets, respectively. Similar to the CICIDS2017 dataset,
75% of the benign class is used for training the autoencoder. For NSL-KDD dataset,
attacks in both the KDDTrain+ and KDDTest+ files are used to evaluate the model. As
mentioned before, the threshold value is selected based on random search parameter
optimisation. The trade-off between the threshold choice and the TNR is observed
in the results, however, it is not as significant as the CICIDS2017 dataset discussion.




Zero-Day Detection: KDD Cup’99 Autoencoder Results
Class Detection Accuracy
Threshold 0.3 0.25 0.2
Normal (Validation) 87.34% 83.95% 77.64%
DoS 99.4% 99.42% 99.48%
Probe 98.73% 98.93% 99.42%
R2L 96.36% 97.25% 100%
U2R 94.23% 96.15% 98.08%
Table 6.5
Zero-Day Detection: NSL-KDD Autoencoder Results
Class Detection Accuracy
Threshold 0.3 0.25 0.2
KDDTrain+.csv
Normal (Validation) 79.09% 77.80% 72.78%
DoS 98.15% 98.16% 98.17%
Probe 99.89% 99.94% 99.94%
R2L 83.12% 96.48% 96.48%
U2R 84.62% 100% 100%
KDDTest+.csv
Normal 84.82% 84.42% 80.94%
DoS 94.67% 94.67% 94.76%
Probe 100% 100% 100%
R2L 95.95% 96.5% 97%
U2R 83.78% 89.19% 100%
Compared to the available autoencoder implementation for detecting zero-day
attacks in the literature, the autoencoder results presented in this section
outperform [178]. Gharib et al. [178] use a hybrid two-stage autoencoder to detect
normal and abnormal traffic. Training on KDDTrain+ file and testing on KDDTest+,
the authors report an overall accuracy of 90.17%, whereas the proposed autoencoder in
this section has the overall accuracy of 91.84%, 92.96% and 94.54% using a threshold
of 0.3, 0.25 and 0.2, respectively. Moreover, it is important to note that Gharib et
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al. [178] do not mention details as of how they define zero-day attacks or the classes
they choose in the testing process. Table 6.6 summarises the performance comparison
of the autoencoder implementation in this section and the work of Gharib et al. [178].
Moreover, it is shown that the implemented autoencoder outperforms the denoising
autoencoder proposed in [163]. The authors did not report any use of hyperparameter
optimisation or dropping correlated features. Moreover, attack instances influenced
their experiments. For example, the authors used the attack instances to train an
autoencoder to be able to decide the threshold value they used. Also, features
normalisation was performed with attack instances included. The results presented
in this work outperforms specifically for the KDDTest+ instances where the authors
model’s accuracy is capped at 88% while this work reaches 94%.
Table 6.6
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For the KDD Cup’99 and NSL-KDD datasets, the One-Class SVM results are reported
in Table 6.7 and Table 6.8, respectively. The results show similar detection trends to
those of the autoencoder which are discussed in Section 6.5.2. This is due to the limited
variance of attacks covered by the KDD Cup’99 and NSL-KDD datasets. To visualise
the similarity in detection accuracy, Figure 6.6 and Figure 6.7 show the results for the
KDD Cup’99 and NSL-KDD datasets, respectively.
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Table 6.7
Zero-Day Detection: KDD Cup’99 One-Class SVM Results
Class Detection Accuracy
ν 0.1 0.15 0.2
Normal (Validation) 90.15% 85.24% 79.93%
DoS 99.48% 99.49% 99.71%
Probe 99.05% 99.29% 99.37%
R2L 96.8% 97.51% 98.49%
U2R 96.15% 96.15% 98.08%
Table 6.8
Zero-Day Detection: NSL-KDD One-Class SVM Results
Class Detection Accuracy
ν 0.1 0.15 0.2
KDDTrain+.csv
Normal (Validation) 89.9% 85.14% 80.54%
DoS 98.13% 98.14% 98.14%
Probe 97.74% 98.77% 99.52%
R2L 49.35% 52.26% 81.71%
U2R 78.85% 80.77% 82.69%
KDDTest+.csv
Normal 88.12% 86.02% 84.72%
DoS 94.67% 94.67% 94.69%
Probe 99.55% 99.91% 100%
R2L 80.17% 82.22% 90.31%



























KDD Cup’99 Autoencoder and One-Class SVM Comparison


























NSL-KDD Autoencoder and One-Class SVM Comparison
SVM (ν = 0.2), AE (Threshold = 0.3)
*: KDDTrain+ file, +: KDDTest+ file
6.6 Summary
In this chapter, the zero-day detection problem is tackled from a different prospective.
Unlike Chapter 5 where zero-day attacks were detected using a Siamese network
trained to classify and discriminate attacks based on similarity, in this chapter, an
autoencoder is used. The autoencoder is trained using benign traffic only, then,
relying on the encoding-decoding capabilities of the autoencoder, zero-day attacks are
detected.
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The proposed Autoencoder model is tested using three benchmark datasets, namely,
KDD Cup’99, NSL-KDD, and CICIDS2017. The experiments demonstrated a high
detection accuracy for zero-day attacks. The CICIDS2017 zero-day detection accuracy
reaches 90.01%, 98.43%, 98.47%, and 99.67% for DoS (GoldenEye), DoS (Hulk),
PortScan and DDoS attacks, respectively. The KDD Cup’99 dataset detection accuracy
reached 95.21% and NSL-KDD dataset detection accuracy reaches 92.96%.
Furthermore, to assess the autoencoder performance, it is compared to an
unsupervised outlier-based ML technique; One-Class SVM, which detects outliers.
The one-class SVM mode presents its effectiveness in detecting zero-day attacks
for KDD Cup’99 and NSL-KDD datasets and the distinctive attack classes from the
CICIDS2017 dataset. Compared to One-Class SVM, the autoencoder shows better
detection accuracies. Both models demonstrate low FPR. Finally, the CICIDS2017
classes that mimic benign traffic behaviour, DoS (Slowloris), DoS (SlowHTTPTest)
as an example, experience lower detection rates by both the autoencoder and the
One-Class SVM models. This is due to the tactic used by attackers to ensure that
attacks display similar behaviour to benign traffic. This problem - detecting attacks
mimicking benign behaviour - is addressed in the next chapter. The code is available
on GitHub at https://github.com/AbertayMachineLearningGroup/zero-day-detection.
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Chapter 7
Classifying Benign Imitating Attacks
Using Flow Aggregation
7.1 Problem Statement
Cyber attacks are becoming more complex due to the expansion of attack surfaces
found in hardware and software of modern computing technologies, and the evolution
of more advanced evasion methods. As outlined in Chapter 6, there exists attacks that
are overlooked in recent research, or - when considered - demonstrate low detection
accuracy. One of the reasons behind this low detection accuracy is because these
attacks mimic benign traffic behaviour to evade detection mechanisms.
In ML models, the choice of features is more important than the choice of the
model [331]. Ghaffarian and Shahriari state that features play a vital role in the
development of IDS [42]. The features used in ML-based IDS cover (i) packet-based
information; for example, TCP flags, IP Flags, packet length, etc., and (ii) flow-based
features that characterise the communication between two nodes; for example, the
average size of packets, and average time between packets in a flow [332]. In current
research, these features have demonstrated their effectiveness when combined with
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feature engineering techniques and sufficient training samples [331, 173]. However,
these features are not effective in cases where cyber attacks mimic benign traffic
behaviour. This is demonstrated in the difficulty to detect/flag those attacks (i.e.
zero-day).
In this chapter, an additional level of feature abstraction, named “Flow Aggregation”
is proposed to tackle this problem and aid in detecting cyber attacks that mimic
benign traffic behaviour. These new features are based on a higher level of abstraction
of network traffic. Specifically, flow aggregation is performed by grouping flows
initiated from a network host. This additional level of feature abstraction benefits
from the cumulative information, thus aiding in qualifying a model to classify
benign-mimicking attacks.
The CICIDS2017 dataset is used to evaluate the proposed features with a focus on
the attacks that are difficult to detect as shown in Chapter 6; namely, DoS (Slowloris)
and DoS (SlowHTTPTest) attacks. The new feature significance is evaluated on attack
classes that do and do not mimic benign behaviour. Finally, the experiments that are
presented in Chapter 6 are re-evaluated using the proposed features to assess the effect
they have on zero-day detection performance.
7.2 Background
7.2.1 Related Work
Different features are used to build IDS. Rezaei and Liu [53] discuss four main
categories of networking features, namely; time series, header, payload, and statistical.
The authors discuss the advantages of using time series and statistical features in
comparison with header and payload features, as the former can be extracted from
both encrypted and unencrypted traffic. The authors further highlight the shortcomings
of available encrypted traffic classification research [53]. Both packet-based and
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flow-based features have been used for intrusion detection purposes and have proved
to be effective. However, with the dominance of network encryption, which reached
87% at the beginning of 2019 [333], packet-based features are rendered less reliable at
detecting cyber attacks in modern networking.
Older attacks are predominant in datasets like KDD Cup’99, and NSL-KDD. These
datasets are used to train ML-based IDS, and in many cases achieve good results.
More up-to-date cyber attacks are recorded in the CICIDS2017 dataset [63], therefore,
building IDS models using the CICIDS2017 is a more complex undertaking.
Table 7.1 and Table 7.2 provide a list of recent articles in which the CICIDS2017
dataset is used. The tables present the published articles, the ML models applied, the
metrics used to assess performance, and the accompanied results. Two observations are
noticed in Table 7.1. (i) Research utilising the CICIDS2017 dataset involve a subset of
attacks, specifically the ones that are distinctive from benign traffic. DDoS, PortScan,
and SSH, for example, have received attention from researchers, whilst others have
been overlooked due to their poor results and their benign-like behaviour that render
their classification difficult. Studies that include these other attacks demonstrate a low
detection accuracy. This low detection accuracy is not reflected in the classification
models’ overall accuracy due to the class imbalance problem of this dataset [334].
(ii) The overall accuracy is much higher than the accuracy of individual classes. For
example, in [176], when 1-layer ANN is used, the overall multi-class classification
accuracy is 96% (Table 7.1), while the individual classes detection accuracies are
55.9%, 95.9%, 85.4% and 85.2% for normal, SSH, DDoS and PortScan classes,
respectively (Table 7.2). This indicates the misleading effect of reporting the overall
accuracy when dealing with imbalanced datasets.
Vinayakumar et al. highlight in their recent research on the CICIDS2017 dataset
that by observing the saliency map for the dataset, it is shown that “the dataset requires
a few more additional features to classify the connection record correctly” [176].
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Table 7.1








- 82% 98% 90%
LSTM - 97% 98% 97%
MLP
FTP
- 93% 77% 85%





96.3% 90.8% 97.3% 93.9%
DNN (5
Layers)
93.1% 82.7% 97.4% 89.4%
LR 83.9% 68.5% 85% 75.8%
NB 31.3% 30% 97.9% 45.9%
KNN 91.0% 78.1% 96.8% 86.5%
SVM
(RBF)




96% 96.9% 96% 96.2%
DNN (5
Layers)
95.6% 96.2% 95.6% 95.7%
LR 87% 88.9% 87% 86.8%
NB 25% 76.7% 25% 18.8%
KNN 90.9% 94.9% 90.9% 92.2%
SVM
(RBF)
79.9% 75.7% 79.9% 72.3%




97.80% 99% 99% 99%




85.92% 86.45% 99.70% -
RF 86.29% 86.80% 99.63% -
NB 90.06% 79.99% 86.03% -
SVM 92.44% 79.88% 84.36 -
+ Only snippets of the results are listed in the table.
Where: DDoS: Distributed Denial of Service MLP: Multilayer Perceptron
DL: Deep Learning NB: Naı̈ve Bayes
DNN: Deep Neural Network RBF: Radial Basis Function
FTP: File Transfer Protocol RF: Random Forest
KNN: k-Nearest Neighbour SSH: Secure Shell
LR: Logistic Regression SVM: Support Vector Machine
LSTM: Long short-term memory
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Table 7.2
CICIDS2017 Recent Articles Performance Summary (2)
Accuracy
Year/Ref Approach




55.9% 95.9% 85.4% 85.2%
DNN (5
Layers)
56.8% 95.8% 85.5% 85.5%
LR 88.5% 98.4% 92.2% 92.6%
NB 32.2% 75.7% 98.5% 87.9%
KNN 90.9% 97% 99.5% 99.6%
SVM (RBF) 79.8% 98.8% 92.9% 99%
+ Only snippets of the results are listed in the table.
The authors’ observations highlight this need specifically for the DoS class. As later
discussed in the experiments and results in Section 7.4, the findings in this chapter
concur with this observation regarding the attack classes that need the proposed
additional abstraction level of features to be discriminated from benign traffic and other
attacks.
7.3 Methodology
Starting with a raw PCAP file which contains network traffic, two levels of features can
be extracted as shown in Figure 7.1. The first level (lower level) inspects the individual
packets to extract packet-based features. For example, TCP and IP flags, packet size,
ports, protocol used, etc. The second level inspects flow to extract flow-based features,
either unidirectional or bidirectional. This is done by inspecting all individual packets















Abstraction Levels of Networking Features
The Centre for Applied Internet Data Analysis (CAIDA) defines a flow as “a
set of packets which share a common property” [24]. In other words, given two
nodes/endpoints in a network, the packets involved in the communication between
them are abstracted as network flows. A network flow could be 2-tuple, where the
source and destination IP addresses are used. When the source and destination ports
are also used, a flow is considered to be 4-tuple, then 5-tuple flows additionally include
the protocol used. The 5-tuple flow is the most commonly used one. Network flows can
be unidirectional (i.e., host A to host B), or bidirectional, which combines the packets
in the unidirectional flow (A−B) and (B − A).
In this chapter, a third additional level of abstraction is proposed. The aim is to
represent characteristics and information about the overall communication between
hosts. This new level groups bidirectional flows into bundles and aggregated features
are derived, called “Flow aggregation features”. The features provide additional traffic
characteristics in the form of cumulative information.
After these aggregated features are computed, they are propagated back to each
bidirectional flow in the bundle/group. This is represented by the superscript + sign in
Figure 7.1. The two proposed flow aggregation features in this chapter are (i) number
of flows and (ii) source ports delta.
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Number of Flows: The first added feature represents the number of siblings in a
flow bundle. Given the communication between a host A and one or more hosts, all
flows initiated by A are counted. The advantage of this feature is that it is significant
for attacks that intentionally spread their associated requests over time when targeting a
single host. However, when grouped, the bundled flow will have additional information
about how many flows are in the same group that can resemble the communication
pattern. Moreover, it can represent patterns when an attacker targets many hosts, each
with a few communications, or spread the communication over time. When these flows
are grouped, a pattern can be identified.
Figure 7.2 shows how the flows bundling process takes place. Each letter at the
top of Figure 7.2 represents a node in the network. Similarly, each pair of arrows in
Figure 7.2 represents a bidirectional flow with the notation XYi, such that X is the
source node, Y is the destination node, and i is the communication counter. Finally,
the colours in Figure 7.2 represent the grouping of flows into bundles. It is observed
that the first bundle (in blue colour) has 4 flows, therefore, AB1, AB2, AC1, and AD1
will have the “number of flows” feature set to 4. Similarly, the second bundle (in green
colour), BC1 and BC2 will have the value 2 and so on.













Aggregation of Network Traffic Flows. Each Colour Represents an Aggregated Flow
170
Source Ports Delta: The second added feature is “source ports delta”. This feature
is calculated using all the port numbers used in a bundle. Algorithm 7.1 illustrates
how this feature is calculated. The advantage of this feature is to capture the level and
variation pattern of the used ports in legitimate traffic. The feature adds this piece of
information to each flow, which then enhances the learning and classification as further
discussed in this chapter.
Algorithm 7.1 Flow Aggregation: Calculate Ports Delta Feature
Input: List of bundle flow ports
Output: Ports Delta Feature
1: ports.sort()
2: for i ∈ length(ports)− 1 do
3: diff[i]← abs(ports[i+1] - ports[i])
4: end for
5: avg diff← diff.mean()
6: return avg diff
Recursive Feature Elimination (RFE) [337] is used to validate the significance of the
added features when used to classify classes that mimic benign traffic behaviour. RFE
is used to select the best k features (here, k = 5 [338]). Over the various experiments
discussed in Section 7.4, RFE demonstrates that the two features are important for
identifying classes that mimic benign behaviour. For attacks that are distinctive, flow
aggregation features are nonessential.
The parameters for the classification models are as follows:
• RFE: Logistic Regression with 2000 iterations
• ANN Architecture:
– Binary Classifier: In(5) : 3 : 2
– Three-Class Classifier: In(5) : 3 : 3
– Five-Class Classifier (1): In(5) : 3 : 5
– Five-Class Classifier (2): In(10) : 8 : 5
• Activation: Relu for hidden layers and Sigmoid for output layer
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• Batch size: 64
• Number of epochs: 50
• Optimiser: Adam
• Loss: Mean Square Error
7.4 Experiments Methodology and Results
In this section, different classification experiments are performed to assess the
impact of “Flow Aggregation” on different attack classification problems. Moreover,
the autoencoder experiment that was evaluated in Chapter 6 is reassessed using
the proposed features to examine their significance in zero-day attack detection;
specifically, for attacks that were previously detected with low accuracy.
The CICIDS2017 dataset [62] is used for evaluation. The attacks of interest from
the CICIDS2017 dataset are DoS (SlowHTTPTest) and DoS (Slowloris). These two
attacks implement low-bandwidth DoS attacks in the application layer by draining
concurrent connections pool [339]. Since these two attacks are performed slowly, they
are hard to detect. Besides DoS (SlowHTTPTest) and DoS (Slowloris), two other
attacks are used for comparative purposes; PortScan and DoS (Hulk). These two
attacks resemble the case where attacks are easier to discriminate from benign traffic.
Since the attacks of interest are underrepresented in the CICIDS2017 dataset [340],
a portion of one hour of Monday benign traffic and PortScan are used for the
classification purpose [341].
Initially, each of the four attack classes and benign PCAP files are processed to
extract features. The output of this process is 5 CSV files containing bidirectional
flow features and aggregation features. RFE is then performed to select the best k
features which are fed into an ANN classifier. Because the focus is to evaluate the
additional level of feature abstraction and not the classifier model complexity, the ANN
classifier architecture is straightforward. It is composed of 5 input neurons, 1 hidden
layer composed of 3 neurons, and an output layer.
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Three classification experiments are performed. The first experiment is a binary
classification problem for each of the attacks of interest versus the benign class
(Section 7.4.1). The second experiment is a three-class classification (Section 7.4.2).
This experiment evaluates the classification of benign, a benign-mimicking attack, and
a distinctive attack (i.e., not mimicking benign behaviour). Finally, the third experiment
is a five-class classification including all classes of interest (Section 7.4.3). Each
of these experiments is performed twice, with bidirectional features only and with
bidirectional features and aggregation features. The RFE is performed independently
in each experiment and the selected features are listed to highlight the cases where the
new features prove significant. For the purpose of performance comparison, the RFE
features that are selected without the flow aggregation ones are used alongside the two
new features.
7.4.1 Binary Classification Results
This section outlines the results of the first experiment which is a binary classification.
Each of the attacks of interest is classified against the benign class. The RFE ranking
for the proposed Flow aggregation features in the binary classification (each of the
attack classes versus benign class) is outlined in Table 7.3. It can be observed that the
new features are in the top list for the benign mimicking attacks (in bold) and not as
significant for the distinctive ones.
Table 7.3
Binary Classification Flow Aggregation RFE Ranking
Flow Aggregation Feature Rank
(out of 30 features)
Attack Class
Number of Flows Source Ports Delta
DoS (Slowloris) 10 1
DoS (SlowHTTPTest) 6 5
DoS (Hulk) 5 28
PortScan 1 27
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Table 7.4 and Table 7.5 show the precision, recall, and F1-Score for DoS (Slowloris)
and DoS (SlowHTTPTest), respectively. The results are calculated using 5-fold cross
validations and are written as (Mean ± Standard Deviation). The recall of each of the
attack classes rises when the flow aggregation features are included. The recall rises
from 83.69% to 91.31% for DoS (Slowloris) attack class and from 65.94% to 70.03%
for the DoS (SlowHTTPTest) attack class. Unlike attacks that mimic benign behaviour
where flow aggregation features improve the classification performance, classification
performance does not hugely benefit from flow aggregation features in the case of
distinctive classes (classes that do not mimic benign traffic behaviour). This is observed
in Table 7.6 and Table 7.7 for DoS (Hulk) and PortScan classes, respectively. Precision
and recall are high for both of these attacks without utilising the aggregation flow
features. The increase in precision and recall for DoS (Hulk) is 0.01% and 0.48%, and
for PortScan is 0.64% and 0.11%, respectively.
Table 7.4
Benign-DoS (Slowloris) Classification (5-fold cross-validation)




1- Fwd Min Inter-arrival Time
2- Bwd Min Inter-arrival Time
3- Bwd mean time between the first
packet and each successive packet
4- Fwd mean time between the first
packet and each successive packet



































Benign-DoS (SlowHTTPTest) Classification (5-fold cross-validation)




1- Fwd mean time between the first
packet and each successive packet
2- Bwd mean time between the first
packet and each successive packet
3- Fwd Min Inter-arrival Time
4- Bwd Min Inter-arrival Time



































Benign-DoS (Hulk) Classification (5-fold cross-validation)




1- Bwd Min Packet Length
2- Fwd Num Reset Flags
3- Bwd Num Push Flags
4- Bwd Num Reset Flags



































Benign-PortScan Classification (5-fold cross-validation)




1- Fwd STD Packet Length
2- Bwd Min Packet Length
3- Fwd Max Packet Length
4- Fwd Mean Packet Length

































Figure 7.3 shows the effect of using flow aggregation features on the recall of four
attack classes. It is observed that the two attack classes that mimic benign behaviour,
DoS (SlowHTTPTest) and DoS (Slowloris), experience a rise in recall. However, for
the other classes, DoS (Hulk) and PortScan, the recall is high regardless of the use of
flow aggregation features. This emphasises the fact that bidirectional flow features are
sufficient for benign distinguishable attack classes, but not for the benign-mimicking












Without Aggregation With Aggregation
Figure 7.3
Binary Classification — Impact of Flow Aggregation on Classification Recall of Attack Classes
(Benign-Attack)
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7.4.2 Three-Class Classification Results
In the second experiment, a complexity is added to the binary classification problem by
increasing the number of classes. This reduces the likelihood of the benign-mimicking
attack to be correctly discriminated. A three-class classification is performed. Benign
class alongside a discriminative class that does not mimic benign traffic behaviour
(PortScan is used for this purpose) and a benign-mimicking class are used. The RFE
ranking for the proposed Flow aggregation features in the three-class classification is
listed in Table 7.8.
Table 7.8
Three-Class Classification Flow Aggregation RFE Ranking
Flow Aggregation Feature Rank
(out of 30 features)
Attack Class
Number of Flows Source Ports Delta
DoS (Slowloris) 2 1
DoS (SlowHTTPTest) 1 13
DoS (Hulk) 1 28
The three-class classification results demonstrate similar behaviour to the binary
classification ones. The recall of the benign and PortScan classes is high without
using the flow aggregation features. However, the recall experiences a high rise in
the benign-mimicking attack class.
As shown in Table 7.9, the DoS (Slowloris) recall rises from 78.25% to 99.09%,
while in Table 7.10, the DoS (SlowHTTPTest) recall rises from 0% to 58.97%. Finally,
the DoS (Hulk) class recall rises from 98.56% to 99.50% as shown in Table 7.11.
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Table 7.9
Benign-PortScan-DoS (Slowloris) Classification (5-fold cross-validation)




1- Fwd STD Packet Length
2- Bwd Min Packet Length
3- Bwd mean time between the first
packet and each successive packet
4- Fwd mean time between the first
packet and each successive packet















































Benign-PortScan-DoS (SlowHTTPTest) Classification (5-fold cross-validation)




1- Fwd Mean Packet Length
2- Fwd STD Packet Length
3- Fwd Max Packet Length
4- Bwd mean time between the first
packet and each successive packet
5- Fwd mean time between the first

















































Benign-PortScan-DoS (Hulk) Classification (5-fold cross-validation)




1- Fwd Mean Packet Length
2- Fwd Max Packet Length
3- Fwd Number of RST Flags
4- Fwd Number of Push Flags














































Figure 7.4 shows the effect of using flow aggregation features on the recall of attack
classes in a three-class classification problem. Flow aggregation shows its significance












Without Aggregation With Aggregation
Figure 7.4
Multi-class Classification — Impact of Flow Aggregation on Recall of the Second Attack Class
(Benign-PortScan-Attack)
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7.4.3 Five-Class Classification Results
The final classification experiment is a five-class classification one. It combines all
classes of interest into a more complex classification problem. The RFE ranking in the
five-class classification is 1 for “Number of Flows” and 2 for “Source Ports Delta”, out
of 30 features. This indicates the high significance of the proposed features.
The precision, recall, and F1-Score are presented in Table 7.12, for when the RFE
five features are used. Two observations are noted; (i) the recall of DoS (Slowloris)
rises from 1.40% to 67.81%. (ii) The recall of Dos (SlowHTTPTest) rises from 0% to
4.64% only. This is not because the new features were insignificant, but because the
model classified DoS (SlowHTTPTest) as DoS (Slowloris). Flow aggregation features
were used to discriminate benign-mimicking attacks from benign traffic but not to
discriminate the attacks from each other. Without the aggregation features, 82.84% of
DoS (SlowHTTPTest) attack instances are classified as benign, however, this drops to
58% when the flow aggregation features are used.
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Table 7.12
Five-Classes Classification - 1 (5-fold cross-validation)




1- Fwd Mean Packet Length
2- Bwd Mean Inter-arrival time
3- Fwd mean time between the first
packet and each successive packet
4- bwd mean time between the first
packet and each successive packet









































































To overcome this low recall, five more features are added by choosing the next
top ones that are selected by RFE. The addition of new features results in an input
layer of 10 neurons. Therefore, the ANN architecture was updated to have 8 neurons
instead of 3 in the hidden layer. The results of this classification experiment are
summarised in Table 7.13. The rise in the recall for the attack classes with and
without flow aggregation features is as follows; from 33.94% to 80.39% and 21.45% to
64.91%, for DoS (Slowloris) and DoS (SlowHTTPTest), respectively. This behaviour
is visualised in Figure 7.5. It is important to mention that while there is a rise in the
recall of all classes, this rise is more significant for the attack classes that mimic benign
behaviour. This demonstrates the inability of bidirectional flow features to discriminate
benign-mimicking attacks solely compared to the other attack, as well as the improved
effect flow aggregation features have. This is reasoned by the nature of these attacks
which are crafted to bypass detection mechanisms.
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Table 7.13
Five-Classes Classification - 2 (5-fold cross-validation)






6- Fwd Max Inter-arrival time
7- Fwd STD Inter-arrival time
8- Fwd Number of Reset Flags
9- Fwd Number of Bytes




















































































Without Aggregation With Aggregation
Figure 7.5
Multi-class Classification — Impact of Flow Aggregation on the Classes Recall)
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7.4.4 CICIDS2017 Zero-Day Attack Detection Reassessed
In Chapter 6, the autoencoder capability to detect zero-day attacks was discussed and
evaluated. Three attack categories were identified based on their detection; (i) attack
classes that are detected with high accuracy, (ii) attack classes that experience a rise in
the detection accuracy with lower thresholds, and (iii) attack classes that were detected
with low accuracy. The last category is of interest in this section.
The attacks that were detected with low accuracy were hard to discriminate
from benign behaviour, therefore their reconstruction error was below the zero-day
threshold. After observing how flow aggregation features are effective in classifying
attacks that mimic benign traffic, the autoencoder zero-day detection model is
reassessed using these additional features. The same model parameters that are
discussed in Chapter 6 are used.
Table 7.14 lists the zero-day detection accuracies when flow aggregation features
are used alongside bidirectional flow ones. The results show a high detection rate of all
the attacks, including the third category (attacks that were detected with low accuracy
without flow aggregation features). Similarly, Table 7.14 shows the rise in attack
detection accuracy and a decrease in benign class detection with lower thresholds,
compared with Table 6.2.
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Table 7.14
Zero-Day Detection: CICIDS2017 Autoencoder Results With Flow Aggregation
Class Accuracy
Threshold 0.15 0.1 0.05
Benign (Validation) 89.5% 85.62% 67.59%
FTP Brute-force 99.81% 99.92% 100%
SSH Brute-force 99.37% 100% 100%
DoS (Slowloris) 94.12% 95.77% 100%
DoS (GoldenEye) 100% 100% 100%
DoS (Hulk) 100% 100% 100%
DoS (SlowHTTPTest) 99.91% 100% 100%
DDoS 99.79% 100% 100%
Heartbleed 99.13% 100% 100%
Web BF 99.7% 99.94% 100%
Web XSS 100% 100% 100%
Web SQL 77.78% 77.78% 100%
Infiltration - Dropbox 1 100% 100% 100%
Infiltration - Dropbox 2 100% 100% 100%
Infiltration - Dropbox 3 46.76% 68.68% 99.82%
Infiltration - Cooldisk 98.08% 100% 100%
Botnet 89.83% 98.98% 100%
PortScan 99.81% 99.85% 100%
Figure 7.6 shows the effectiveness of flow aggregation features by contrasting the
results that are discussed in this section versus the ones in Chapter 6. It is observed that
all attacks experience a better detection accuracy when the flow aggregation features
are used. This is because the additional feature abstraction provides consolidated
characteristics and information. This abstraction aids in discriminating the attacks
that mimic benign behaviour, therefore, the autoencoder reconstruction, in this case,
























Without Aggregation With Aggregation






















Without Aggregation With Aggregation














Without Aggregation With Aggregation
(c) Threshold = 0.05
Figure 7.6
CICIDS2017: Zero-day Detection using Autoencoder with and without Flow Aggregation
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7.5 Summary
Cyber attacks are becoming more complex and attackers use available knowledge to
tailor attacks that can bypass detection methods. This chapter proposes an additional
abstraction level of network flow features. The aim is to improve the cyber attack
classification performance, specifically for attacks that mimic benign traffic behaviour.
Traditional network traffic features prove powerful when combined with sufficient
training examples to train ML-based classifiers, and the trained models are capable
of classifying cyber attacks. However, cyber attacks that are not distinctive are left
undetected. The idea proposed in this chapter is based on aggregating bidirectional
flows to bundles and computing bundle-specific features. Once the features are
computed, the values are populated back to the bidirectional flows. The advantage
of this additional feature abstraction level is that the bidirectional flows have some
additional information about the flows in the same bundle (sibling flows).
In this chapter, two flow aggregation features are used and evaluated using
CICIDS2017 dataset. Four cyber attack classes are used besides benign class; DoS
(Slowloris), DoS (SlowHTTPTest), DoS (Hulk), and Portscan. Three classification
experiments are conducted; binary classification, three-class classification, and
five-class classification. The results demonstrate the validity and effectiveness of the
proposed feature abstraction. This is shown in the rise of recall for attack classes. For
example, the recall of the DoS (Slowloris) attack increased from 83.69% to 91.31%
using binary classification, from 78.25% to 99.09% using three-class classification,
and finally, from 33.94% to 80.39% using multi-class classification.
Furthermore, the flow aggregation features are used to reassess the autoencoder
zero-day detection model. The results demonstrate an increase in the detection of all
attacks compared to the results previously discussed in Chapter 6. The code is available
on GitHub at https://github.com/AbertayMachineLearningGroup/flow-aggregation.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions and Future Work
8.1 Conclusion
IDS are systems that monitor and analyse network traffic to detect anomalies and
cyber attacks. Various ML techniques have been utilised in the past decade to build
IDS. The predominant use of ML techniques is due to the sophistication and pace at
which new cyber attacks emerge. The work presented in this thesis investigates the
use of ML techniques to build special-purpose IDS. Moreover, this thesis investigates
utilising novel DL techniques that are used in other research domains to build towards
the next-generation IDS to improve their efficiency and effectiveness.
Based on the background presented in Chapter 2 and the analysis of the
past decade of IDS in Chapter 3, the following observations are highlighted:
(i) the underrepresentation of new cyber attacks in IDS datasets. (ii) the lack of
special-purpose network IDS datasets, and (iii) the dominance of ML techniques usage
to build IDS. Consequently, the objectives of this research are outlined.
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In Chapter 4 two case studies of utilising ML techniques to build special-purpose
IDS are presented; one for a SCADA network and the other for an IoT network. Six
ML techniques are utilised, namely; LR, NB, k-NN, SVM, DT, and RF.
The first dataset simulates a CI that controls a water SCADA system. The dataset
consists of 14 real-world scenarios that cover hardware failures, sabotage, and cyber
attacks. Three experiments are conducted. The first experiment performs a binary
classification (i.e., normal versus anomaly classes). The second experiment classifies
the affected component (i.e., none in case of normal operation or the affected
component by an anomaly or a cyber attack). Finally, the third experiment aims to
classify the occurring scenario.
The evaluation of the three experiments shows that k-NN, DT, and RF outperform
NB, SVM, and LR. This is owed to the non-linearity of the dataset features, which
represents the CI networks setup. In this setup, normal operations and anomalies can
overlap [232]. The accuracy reached 94.12% for the binary classification, 82.71% for
the affected components, and 95.49% for the scenario classification. On account of
the scenario overlapping problem, a confidence interval is used to report the highest
probable scenario or two probable scenarios when the confidence is below the accepted
interval.
The second dataset is generated and collected using a simulated IoT network that
is based on MQTT protocol (a well-established machine-to-machine communication
protocol) [212]. The MQTT-IoT-IDS2020 dataset covers normal operations and four
cyber attack scenarios. After the dataset collection phase, three levels of feature
abstraction are generated; namely, packet-based, unidirectional flow, and bidirectional
flow.
The overall accuracy reached 88.55% when using packet-based features, 99.98%,
and 99.9% when using unidirectional and bidirectional flow features, respectively.
Furthermore, the recall demonstrated that the two classes for which performances
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improved using flow-based features, are the benign class and MQTT-Brute-Force
attack class. This is because in an IoT setup, generic attacks (such as scanning) are
distinctive from IoT traffic behaviour. However, the challenge lies in MQTT-based
attacks (protocol-based attacks) as they rely on the known MQTT communication
commands, thus coinciding with normal traffic.
The main contributions of this Chapter are summarised as follows:
• Conducting three experiments on a SCADA dataset. The dataset covers real-life
cyber attacks, sabotage, and hardware failure scenarios.
• Analysing the class overlapping problem when classifying anomalies in SCADA
networks.
• Generating and analysing a novel dataset; MQTT-IoT-IDS2020. The dataset
comprises benign, generic cyber attack and MQTT-based attack scenarios.
• Evaluating the significance of using high-level (flow-based) features to build IDS
for IoT networks.
• Examining the different needs of MQTT-based versus generic attack detection,
which emphasise the special setup and, thus the needs of IoT networks.
In Chapter 5 a One-Shot learning model that can learn from limited data is
presented. This aims to resolve the proportional relation between the amount of
required data and the size of the ML model. To this end, this chapter proposes a novel
model to build IDS. This model is based on Siamese networks which differentiate
between classes based on pair similarities rather than specific class discriminating
features. Learning from similarities requires less data for training and provides the
ability to introduce and classify new cyber attacks after training.
The Siamese network model is evaluated in three scenarios. The first one evaluates
the validity of similarity-based learning for IDS usage. This is performed by assessing
the ability of Siamese networks to classify attacks (i.e., differentiate between attacks)
using pair similarity solely. The second scenario assesses the flexibility of the proposed
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Siamese network model to classify a new cyber attacks without retraining using a few
samples of this new attack. Finally, in the third scenario, the Siamese network model
is evaluated to flag zero-day attacks alongside classifying known attacks (attacks that
are included in training).
Four datasets are used for evaluation; namely, SCADA, CICIDS2017, NSL-KDD,
and KDD Cup’99. In the classification scenario. the accuracy of the first dataset
(SCADA) is 76.06%. However, it is seen that the classes either have high classification
accuracy (reaching 100%) or a low accuracy (less than 50%). This is due to the
class overlapping problem of the SCADA dataset and its multi-label nature, where
classes are not mutually exclusive. The Siamese network cannot discriminate highly
overlapping classes only using similarity. By observing the classification results, it is
proved that Siamese network can discriminate classes that overlap with at most 7 other
classes (in a dataset of 14 classes).
For the CICIDS2017, the overall classification accuracy is 83.74%. The different
attack classes detection accuracies are 96.08%, 75.17%, 80.05%, and 76.55%,
respectively. The results show that using only one pair to classify attacks is not
enough. This is due to the pair selection randomness, which increases the probability
of selecting a representable pair as the number of pairs increases. Therefore, multiple
instances are used and majority voting technique decides on the class label. Similar
behaviour was noted for the NSL-KDD and KDD Cup’99 datasets with an overall
accuracy of 91.01% and 87.99%, respectively.
In the second scenario, an attack class is excluded from the Siamese network model
training. During the evaluation, a few instances from the excluded class are used as
labelled instances of a new attack. The excluded attack mimics the situation when a
new cyber attack is detected, but there are no enough instances to retrain IDS to detect
it. In this case, the proposed One-Shot learning model aims to classify this new attack,
using pair similarities, in the interim time between identifying this new attack and
collecting enough instances to retrain an IDS.
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For the CICIDS2017 dataset, the overall accuracy is 81.28% and 82.5%, when
excluding the SSH and FTP attack classes, respectively. The overall accuracy
demonstrates that the network performance is not disturbed by the attack class addition
post training when compared to 83.74% when all classes are used during training.
Moreover, the new classes detection accuracies are 73.03% and 70.03% for SSH and
FTP, respectively.
The evaluation of the NSL-KDD demonstrated that it outperforms that of the KDD
Cup’99. The detection accuracies of the DoS attack (when excluded from training)
are 40.28% for the KDD Cup’99 and 78.87% for the NSL-KDD. This is because the
NSL-KDD dataset is an enhanced version of the KDD Cup’99. Given that the new
class is not included in training, having a better representation of instances shows a
better performance, therefore, NSL-KDD performance outperforms KDD Cup’99.
This demonstrates an observation about the Siamese network training. Since the
training and evaluation are based on pairing instances from different classes, the more
representative the instances are, the better the Siamese network performance.
Finally, for the zero-day detection scenario, the Siamese network was capable
of discriminating 84.8% of the SSH and 94.17% of the DoS (Hulk) attacks in
CICIDS2017. The FTP class was detected as zero-day attack with low rate, however,
only 4.83% was classified as normal. This indicates that the Siamese network classified
the new attack as another attack but not benign behaviour. For the NSL-KDD and
KDD Cup’99 datasets 85.85%, and 72.83% of the R2L class are correctly flagged
as unknown, respectively. Similar behaviour to the CICIDS2017 dataset classes was
observed for the other attack classes in the NSL-KDD and KDD Cup’99 datasets.
This indicates the restricted capability of detecting zero-day attacks for classes that are
highly distinctive from other attack classes.
The main contributions of this Chapter can be summarised as follows:
• Proposing a novel Siamese network model to classify attacks based on learning
from similarity (few samples-based standard classifier).
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• Implementing a One-Shot Siamese network and evaluating its performance
to detect a new cyber attack class based on a few labelled samples without
retraining.
• Evaluating the use of Siamese network to detect Zero-Day attacks.
• Demonstrating the need for distinctive samples to boost the Siamese network
performance.
Chapter 6 focuses on building a model that is capable of detecting zero-day attacks.
The proposed model leverages the encoding-decoding capabilities of autoencoders.
Benign traffic is used to train the model and relying on the reconstruction error the
zero-day attacks are detected. Furthermore, the proposed autoencoder performance is
compared with a One-Class SVM.
The CICIDS2017 zero-day detection accuracy reaches 90.01%, 98.43%, 98.47%,
and 99.67% for DoS (GoldenEye), DoS (Hulk), PortScan and DDoS attacks,
respectively. The KDD Cup’99 dataset detection accuracy reached 95.21% and
NSL-KDD dataset detection accuracy reaches 92.96%.
The one-class SVM model shows its high performance in detecting zero-day
attacks for KDD Cup’99 and NSL-KDD datasets and the distinctive attack classes
from the CICIDS2017 dataset. Compared to One-Class SVM, which has proven its
effectiveness and high accuracy in novelty detection in the literature, the autoencoder
demonstrates its better detection accuracy. Both models demonstrate low FPR. Finally,
the CICIDS2017 classes that mimic benign traffic behaviour (DoS (Slowloris), DoS
(SlowHTTPTest)) experience lower detection rates by both the autoencoder and the
One-Class SVM models. This is because these attacks are launched with a behaviour
that is similar to benign traffic, thus, their reconstruction error is low.
The main contributions of this chapter are summarised as follows:
• Proposing and implementing an autoencoder model for zero-day detection IDS.
• Building an outlier detection One-Class SVM model.
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• Comparing the performance of the One-Class SVM model as a baseline
outlier-based detector to the proposed autoencoder model.
Chapter 7 proposes an additional level of feature abstraction, named “Flow
Aggregation”, to assist in detecting benign-mimicking attacks. This additional
level of feature abstraction benefits from the cumulative information of the flow
communication between nodes.
In this chapter, the focus is on the attacks that are hard to detect using bidirectional
flow features. Three classification experiments are conducted; binary classification,
three-class classification, and five-class classification. The results demonstrate the
validity and effectiveness of the proposed feature abstraction. This is shown in the
rise of recall for attack classes. For example, the recall of the DoS (Slowloris) attack
increased from 83.69% to 91.31% using binary classification, from 78.25% to 99.09%
using three-class classification, and finally, from 21.45% to 99.69% using multi-class
classification.
Finally, the flow aggregation features are used to reassess the autoencoder zero-day
detection model. The results demonstrate an increase in the detection of all attacks,
including benign mimicking ones, compared to the results presented in Chapter 6.
The main contribution of this chapter is summarised as follows:
• Introducing a higher level of abstraction for network traffic analysis by proposing
novel features to describe bundles of flows.
• Assessing the performance improvements in binary classification of cyber
attacks when these new features are utilised, particularly for attacks that mimic
benign network traffic.
• Assessing the performance improvements in multi-class classification of cyber
attacks when these new features are utilised.
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Within this thesis, different models are proposed and evaluated to address the
research questions as follows:
RQ1: How can Machine Learning be utilised to detect anomalies and attacks in
special-purpose networks (IoT and CI)?
For special-purpose IDS, ML can be utilised to detect anomalies and cyber attacks
as demonstrated in Chapter 4. Based on the chapter findings, special-purpose networks
have unique architecture based on their application. As a result, special-purpose
IDS development face different challenges compared with general-purpose ones.
Probabilistic models and confidence intervals can be used to overcome the overlapping
of anomaly scenarios. Also, flow-based features are better suited to discriminate
protocol-specific attacks.
RQ2: In an attempt to reduce the burden of needing to generate/collect large
volumes of data, can IDS models train using limited-size datasets?
Based on the Siamese network model proposed and evaluated in Chapter 5, IDS
can be trained using limited data, based on similar and dissimilar pairs. A One-Shot
learning paradigm using Siamese networks proved its applicability and effectiveness
to develop IDS. The experiments results demonstrate that Siamese networks perform
better when datasets contain representable instances from each class and minimise
class overlap.
RQ3: In order to reduce the interim period between identifying a new cyber attack
and detecting it, is there potential to build IDS that can detect new cyber attacks
without retraining?
The similarity-based learning using Siamese network presented in Chapter 5 was
found to benefit IDS development process by enabling the detection of new attacks
after initial training. Detection of new attacks is possible when a few instances are
available. This serves as an appropriate interim detection mechanism until more
samples are available and retraining takes place.
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RQ4: How can non-conventional DL techniques provide improved robustness and
accuracy for IDS when detecting zero-day attacks?
In Chapter 6, autoencoders show their ability to serve as zero-day detection models
by training on normal traffic instances only and relying on their encoding-decoding
capabilities to flag attacks. Furthermore, in Chapter 7 flow aggregation features
are proposed. These features provide an additional level of feature abstraction that
improves the classification performance for complex attacks. This is demonstrated in
classifying benign-mimicking attacks and detecting zero-day attacks that are hard to
flag.
8.2 Future Work
The research presented in this thesis can be extended as follows.
8.2.1 Special-Purpose Network IDS
The lack of special-purpose network datasets, and special-purpose IDS accordingly,
are outlined in this thesis. To fill this gap, different ML techniques are used to build
IDS for a SCADA and IoT networks.
Building on the work discussed in this thesis, investigation of other IoT-based
attacks is needed. This investigation will help in examining the unique requirements
of special-purpose IDS. This process involves the generation of new special-purpose
datasets that comprise these attacks alongside generic ones. Firstly, the generation
setup and platform of MQTT-IoT-IDS2020 dataset can be extended to include
additional components and scenarios. This will result in a larger corpus of data and
a quick generation of datasets.
Secondly, utilising multi-label classification [342], where an instance can belong to
one or more classes, to build special-purpose IDS. This would assist in improving the
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IDS performance and overcome the co-existable, inclusive and overlapping nature of
anomaly classes in these networks.
Thirdly, based on the constantly changing and different requirements for CI and IoT
networks, exploring the opportunities of transfer learning to assist in accelerating the
special-purpose IDS development is needed. This research will involve both methods
of standardising dataset generation, processing, and the applicability of different
transfer learning approaches.
8.2.2 Few-Shot Learning
This thesis proposed the use of Siamese networks as a One-Shot/Few-Shot learning
model to build a novel IDS. To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first
attempt to leverage these learning paradigms for IDS purposes. The Siamese network
demonstrated its ability to learn cyber attack similarities. As a result, the Siamese
network model is capable of detecting new attacks using a few samples and the ability
to flag unknown zero-day attacks.
Firstly, “Triplet Networks”, which are based on Siamese networks, have been
proposed in other domains to learn similar and dissimilar relation concurrently [343].
A Triplet network is composed of three identical networks that train simultaneously.
Unlike Siamese networks that learn from similar and dissimilar pairs, Triplet Networks
learn from a set of three instances (two of the same class and one from a different
class). These three instances are called; positive, anchor, negative. During training,
triplet loss is used to reduce the distance between the two instances from the same
class while increasing that of the instance from the different class [344]. Investigating
the use of Triplet networks for IDS can improve the detection accuracy in the interim
time between identifying a new attack and detecting it.
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Secondly, the pair generation is still an open research issue [288]. Research in
this direction will involve studying different approaches to pair selection, other than
random selection, and their effect on the Siamese network model.
Thirdly, the examination of Siamese network adaptability can be extended. This can
be done by evaluating the performance of introducing multiple attacks post training.
The experiments presented in this thesis outlined the Siamese network ability to
classify a new attack without retraining. Examining the model capability to multiple
attacks will extend its usage and gain.
8.2.3 Zero-Day Attack Detection
In this thesis, autoencoders are used to detect zero-day attacks by relying on their
encoding-decoding capabilities. The autoencoder performance model is compared with
the novelty detection model; One-Class SVM. This experiment can be extended to
include other IDS datasets. Furthermore, other non-conventional ML techniques can
be considered to detect zero-day attacks. For example, the use of LSTM memorisation
capabilities to learn normal operation patterns can be examined.
8.2.4 Flow Aggregation
Flow aggregation is a new direction for extracting high-level network flow features.
In this thesis, two new features are proposed and their significance is evaluated.
Introducing other flow aggregation-based features can assist in the detection
of benign-mimicking attacks. These features represent the characteristics of the
communication between different nodes during normal and attack operations.
Flow aggregation features can be proposed and evaluated on other communication
networks. An investigation of their impact on ad-hoc networks, industrial protocols,
etc. allows benefiting from the concept of the additional level of feature abstraction.
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Further work can include the generation of the flow aggregation features in a sliding
time-window scheme. Different time windows can be applied to grouping/bundling
the network flows. This experiment should examine both the impact of windowing on
the IDS detection accuracy and the trade-off between different window sizes and the
detection of various benign-mimicking attacks.
Finally, the potential of evaluating the models proposed in this thesis in real testing
setup would provide additional insights. This would further highlight the needs and
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[240] D. Dinculeană and X. Cheng, “Vulnerabilities and limitations of MQTT
protocol used between IoT devices.” Applied Sciences, vol. 9, no. 5, p. 848,
2019. https://doi.org/10.3390/app9050848
[241] C. Dietz, R. L. Castro, J. Steinberger, C. Wilczak, M. Antzek, A. Sperotto,
and A. Pras, “IoT-Botnet detection and isolation by access routers.” in 9th
International Conference on the Network of the Future (NOF). IEEE, 2018,
pp. 88–95. https://doi.org/10.1109/NOF.2018.8598138
[242] I. Hafeez, M. Antikainen, A. Y. Ding, and S. Tarkoma, “IoT-KEEPER:
Detecting malicious IoT network activity using online traffic analysis at the
edge.” IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management, vol. 17, no. 1,
pp. 45–59, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1109/TNSM.2020.2966951
[243] Vyopta, “What’s an acceptable amount of packet loss in 2019?” 19
December 2018, Accessed: 19 November, 2020. [Online]. Available:
https://www.vyopta.com/blog/video-conferencing/understanding-packet-loss/
[244] D. Abeles and M. Zioni, “MQTT-PWN, IoT exploitation & recon framework,”
Accessed: February, 2020. [Online]. Available: https://mqtt-pwn.readthedocs.
io/en/latest/index.html
231
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Section 2.4 discusses different IDS datasets and the attacks included in each. Table A.1
summarises the different institutes that contributes to the generation of the discussed
datasets alongside the details of the attack types they cover (if available).
Table A.1
IDS Datasets Remarks






Brute-force (FTP and SSH), U2R,




















8 DoS attack traces
CICIDS2017
[63]
Brute-force (FTP and SSH), 4 DoS types,
DDoS, Heartbleed, Web Attacks,
Infiltration Dropbox Download and Cool





Dataset Name Institute Attacks Remarks
CTU-13 [73] CTU University 13 captures of botnet samples
DARPA [79] MIT Lincoln Laboratory 17 DoS, 12 U2R, 15 R2L, and 10 Probing
DDoSTB [68]
Punjab Technical
University & SBS State
Technical Campus





HTTP, SMTP, SSH, IMAP, POP3, and
FTP Traffic
KDD-99 [78] University of California
Covers 24 training attack types and 14
additional types in the test data
TUIDS [70] Tezpur University
(1) TUIDS IDS dataset. (2) TUIDS Scan
dataset. (3) TUIDS DDoS dataset (22
DDoS attack types)
NSL-KDD [77] CIC Improvement of KDD’99 dataset
STA2018 [72] University of St Andrews

















15 different real situations covering cyber
attacks (DoS & Spoofing), breakdown
(Sensor Failure & Wrong connection),
sabotage (Blocked Measures & Floating
Objects)
Bot-IoT [80]
The centre of UNSW
Canberra Cyber
Attacks include DoS/DDoS, OS and





represents the data of 31 smart home IoT
devices of 27 different types
Tor-nonTor
dataset [83] CIC
7 traffic categories (Browsing, Email,




Dataset Name Institute Attacks Remarks
VPN-nonVPN
dataset [84]
14 traffic categories (VPN-VOIP,
VPN-P2P, etc.) covering Browsing, Email,





Section 3.2 provides a taxonomy of networking threats. The analysis of attacks
considered by recent IDS, with respect to the taxonomy, demonstrates the lack of
attack representation is IDS datasets. In order to represent these threats, various
tools [194, 345] can be used to initiate different attacks. Figure B.1 lists the main
tools classified by the attacks they are used to initiate. This can be used by researchers
when generating new IDS datasets. For a specific attack, the associated tools are
used to launch it, which leads to collecting the relevant traffic data. For example, for
impersonation attacks, Caffe-Latte, Wep0ff, and Cain and Abel are tools to consider.

















































































































Section 4.4 discusses the results of the SCADA scenarios classification. The full results
are listed here for completeness and reproducibility.
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Table C.1
SCADA Results: Scenarios Classification (5-fold cross-validation) - LR
Class (Scenario) Recall Precision F1-Score
LR
Normal 7.25% 83.05% 13.31%
Plastic bag 6.05% 51.75% 10.78%
Blocked measure 1 0% 0% 0%
Blocked measure 2 100% 100% 100%
Floating objects in main tank (2 objects) 81.74% 48.39% 60.76%
Floating objects in main tank (7 objects) 95.5% 84.71% 89.76%
Humidity 0% 0% 0%
Sensor Failure 86.89% 54.59% 67.05%
DoS 100% 100% 100%
Spoofing 100% 55.33% 71.24%
Wrong connection 44.1% 68.33% 53.58%
Person hitting the tanks (low intensity) 100% 100% 100%
Person hitting the tanks (med intensity) 100% 100% 100%
Person hitting the tanks (high intensity) 92.85% 85.19% 88.77%
Accuracy 60.95% 63.37% 63.37%
Table C.2
SCADA Results: Scenarios Classification (5-fold cross-validation) - NB
Class (Scenario) Recall Precision F1-Score
NB
Normal 21.54% 45.55% 29.23%
Plastic bag 0% 0% 0%
Blocked measure 1 100% 100% 100%
Blocked measure 2 100% 100% 100%
Floating objects in main tank (2 objects) 29.28% 35.69% 32.09%
Floating objects in main tank (7 objects) 96.59% 33.55% 49.79%
Humidity 100% 100% 100%
Sensor Failure 3.85% 100% 7.41%
DoS 99.68% 100% 99.84%
Spoofing 100% 44.68% 61.75%
Wrong connection 49.15% 20.44% 28.86%
Person hitting the tanks (low intensity) 100% 100% 100%
Person hitting the tanks (med intensity) 100% 100% 100%
Person hitting the tanks (high intensity) 100% 53.46% 68.28%
Accuracy 41.12% 54.4% 54.4%
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Table C.3
SCADA Results: Scenarios Classification (5-fold cross-validation) - k-NN
Class (Scenario) Recall Precision F1-Score
k-NN
Normal 76.71% 74.11% 75.37%
Plastic bag 75.91% 69.04% 72.3%
Blocked measure 1 100% 100% 100%
Blocked measure 2 100% 100% 100%
Floating objects in main tank (2 objects) 70.14% 75.98% 72.91%
Floating objects in main tank (7 objects) 96.73% 95.33% 96.01%
Humidity 100% 100% 100%
Sensor Failure 76.23% 75.12% 75.66%
DoS 100% 100% 100%
Spoofing 89.7% 94.58% 92.07%
Wrong connection 75.1% 81.95% 78.36%
Person hitting the tanks (low intensity) 100% 100% 100%
Person hitting the tanks (med intensity) 100% 100% 100%
Person hitting the tanks (high intensity) 97.26% 100% 98.58%
Accuracy 81.19% 81.51% 81.51%
Table C.4
SCADA Results: Scenarios Classification (5-fold cross-validation) - SVM
Class (Scenario) Recall Precision F1-Score
SVM
Normal 23.29% 92.35% 37.18%
Plastic bag 77.26% 56.97% 65.53%
Blocked measure 1 100% 100% 100%
Blocked measure 2 100% 100% 100%
Floating objects in main tank (2 objects) 29.28% 92.38% 44.37%
Floating objects in main tank (7 objects) 95.91% 86.08% 90.72%
Humidity 35.48% 47.41% 34.11%
Sensor Failure 89.49% 54.79% 67.95%
DoS 100% 100% 100%
Spoofing 88.86% 95.5% 92.05%
Wrong connection 44.25% 87.94% 58.76%
Person hitting the tanks (low intensity) 100% 100% 100%
Person hitting the tanks (med intensity) 100% 100% 100%
Person hitting the tanks (high intensity) 100% 100% 100%
Accuracy 70.68% 77.94% 77.94%
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Table C.5
SCADA Results: Scenarios Classification (5-fold cross-validation) - Kernel SVM
Class (Scenario) Recall Precision F1-Score
Kernel SVM
Normal 54.07% 78% 63.78%
Plastic bag 77.76% 58.65% 66.86%
Blocked measure 1 100% 100% 100%
Blocked measure 2 100% 100% 100%
Floating objects in main tank (2 objects) 29.28% 92.1% 44.33%
Floating objects in main tank (7 objects) 95.09% 86.51% 90.59%
Humidity 100% 100% 100%
Sensor Failure 87.07% 61.84% 72.31%
DoS 100% 100% 100%
Spoofing 87.35% 90.81% 89.03%
Wrong connection 45.9% 97.38% 62.33%
Person hitting the tanks (low intensity) 100% 100% 100%
Person hitting the tanks (med intensity) 100% 100% 100%
Person hitting the tanks (high intensity) 98.64% 100% 99.31%
Accuracy 74.78% 79.26% 79.26%
Table C.6
SCADA Results: Scenarios Classification (5-fold cross-validation) - DT
Class (Scenario) Recall Precision F1-Score
DT
Normal 74.91% 74.72% 74.8%
Plastic bag 70.02% 70.38% 70.18%
Blocked measure 1 100% 100% 100%
Blocked measure 2 100% 100% 100%
Floating objects in main tank (2 objects) 75.66% 74.72% 75.12%
Floating objects in main tank (7 objects) 96.05% 96.32% 96.18%
Humidity 100% 100% 100%
Sensor Failure 74.01% 74.57% 74.28%
DoS 100% 99.06% 99.52%
Spoofing 91.35% 91.11% 91.23%
Wrong connection 77% 76.46% 76.67%
Person hitting the tanks (low intensity) 100% 100% 100%
Person hitting the tanks (med intensity) 98.93% 100% 99.45%
Person hitting the tanks (high intensity) 99.66% 100% 99.83%
Accuracy 80.38% 80.41% 80.41%
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Table C.7
SCADA Results: Scenarios Classification (5-fold cross-validation) - RF
Class (Scenario) Recall Precision F1-Score
RF
Normal 76.21% 74.27% 75.22%
Plastic bag 72.81% 70.79% 71.76%
Blocked measure 1 100% 99.57% 99.78%
Blocked measure 2 99.31% 100% 99.65%
Floating objects in main tank (2 objects) 77.53% 74.02% 75.67%
Floating objects in main tank (7 objects) 97.82% 95.65% 96.71%
Humidity 100% 100% 100%
Sensor Failure 76.05% 74.95% 75.48%
DoS 99.68% 100% 99.84%
Spoofing 90.8% 93.62% 92.19%
Wrong connection 74.1% 80.89% 77.31%
Person hitting the tanks (low intensity) 100% 100% 100%
Person hitting the tanks (med intensity) 100% 99.66% 99.83%
Person hitting the tanks (high intensity) 99.66% 100% 99.83%
Accuracy 81.19% 81.35% 81.35%
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Appendix D
Siamese One-Shot Learning Results
Tables
In Section 5.6, the proposed Siamese network model is evaluated on classifying a
new cyber attack class without the need for retraining. An attack class is excluded
from training, one at a time, and used to mimic a new cyber attack with a few
instances available. For completeness and transparency, the following subsections list
the confusion matrices of the different attacks in the four datasets that are used for



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Siamese Network: SCADA One-Shot Accuracy (Wrong Connection excluded from Training)





(j) Accuracy TPR FNR TNR FPR
1 65.13% 3.75% 0.8% 23.35% 76.65%
5 67.87% 1.85% 0.9% 30% 70%
10 69.32% 1.45% 0.35% 28.4% 71.6%
15 69.37% 1.5% 0.45% 28.65% 71.35%
20 69.8% 1.25% 0.35% 28.2% 71.8%
25 69.8% 0.95% 0.4% 28% 72%
30 70.05% 0.6% 0.3% 28.45% 71.55%
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Table D.3




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(j) Accuracy TPR FNR TNR FPR
1 65.29% 31.25% 15.1% 23.3% 76.7%
5 65.87% 27.9% 21.2% 31.35% 68.65%
10 65.6% 32% 21.2% 29.7% 70.3%
15 65.83% 36.75% 20% 27.5% 72.5%
20 65.63% 39% 19.2% 26.75% 73.25%
25 65.86% 42.55% 18.8% 26.85% 73.15%
30 65.85% 43.95% 18.15% 25.4% 74.6%
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Table D.5




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(j) Accuracy TPR FNR TNR FPR
1 64.4% 18.5% 18.2% 19.65% 80.35%
5 67.44% 14.05% 21.55% 23.75% 76.25%
10 68.78% 16.15% 14.85% 19.25% 80.75%
15 68.94% 16.45% 12.45% 14.65% 85.35%
20 69.49% 17.4% 10.35% 13.15% 86.85%
25 69.74% 18.7% 8.2% 12.7% 87.3%
30 69.92% 19.95% 7.4% 10.35% 89.65%
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Table D.7




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(j) Accuracy TPR FNR TNR FPR
1 71.05% 19.05% 19.2% 35.15% 64.85%
5 74.4% 16.9% 26.45% 48.45% 51.55%
10 74.83% 12.15% 27.4% 48.15% 51.85%
15 75.15% 12.3% 27.15% 46.7% 53.3%
20 75.24% 11.45% 26.1% 47.5% 52.5%
25 75.23% 10.8% 25.3% 46.85% 53.15%
30 75.23% 10.7% 25.45% 47.45% 52.55%
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Table D.9






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































Siamese Network: SCADA One-Shot Accuracy (Person Hitting Low Intensity excluded from





(j) Accuracy TPR FNR TNR FPR
1 58.55% 85.9% 0% 15.5% 84.5%
5 61.79% 97.35% 0% 22.75% 77.25%
10 61.79% 99.15% 0% 20.1% 79.9%
15 61.77% 99.8% 0% 19.1% 80.9%
20 61.5% 99.95% 0% 18.05% 81.95%
25 61.49% 99.95% 0% 18.3% 81.7%
30 61.2% 100% 0% 17.65% 82.35%
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Table D.11
Siamese Network: SCADA One-Shot Confusion Matrix (j = 5) (Person Hitting Medium





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































Siamese Network: SCADA One-Shot Accuracy (Person Hitting Medium Intensity excluded





(j) Accuracy TPR FNR TNR FPR
1 56.04% 73.8% 0.3% 13.4% 86.6%
5 58.24% 87.9% 0.1% 12.75% 87.25%
10 59.55% 96.5% 0% 7.3% 92.7%
15 60.1% 97.1% 0% 4.5% 95.5%
20 60.27% 98.7% 0% 2.5% 97.5%
25 60.63% 98.8% 0% 1.5% 98.5%
30 60.58% 99.25% 0% 1.3% 98.7%
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Table D.13






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































Siamese Network: SCADA One-Shot Accuracy (7 Floating Objects excluded from Training)





(j) Accuracy TPR FNR TNR FPR
1 78.27% 48.25% 0.95% 43.8% 56.2%
5 81.49% 54.45% 0.8% 61.1% 38.9%
10 82.29% 54.45% 0.65% 66.95% 33.05%
15 82.87% 54.35% 0.7% 70.35% 29.65%
20 83.13% 54.45% 0.65% 72.55% 27.45%
25 83.28% 54.5% 0.75% 74.3% 25.7%
30 83.38% 54.4% 0.75% 75.05% 24.95%
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Table D.15






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































Siamese Network: SCADA One-Shot Accuracy (2 Floating Objects excluded from Training)





(j) Accuracy TPR FNR TNR FPR
1 69.9% 21.05% 0% 38.5% 61.5%
5 72.81% 20.05% 0% 57.1% 42.9%
10 73.1% 17.6% 0% 58.85% 41.15%
15 73% 14.8% 0% 60.35% 39.65%
20 72.89% 13.1% 0% 61.6% 38.4%
25 72.73% 12.4% 0% 61.55% 38.45%
30 72.59% 11.25% 0% 61.75% 38.25%
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Table D.17




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(j) Accuracy TPR FNR TNR FPR
1 58.44% 80.9% 2.85% 12.9% 87.1%
5 60.45% 96.85% 0.65% 9.9% 90.1%
10 62.07% 99.35% 0.05% 4.3% 95.7%
15 62.65% 99.95% 0% 2.7% 97.3%
20 62.91% 100% 0% 1.6% 98.4%
25 63.16% 100% 0% 0.5% 99.5%
30 63.17% 100% 0% 0.45% 99.55%
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Table D.19






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































Siamese Network: SCADA One-Shot Accuracy (Blocked Measure 2 excluded from Training)





(j) Accuracy TPR FNR TNR FPR
1 75.99% 100% 0% 43.4% 56.6%
5 78.96% 100% 0% 56.8% 43.2%
10 80.15% 100% 0% 61.3% 38.7%
15 80.7% 100% 0% 62.65% 37.35%
20 80.94% 100% 0% 64.6% 35.4%
25 81.1% 100% 0% 65.2% 34.8%








































































Siamese Network: CICIDS2017 One-Shot Accuracy (DoS (Slowloris) excluded from Training)





(j) Accuracy TPR FNR TNR FPR
1 70.89% 50.97% 11.50% 72.65% 27.35%
5 81.07% 67.07% 9.57% 88.45% 11.55%
10 82.67% 71.38% 7.38% 89.48% 10.52%
15 82.85% 72.20% 7.18% 89.37% 10.63%
20 83.01% 72.77% 6.85% 89.67% 10.33%
25 82.98% 72.93% 6.58% 89.65% 10.35%
30 82.94% 72.82% 6.68% 89.70% 10.30%
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Table D.23




































































Siamese Network: CICIDS2017 One-Shot Accuracy (DoS (Hulk) excluded from Training)





(j) Accuracy TPR FNR TNR FPR
1 72.28% 91.07% 4.90% 58.05% 41.95%
5 80.81% 95.13% 1.30% 71.90% 28.10%
10 82.59% 95.22% 1.22% 75.58% 24.42%
15 82.54% 95.23% 1.20% 74.67% 25.33%
20 82.86% 95.20% 1.20% 76.02% 23.98%
25 82.76% 95.20% 1.15% 75.50% 24.50%
30 82.93% 95.18% 1.22% 76.15% 23.85%
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Table D.25
Siamese Network: KDD Cup’99 One-Shot Confusion Matrix (j = 5) (U2R excluded from
Training)
Predicted Class
























































D.3 KDD Cup’99 Dataset
Table D.26






(j) Accuracy TPR FNR TNR FPR
1 70.69% 21.40% 17.28% 59.27% 40.73%
5 75.72% 22.50% 15.97% 69.10% 30.90%
10 76.26% 21.82% 17.17% 72.18% 27.82%
15 76.33% 21.83% 17.15% 72.52% 27.48%
20 76.31% 21.48% 17.52% 72.72% 27.28%
25 76.34% 21.45% 17.55% 72.77% 27.23%
30 76.33% 21.27% 17.73% 72.90% 27.10%
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Table D.27
Siamese Network: KDD Cup’99 One-Shot Confusion Matrix (j = 5) (R2L excluded from
Training)
Predicted Class































































(j) Accuracy TPR FNR TNR FPR
1 67.75% 38.48% 25.95% 59.65% 40.35%
5 74.2% 35.80% 28.37% 71.47% 28.53%
10 77.27% 42.22% 23.85% 74.38% 25.62%
15 78.34% 46.65% 22.05% 74.50% 25.50%
20 78.94% 49.18% 21.45% 74.62% 25.38%
25 79.44% 51.32% 20.72% 74.65% 25.35%
30 79.87% 53.35% 20.65% 74.55% 25.45%
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Table D.29
Siamese Network: KDD Cup’99 One-Shot Confusion Matrix (j = 5) (Probe excluded from
Training)
Predicted Class































































(j) Accuracy TPR FNR TNR FPR
1 66.72% 15.72% 11.77% 65.72% 34.28%
5 72.23% 10.20% 11.98% 75.25% 24.75%
10 72.59% 5.90% 13.30% 78.65% 21.35%
15 72.35% 4.82% 13.08% 78.57% 21.43%
20 72.26% 3.58% 13.50% 79.20% 20.80%
25 72.17% 3.05% 13.55% 79.23% 20.77%
30 72.07% 2.17% 13.98% 79.62% 20.38%
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Table D.31
Siamese Network: NSL-KDD Cup’99 One-Shot Confusion Matrix (j = 5) (U2R excluded
from Training)
Predicted Class
































































(j) Accuracy TPR FNR TNR FPR
1 72.42% 34.37% 35.55% 66.58% 33.42%
5 77.04% 33.32% 36.52% 75.50% 24.50%
10 77.08% 30.42% 36.95% 77.85% 22.15%
15 77.19% 30.20% 36.70% 78.22% 21.78%
20 77.12% 29.37% 36.67% 78.52% 21.48%
25 77.14% 28.85% 36.72% 78.87% 21.13%
30 77.12% 28.30% 37.10% 79.25% 20.75%
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Table D.33
Siamese Network: NSL-KDD Cup’99 One-Shot Confusion Matrix (j = 5) (R2L excluded
from Training)
Predicted Class































































(j) Accuracy TPR FNR TNR FPR
1 74.5% 46.05% 38.13% 74.73% 25.27%
5 80.16% 45.98% 42.10% 86.65% 13.35%
10 80.79% 46.82% 41.58% 88.07% 11.93%
15 81.09% 49.02% 39.88% 87.72% 12.28%
20 81% 48.62% 40.38% 87.90% 12.10%
25 80.95% 48.37% 40.63% 87.88% 12.12%
30 80.91% 48.20% 40.93% 87.93% 12.07%
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Table D.35
Siamese Network: NSL-KDD Cup’99 One-Shot Confusion Matrix (j = 5) (Probe excluded
from Training)
Predicted Class































































(j) Accuracy TPR FNR TNR FPR
1 70.62% 18.80% 24.78% 77.53% 22.47%
5 75.31% 9.42% 28.28% 89.82% 10.18%
10 75.2% 4.83% 28.82% 91.08% 8.92%
15 75.12% 4.05% 29.08% 91.18% 8.82%
20 75.11% 3.47% 29.20% 91.45% 8.55%
25 75% 3.02% 29.55% 91.35% 8.65%
30 74.94% 2.68% 29.68% 91.33% 8.67%
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Appendix E
Siamese Zero-Day Detection Results
Tables
In Section 5.7, the proposed Siamese network model is evaluated on detecting
unknown (zero-day) attacks based on pair similarity. Relying on the similarity, an
attack is classified as unknown, if its similarity is less than a given threshold (i.e., the
difference with all known classes is high). An attack class is excluded from training,
one at a time, and used to mimic a zero-day attack. For completeness and transparency,
the following subsections list the zero-day detection performance of the different




Siamese Network: SCADA Zero-Day Accuracy (Wrong Connection excluded from Training)












(j) Unknown Normal Normal Unknown Unknown
1 68.17% 99.5% 0.15% 13.15% 55.25% 15.44%
5 71.8% 99.55% 0.25% 14.25% 53.55% 12.16%
10 69.59% 99.95% 0.05% 5.5% 64.35% 15.63%
15 71.52% 99.9% 0.1% 6.8% 62.25% 13.21%
20 70.16% 99.95% 0.05% 3.65% 66.2% 15.06%
25 69.26% 99.95% 0.05% 2.1% 67.9% 16.3%
30 70.4% 99.9% 0.1% 2.75% 67.1% 14.84%
Table E.2













(j) Unknown Normal Normal Unknown Unknown
1 62.78% 5.25% 16.55% 22.45% 12.6% 7.99%
5 64.49% 5.2% 22.05% 29.7% 11.1% 6.86%
10 63.8% 26.5% 14.2% 19.9% 28.75% 10.55%
15 64.15% 14.8% 18.35% 24.85% 20% 8.72%
20 64.14% 28.95% 13.35% 19.7% 30.8% 10.57%
25 64.18% 37.05% 11.25% 15.95% 39.45% 11.96%
30 64.15% 29.95% 13.35% 18.9% 33.15% 10.8%
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Table E.3













(j) Unknown Normal Normal Unknown Unknown
1 63.92% 48.45% 11.35% 17.45% 32.45% 9.18%
5 66.84% 43.15% 11.45% 20.2% 22.65% 6%
10 66.46% 55.45% 3.35% 10.25% 37.55% 8.75%
15 67.55% 47.35% 5.05% 11% 26.85% 6.21%
20 67.25% 52.45% 2.65% 6.45% 34.6% 7.43%
25 67.05% 55.6% 1.6% 4.4% 38.6% 8.15%
30 67.54% 51.25% 2.1% 4.9% 32.75% 6.71%
Table E.4













(j) Unknown Normal Normal Unknown Unknown
1 71.54% 3.95% 22.05% 35.05% 13.55% 4.08%
5 73.75% 0.7% 28.25% 45.5% 4.45% 3.59%
10 73.61% 6.75% 24.4% 41.9% 7.85% 5.36%
15 74.03% 1.05% 26.8% 44.45% 2.4% 4.05%
20 73.75% 5.25% 25% 43.9% 3.55% 5.23%
25 73.81% 8.6% 24.25% 42.75% 5.4% 5.95%
30 73.7% 4.2% 24.7% 44.6% 2.45% 5.21%
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Table E.5
Siamese Network: SCADA Zero-Day Accuracy (Person Hitting Low Intensity excluded from












(j) Unknown Normal Normal Unknown Unknown
1 54.41% 32.1% 3.4% 14.15% 13.25% 6.46%
5 57.83% 29.3% 1.55% 19.15% 13.6% 5.42%
10 48.79% 0% 0% 9.9% 29.5% 14.29%
15 58.76% 45.5% 0% 13.25% 21.85% 6.73%
20 58.65% 58.45% 0% 7.45% 30% 8.66%
25 58.37% 63.95% 0% 5.5% 36.1% 10.38%
30 58.8% 59.8% 0% 7% 31.25% 8.38%
Table E.6
Siamese Network: SCADA Zero-Day Accuracy (Person Hitting Medium Intensity excluded












(j) Unknown Normal Normal Unknown Unknown
1 52.06% 49.15% 1.7% 11.65% 22.9% 15.55%
5 53.94% 25.6% 0.55% 11.15% 16.65% 12.1%
10 52.15% 31% 0% 4.6% 28.9% 19.19%
15 53.91% 15.85% 0% 4.3% 19.75% 13.81%
20 52.66% 18.45% 0% 2.3% 25.2% 17.21%
25 51.84% 19.8% 0% 1.15% 28.65% 19.88%
30 52.76% 11.75% 0% 1.5% 22.5% 16.38%
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Table E.7
Siamese Network: SCADA Zero-Day Accuracy (7 Floating Object excluded from Training)












(j) Unknown Normal Normal Unknown Unknown
1 79.26% 58.55% 1.6% 43.8% 7.3% 0.81%
5 82.11% 58.55% 1% 61.2% 1.55% 0.18%
10 81.96% 58.85% 0.65% 61% 8.2% 0.78%
15 83.08% 58.45% 0.7% 70.1% 0.75% 0.12%
20 83.09% 58.65% 0.6% 70.75% 2.95% 0.35%
25 83.11% 58.75% 0.6% 70.7% 5.35% 0.6%
30 83.49% 58.45% 0.7% 73.95% 1.55% 0.2%
Table E.8
Siamese Network: SCADA Zero-Day Accuracy (2 Floating Objects excluded from Training)












(j) Unknown Normal Normal Unknown Unknown
1 67.63% 0% 0% 38.5% 8.15% 4.55%
5 71.08% 0% 0% 56.85% 3.8% 3.53%
10 70.36% 0% 0% 51.8% 12.45% 4.83%
15 71.43% 0% 0% 59.3% 3.35% 3.54%
20 71.08% 0% 0% 58.35% 6.45% 3.97%
25 70.81% 0% 0% 57% 10.2% 4.3%
30 71.17% 0% 0% 61% 5.05% 3.69%
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Table E.9













(j) Unknown Normal Normal Unknown Unknown
1 52.6% 26.25% 11% 12.35% 18.35% 12.85%
5 55.92% 24.25% 7.9% 11.45% 10.75% 9.78%
10 56.94% 52.2% 1.25% 3.95% 20.55% 16.2%
15 58.47% 37.05% 1.4% 4.1% 10% 11.05%
20 58.79% 53.6% 0.4% 2.3% 14.45% 13.64%
25 58.75% 64.5% 0% 1.6% 19.05% 15.83%
30 59.54% 54.55% 0.05% 1.25% 13.05% 12.45%
Table E.10
Siamese Network: SCADA Zero-Day Accuracy (Blocked Measure 2 excluded from Training)












(j) Unknown Normal Normal Unknown Unknown
1 68.69% 0% 0% 42.55% 10.25% 0.86%
5 71.8% 0% 0% 55.6% 3.4% 0.24%
10 72.48% 0% 0% 54.9% 8.9% 1.31%
15 73.43% 0% 0% 61.05% 2.3% 0.28%
20 73.54% 0% 0% 61.6% 4.3% 0.65%
25 73.59% 0% 0% 61% 5.5% 0.87%
30 73.96% 0% 0% 64.6% 1.7% 0.34%
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Table E.11
Siamese Network: SCADA Zero-Day Accuracy (Blocked Measure 1 excluded from Training)












(j) Unknown Normal Normal Unknown Unknown
1 69.38% 0% 0% 40.65% 8.55% 4.72%
5 72.33% 0% 0% 59.55% 1.6% 4.07%
10 72.3% 0% 0% 59.7% 6.7% 5.32%
15 73.45% 0% 0% 66.95% 0.85% 4.38%
20 73.18% 0% 0% 66.35% 3.15% 4.88%
25 72.97% 0% 0% 64.95% 4.85% 5.18%
30 73.41% 0% 0% 68.6% 1.35% 4.78%
E.2 CICIDS2017 Dataset
Table E.12













(j) Unknown Normal Normal Unknown Unknown
1 56.57% 31.82% 3.75% 38.43% 53.3% 23.09%
5 64.64% 11.48% 4.83% 61.92% 32.93% 10.34%
10 64.22% 12.27% 3.62% 58.88% 37.73% 11.59%
15 65.63% 10.22% 4.87% 67.23% 29.33% 10.76%
20 65.39% 11.38% 4.02% 65.03% 31.8% 11.31%
25 65.19% 11.67% 3.77% 63.82% 33.15% 11.63%
30 65.84% 11.03% 4.35% 67.6% 29.37% 11.24%
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Table E.13
Siamese Network: CICIDS2017 Zero-Day Accuracy (DoS (Slowloris) excluded from Training)












(j) Unknown Normal Normal Unknown Unknown
1 67.45% 71.65% 6.33% 49.87% 41.8% 21.54%
5 80.56% 76.28% 4.35% 73.8% 21.17% 8.82%
10 82.46% 87.58% 2% 72.97% 24.32% 10.94%
15 83.61% 86.72% 2.52% 79.2% 18.08% 10.17%
20 83.53% 88.57% 2.18% 77.6% 20.1% 11.02%
25 83.59% 89.52% 1.92% 77.02% 20.78% 11.34%
30 83.95% 88.88% 2.12% 79.48% 18.28% 11.04%
E.3 KDD Cup’99 Dataset
Table E.14













(j) Unknown Normal Normal Unknown Unknown
1 60.18% 52.07% 2.62% 46.3% 46.1% 30.18%
5 71.35% 50.07% 0.13% 64.93% 26.9% 18.87%
10 72.01% 50.22% 0% 66.28% 25.63% 18.31%
15 72.51% 50.22% 0% 67.4% 24.52% 17.84%
20 72.47% 50.22% 0% 67.3% 24.62% 17.87%
25 72.5% 50.22% 0% 67.37% 24.55% 17.84%
30 72.52% 50.22% 0% 67.43% 24.48% 17.83%
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Table E.15













(j) Unknown Normal Normal Unknown Unknown
1 64.51% 55.38% 6.27% 53.63% 38.53% 25.82%
5 75.1% 53.17% 7.32% 71.1% 18.93% 16.04%
10 75.2% 53.43% 7.38% 71.93% 18.13% 16.35%
15 75.6% 53.35% 7.48% 72.53% 17.5% 15.85%
20 75.52% 53.47% 7.47% 72.5% 17.57% 16.01%
25 75.48% 53.48% 7.47% 72.47% 17.62% 16.07%
30 75.51% 53.47% 7.48% 72.52% 17.55% 16.03%
Table E.16













(j) Unknown Normal Normal Unknown Unknown
1 57.05% 75.15% 0.42% 45.32% 46.5% 38.06%
5 70.85% 68% 0.07% 64.15% 26.02% 23.04%
10 71.25% 67.65% 0.07% 65.38% 24.88% 22.77%
15 71.95% 67.4% 0.07% 66.85% 23.42% 21.97%
20 71.9% 67.38% 0.07% 66.83% 23.43% 22.03%
25 71.92% 67.38% 0.07% 66.9% 23.37% 22.02%

















(j) Unknown Normal Normal Unknown Unknown
1 54.16% 71.2% 21.82% 36.67% 59.95% 43.92%
5 66.52% 58.18% 36.4% 58.27% 39.8% 25.18%
10 67.17% 61.67% 34.38% 56.7% 42.65% 24.89%
15 68.52% 53.17% 42.97% 67.95% 31.37% 22.99%
20 68.5% 54.7% 41.58% 67.12% 32.23% 23.43%
25 68.2% 55.28% 41.02% 65.6% 33.77% 23.59%
30 68.76% 50.98% 45.32% 71.3% 28.05% 22.79%
Table E.18













(j) Unknown Normal Normal Unknown Unknown
1 61.32% 58.57% 13% 58.78% 39.8% 34.82%
5 70.01% 52.72% 16.8% 76.3% 22.55% 24.52%
10 70.08% 52.5% 17.1% 76.85% 22.03% 24.62%
15 71.31% 52.28% 17.27% 77.15% 21.72% 22.56%
20 71.27% 52.28% 17.25% 77.12% 21.77% 22.62%
25 71.32% 52.38% 17.25% 77.08% 21.8% 22.57%
30 71.59% 52.33% 17.27% 77.08% 21.8% 22.08%
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Table E.19













(j) Unknown Normal Normal Unknown Unknown
1 52.48% 19.12% 6.1% 64.17% 33.8% 38.43%
5 61.63% 3.9% 7.58% 79.07% 19.75% 23.17%
10 61.82% 3.78% 7.48% 79.52% 19.37% 22.97%
15 62.31% 3.48% 7.78% 79.6% 19.27% 22.05%
20 62.33% 3.45% 7.82% 79.62% 19.25% 22%
25 62.36% 3.52% 7.77% 79.63% 19.23% 21.98%
30 62.38% 3.38% 7.88% 79.63% 19.23% 21.91%
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Appendix F
Autoencoder Experiment ROC Plots
In Chapter 6, an autoencoder model is evaluated on its ability to detect zero-day
attacks. Figure F.1 shows the ROC curves for each of the attacks in the CICIDS2017
































































































































































































Autoencoder Classification ROC Curves
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